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Now, more than ever, with Islamic voices
contesting politics, culture and society in prac-
tically every country with a Muslim population,
Islam would appear to have a unity and a com-
mon purpose across political and cultural fron-
tiers: to provide a common identity for Mus-
lims who wish to live in a society of their faith
and be ruled by their sacred law. This picture
can only confirm in the public mind the idea of
Islam as a common essence of all these soci-
eties, one that rules and determines their cul-
ture and their social and political processes. 
The views asserting the uniqueness, unity
and exceptionalism of Muslim society and his-
tory are all the more potent in the current
intellectual climate which has seen the demise
of universalist theories of historical causation
and social analysis such as Marxism. The idea
of cultural and civilizational essences and iden-
tities underlying unique histories of particular
civilizations have been most prominently stat-
ed in Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civiliza-
tions’ thesis. Even though this has been widely
criticized, the assumptions behind it are equal-
ly widely held, not least by many Muslim and
Arab intellectuals.
Muslim exceptionalism and uniqueness and
the centrality of religion to Muslim society and
history are, of course, the pillars of Islamist
political advocacy. Many ‘secular’ intellectuals,
specially in Egypt, while challenging Islamist
illiberal interpretations, would, nevertheless,
wish to base their own advocacies on ‘authen-
tic’ Muslim and Arab ‘culture’. Many advocates
of Human Rights, for instance, insist on deriv-
ing these rights from liberal (and strained)
interpretations of the Qu'ran and the tradi-
tions. I have encountered strong hostility to
my argument that the modern discourses of
Human Rights are products of recent political
struggles and ideologies, many of them
against the establishments of state, church
and dominant classes, and which have no
ancestry in the much older ethical and legal
discourses of any religion.
What is unique about Islam? I argue, along-
side many colleagues, against this cultural
essentialization of an exceptional ‘Islamic
world’, contrasted implicitly or explicitly with
an equally exceptional and totalized ‘West’. Of
course, every history is unique. The conceptual
tools of social and historical analyses are how-
ever common, and are used to analyse diverse
unique histories. The question also arises of
what is the object whose unique history is
being told? Does ‘Islamic society’ constitute a
unitary entity with a common and consistent
history extending to the present and underly-
ing the current ‘Islamic phenomenon’? Many
eminent writers such as the historian H.A.R.
Gibb and the anthropologist and philosopher
Ernest Gellner, have advanced arguments to
that effect. These arguments are the products
of deep scholarship and often thorough famili-
arity with the histories and cultures of the
region. The question however is conceptual:
the essentialism rests on a totalization of histo-
ries and societies as ‘Islamic’. This label cannot
be denied: yet, what commonality does it
entail? It can be argued for instance, that the
modern history (from the eighteenth century)
of Iran shows a totally different political and
social structure to that of Turkey or Egypt, let
alone Arabia. It can be plausibly argued that
the Christian and Muslim shores of the
Mediterranean shared many common features
of popular culture: Tunisian coastal cities had
more in common with Sicily and the Italian
south than with Arabia or Iraq. The manifest
reality, for instance, of women in southern
Europe covering their heads in a similar man-
ner to their Mediterranean Muslim counter-
parts seems to have escaped the notice of
observers intent on totalized contrasts!
Indeed, we can date the divergence from pre-
vious common elements between the two
shores of the Mediterranean to the second half
of the twentieth century as many Muslim
Mediterranean cities, such as Alexandria or
Algiers, became ‘peasantized’ by the great
rural influx, and European Mediterranean cities
increasingly integrated into a national culture
dominated by the North, a process accelerated
by the regional policies of the European Com-
m u n i t y .
I still have to deal with the question of what
it is that lends credence to the essentialist
arguments: what is the common denominator
which makes diverse societies Muslim beyond
the obvious fact of religion? Perhaps a good
way of answering this question is by drawing
parallels with European Christianity. The Chris-
tian world shares a universe of discourse refer-
ring to sets of institutions, doctrines and per-
sonnel: the church, the priesthood, the Holy
Trinity, the Bible, the problems of salvation and
grace. These are not restricted to the religious
sphere but have involved many spheres of cul-
ture, law, morality and family. Divorce, homo-
sexuality and abortion, for instance, continue
to be issues in the politics of several Western
countries. A good historian of Europe will tell
you however, that these entities of Church,
scriptures, law and so on, have taken vastly dif-
ferent forms and social significance at various
points in European history and in different
regions. The Medieval Catholic Church, for
instance, was a very different institution from
the eighteenth century Church and with a very
different role in society and politics.
Similarly, we find in Islam a common set of
vocabularies referring to institutions, doctrines
and personnel: the Qu'ran and Hadith (tradi-
tions of the Prophet), the ulama, the Sharica
(religious law) and many others. These have
similarly varying structures, forms of organiza-
tion and social significance over the centuries
and in different societies. Ernest Gellner in his
characterization of a constant pattern of Mus-
lim history and society, attributes a central role
to the ulama and the Sharica. His model, how-
ever, crumbles before the many different
forms of ulama organization, power, and insti-
tutions, not only in different societies and his-
tories but even within the class structure of the
same society. The elite ulama of late Ottoman
times, for instance, were integrated into the
ruling institutions and bureaucracies, while
their Iranian counterparts of the same time
constituted parts of local, decentralized power
elites with their own revenues and institutions
separate from the govenment. Both were dis-
tinct from the ulama ‘proletariat’ of their own
time, the multitude of students, preachers,
dervishes and mendicants, performing ser-
vices for the poor. Similarly, Sufism and sufi
brotherhoods, regular features of practically all
Muslim societies display a great variety of
manifestation and of relations to the main-
stream religious institutions, from elite intel-
lectual mystics counting the higher ulama in
their ranks, to illiterate rural charismatic saints
ruling peasant communities with magic, medi-
cine and ceremony.
And how do we understand these social for-
mations and their historical and geographical
variations and transformations, the logic of
their coherence and contradiction? Well, by
the same repertoire of social and historical
concepts and analyses which we use for West-
ern or any other societies. It is by these means
that we grasp the uniqueness of each manifes-
tation, not of a totalized history with an Islamic
e s s e n c e .
Finally, does the current ‘Islamic resurgence’
vindicate the essentialist position that Islam
remains the essence of Muslim society, which
is peculiarly resistant to secularization and to
separating religion from politics? I am more
convinced by the opposite argument: that cur-
rent political Islam is partly a reaction and a
defence against the secularizing processes
that have inevitably come with modernity and
which continue to have their effect on all soci-
eties in the region. Law, even where elements
of religion have remained within it, has
become codified state law, subject to political
and social exigencies; education has been
largely removed from religious spheres and
authorities (that is why these authorities are
trying, in vain, to hang on); religious authori-
ties cannot, try as they may, control the mani-
fold channels of information and entertain-
ment of the modern media; modern economic
exigencies have forced women into the labour
market and the public spheres, subverting
patriarchal authority and traditional values
(associated with religion). Only in a society so
thoroughly destroyed by successive wars such
as Afghanistan can the religious reactionaries
succeed in reversing these inexorable process-
es. Saudi Arabia, where wealth from petrol has
partly exempted the authorities from the exi-
gencies of modern socio-economic processes,
has also partly succeeded in arresting these
trends, but for how long? In Iran, the ‘mullocra-
cy’ of the Islamic Republic has had to retreat
repeatedly (but discreetly) in the face of these
contingencies. Family planning, for instance,
initially denounced by Khomeini as contrary to
Islam and an imperialist measure against Mus-
lims, was restored after a few years as govern-
ment policy. Family law, after initial reversals,
has now restored most of the Shah’s reforms
and more. Regarding working women, the
level of employment in the work force was
mostly maintained, and there is increasing par-
ticipation of women in public life, politics, the
arts, sport and even as junior judges. Crucially,
Khomeini, faced with the exigencies of gover-
nance, ruled in 1988 that in the interests of the
whole Islamic Umma, the Islamic government
is empowered to suspend any provision of the
S h a r ica, including prayer and fasting! Since
then the category of ‘interest’ (m a s l a h a) has
been written into the constitution and institu-
tionalized, opening the gates wide for prag-
matic legislation and policy. I rest my case. ♦
Dr Sami Zubaida is a reader in Politics,
D e p a r t m e n t of Politics and Sociology,
B i r k b e c k College, University of London.
It is often claimed that Islam is not only a religion but a
culture and a civilization. ‘The Islamic world’ and ‘Islam-
ic history’ are commonly used terms, both in popular
public discourse and in academic writing, suggesting
some kind of coherent unity. At the same time, writers
point to the diversity of Muslim countries from Morocco
to Indonesia, from Nigeria to Turkey. Is there a unity
behind the diversity, at least in the ‘heartlands’ of Islam
in the Middle East and North Africa, as Ernest Gellner
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The ISIM Newsletter is the principal source of infor-
mation on the activities of the International Insti-
tute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World. In
this inaugural issue you will find information on the
plans and policies of the Institute
as well as on its organization and
structure. The ISIM is an institute
under construction; its activities
are to develop in the coming
years. In order to reach its ultimate goal, the execu-
tion of innovative interdisciplinary research with an
international orientation, the ISIM needs your sup-
port and collaboration. The ISIM Newsletter is one
way of inviting individual academics and institutes
to contribute to the development of this initiative.
The ISIM operates in the broad field of the study of
modern Islam and Muslim societies and communi-
ties, a field in which a multitude of academic tradi-
tions and approaches co-exist. Many more insti-
tutes are actively involved in this field. Some of
them have been in the business for centuries, but
quite a number of them, in particular those insti-
tutes which focus explicitly on contemporary Mus-
lim movements and societies, are relatively recent.
The ISIM Newsletter pays special attention to
national and international institutes and projects
and invites them to use the ISIM Newsletter as a
means of disseminating news on their plans and
activities; as a platform for discussion and exchange;
and as a tool to help diminish the fragmentation in
the field.
In this first ISIM Newsletter an attempt is made to
mirror the multifaceted world of Islam, in particular
its broad regional spread and its highly diverse
local and supra-local expressions and practices, as
well as social and political formations. Furthermore,
a variety of research approaches are presented,
which often combine methods and principles from
various trends and traditions, most notably the
social sciences and the humani-
ties. The contents of this first edi-
tion are not meant to define the
way the ISIM should organize
and direct its research. It demon-
strates instead the broad scope of interest of the
ISIM, both thematically and regionally, and its
openness towards the diverse regional, thematic,
and methodological approaches. Undoubtedly,
many more issues in research need to be addressed.
The ISIM Newsletter primarily addresses scholarly
concerns, but seeks to disseminate expertise on
modern Islam and Muslim societies and communi-
ties to various audiences such as policy makers, the
media, non-governmental organizations, and edu-
cational institutes in general. Just as the ISIM as an
institute has to find its way and establish its reputa-
tion, the ISIM Newsletter has to create its own image
and to find ways of effective dissemination and
stimulating response. In other words, the News-
letter needs its readers’ input. In particular, we
invite you to send us information on projects, insti-
tutes, seminars, lectures and other activities which
you think should be included in the Info Pages of
the coming issues of the ISIM Newsletter. By your
comments, suggestions and critiques, the ISIM can
attain its goals of cooperation, service, and high
academic standards. ♦
Dick Douwes, e d i t o r
Dr Gevers was born in 1944 in Valkenswaard
and read Sociology at Leiden University, a
study he began in 1962. From 1967, he was
affiliated with the department of Sociology
and until 1981 was frequently exempted from
teaching duties in order to fulfil administrative
functions at the university. From 1969 to 1973
he was member of the Leiden University Coun-
cil as, among others, deputy chairman and
member of the committee of finance and plan-
ning. In 1974 he became member of the Board
of that university. He was appointed advisor
for national university planning in the Nether-
lands in 1978 and was instrumental in the
implementation of an operation to redistribute
teaching and research tasks to the Dutch uni-
versities. As Chairman of the Council of Poly-
technic Institutions from 1984 to 1988 and as
President of the University of Amsterdam from
1988 onwards, he continuously engaged him-
self in higher educational affairs. Not limiting
his endeavours to the Netherlands, he was also
active in the international arena, for which he
was conferred honoris causa a law doctorate
from New York University.
Dr Gevers advocated the concept of universi-
ties as independent institutions in the Nether-
lands that would assume their own responsi-
bilities. He cherished the university as a place
of learning, science and culture, and favoured
the foundation of institutions of learning
beyond the scope of universities, which would
function as arenas for the free exchange of
thoughts and ideas. As a true intellectual, he
was opposed to the notion of ‘political correct-
ness’ and was known to be, at times, provoca-
tive. He aspired to the classical universal ideals
of freedom, truth, justice and beauty, while
remaining realistic about the world in which
we live. His pragmatism by no means ham-
pered him from living life to the fullest, striving
to attain his ideals, and adhering to a humanis-
tic approach.
More than simply an enthusiastic Chairman
of the ISIM Board, the role he played in the
founding of the ISIM was crucial to say the
least. The ISIM, in form and in content, shall
carry on in the spirit of Dr J.K.M. Gevers.
We deeply regret his loss and will continue
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The ISIM Newsletter is a tri-annual publication of
the International Institute for the Study of Islam
i n the Modern World (ISIM). Responsibility for the
facts and opinions expressed in this publication
rests solely with the authors. Their views do not
necessarily reflect those of the Institute or its
supporters. The ISIM Newsletter is free of charge.
Dr J.K.M. Gevers
The Chairman of the board of the ISIM, Dr Jankarel
Gevers, passed away on 5 August 1998 at the age of 54.
His untimely death was a shock not only for the ISIM,
but especially for the University of Amsterdam, of which
he had been President for the last 10 years, and for all
other institutions and organizations in which he was
a c t i v e .
E d i t o r i a l
I n t r o d u c t i o n
B Y  P R OF .  D R  W. A . L .  S T O K H O F
IS IM Di r ec to r  i n  C ha rg e
In addition to opening its doors
officially, the International
Institute for the Study of Islam
i n the Modern World (ISIM)
would like to simultaneously
open itself to your cooperation.
This Newsletter, which
complements the ISIM Website,
is to be the main mode of
disseminating information
about the Institute and its
activities. 
At this crucial stage in the
design of research programmes,
I would like to solicit your
participation to ensure that the
ISIM attains its goals of service to
the academic community as well
as to society at large. In order to
set and maintain high standards
of research, the ISIM must
establish itself firmly in the
national and international
academic environments. This,
we feel, can only be effective
through concerted efforts.
As the ISIM aspires to
international, interdisciplinary
collaboration, colleagues from
Asia, Africa, the Middle East,
t h e Americas, Australasia, and
Europe are asked to contribute
through their ideas and
suggestions. Sounding board
meetings are to be held to offer
a structured venue for the dual
purpose of introducing the
Institute and welcoming
international input. Calls for
research project proposals will
be announced regularly in this
Newsletter, but please feel free
to contact us in the meantime
with any comments or
s u g g e s t i o n s .♦
O B I T U A R Y
ISIM NewsI S I M  N E W S L E T T E R  1 / 9 8 3
I n s t i t u t e
I S I M Research Approaches
and Thematic Profile
International Institute for the Study of I s l a m
i n t h e Modern World
The Institute’s raison d’être, however, is the
fact that developments of great intellectual,
social and political importance in the Muslim
world have remained seriously under-
researched in the social sciences and humani-
ties. The Institute’s research approaches are to
be expressly interdisciplinary: they are to be
grounded in social and cultural science theory
and methodology (which implicitly means a
rejection of obsolete essentialist conceptions
of Islam) but will attach great importance to
solid knowledge of the languages concerned
and integrate, where this is relevant, the
methodologies and accumulated insights of
such disciplines as philology, literary criticism,
Islamic studies, religious studies, history, legal
studies, etc. The approaches are to be informed
by critiques of orientalism and of positivist
social science, without dogmatically rejecting
the contributions of traditional disciplines.
The Institute will not concentrate its research
on any single geographical area in the world of
Islam. In the regional specializations of its staff,
North Africa and the Middle East, sub-Saharan
Africa, Central Asia, South and Southeast Asia, as
well as the Muslim communities of Europe/the
West will be represented. Research programmes
will be comparative in the sense that they will be
concerned with more than one region.
Thematic Profile
Some of the most remarkable recent develop-
ments in the Muslim world correspond to the
worldwide Islamic resurgence, first noticeable in
the wake of the 1967 Israeli-Arab War and
increasingly vigorous since the Iranian revolu-
tion. Political radicalism in the name of Islam is
only one aspect of this development and not
necessarily the most interesting from scholarly
points of view. Following a period of apparent
secularization (which was long believed to be
inherent to modernization processes), Islam
returned to the public sphere in most Muslim
societies with vigour. The public expression of
Islam is no longer primarily associated with the
more ‘backward’ segments of society but pre-
cisely with relatively well-educated, socially ris-
ing groups, who do not reject all modernity but
who embrace at least its technological aspects
along with various conceptions of democratiza-
tion. Recent developments in the Muslim world
seem to show that secularization is not a neces-
sary, inevitable concomitant of modernization.
The appeal of radical Islam to the rapidly
growing underclass of marginalized, unem-
ployed or underemployed youth in many Third
World cities is more often asserted than actually
demonstrated. It is true that numerous Muslim
preachers and writers address these classes or
speak in their name, but the underprivileged
often prefer quietistic, mystical-magical varieties
of Islam to the politically radical. Be this as it may,
both this potential constituency and the Muslim
discourse specifically addressing it are new to
Islam. The concern of Muslim thinkers with
increasing social inequality has given rise also to
new forms of Muslim social thought.
Intellectual Challenges
Much creative effort in the Muslim world is
directed towards the formulation of Islamic
answers to the social, political, economic and
intellectual challenges faced by these rapidly
changing societies. Due to dramatically im-
proved communication, Muslims are regularly
confronted with moral and intellectual alterna-
tives to their own convictions and values (i.e.
other religious and philosophical systems with
comparable claims to universality), in some
cases backed up by economic and military supe-
riority. They have had to reflect on such civil con-
cepts as human rights, minority group rights and
women’s rights, popular sovereignty, account-
ability, democracy, representation and self-
determination; define their attitude towards
free-market liberalism and international law; and
work out Islamic ethics of modern technological
phenomena such as gender change, in vitro fer-
tilization or cloning.
This intellectual challenge is not new, and its
beginnings of course long predate the recent
Islamic resurgence. Contemporary Muslim
thought, although experiencing a quickening
and perhaps a qualitative change, builds on the
work of several generations of predecessors.
Islamic responses to modernization (which often
means colonization and westernization) go back
to the 18th century, and they emerged in a con-
text of, though often in reaction to, a learned tra-
dition.
Islam and the State
One aspect of the resurgence is the intensified
debate on the relationship between Islam and
the State. Virtually all states in the Muslim world
have institutions and legislation that ultimately
derive from the West, either adopted in deliber-
ate imitation of, or initially imposed by, colonial
regimes and retained by the first generations of
post-colonial politicians. Efforts to accommo-
date those foreign borrowings and Islam with its
divine Law also have precedents dating back to
the 18th century, but they have significantly
intensified recently. Several states have declared
themselves Islamic and have made efforts to
properly develop Islamic alternatives to, or
adaptations of, institutions and legislation.
Other states have integrated more sharica into
their secular legislation, while also intervening in
the teaching and development of fiqh (Islamic
jurisprudence), the practice of ifta’ (issuing
authoritative opinions on questions of Muslim
law) or the codification of the sharica. Even secu-
lar regimes such as those of Turkey and Tunisia
have to make new compromises with Islam. In
states where Muslims are in a minority position,
such as India, the terms of the equation between
Islam and the State are different, but elements of
Muslim law have also entered the jurisprudence
of secular courts.
Muslim Diasporas 
The emergence of significant Muslim diaspo-
ras in the West as well as throughout the Muslim
world itself is another recent development.
Labour migration, study abroad, civil wars and
political conflicts have caused tens of millions to
spend parts of their lives, voluntarily or involun-
tarily, far away from their native lands. Muslim
expatriate communities are not a new phenom-
enon as such; Arab and Persian Muslim trading
communities have existed throughout Asia
since the first centuries of Islam and have
played a central role in the spread of Islam on
that continent. Since the 1960s, however, there
has been unprecedented growth of labour
migrant communities. Students and political
refugees have done much to organize and pro-
vide leadership to these communities, and
improved communication techniques (air trav-
el, phone and fax links, satellite television, com-
puter networks) now link these communities
with their home countries as well as with similar
communities elsewhere. Dispersed expatriate
communities have thus become integrated into
diasporas that are increasingly transnationally
organized. Islam has been an important factor
in the process of diaspora formation (the
mosque is perhaps the diasporas’ most promi-
nent institution), and it has in turn become
more important in the lives of the communities.
Debates and developments within Islam in the
home countries have an impact on the diaspo-
ras and may generate freer and more creative
debate there because of, for instance, less
restricted freedom of expression. In return,
developments in the diaspora may greatly
affect the home country.
Diasporas have inherently ambivalent rela-
tions with both their host countries and their
countries of origin. Both states perceive these
diasporas as potential threats and make efforts
to bring them under control. Members of the
diaspora may lay claims to civil rights in both
countries but often feel rejected by both as well.
Diasporas may, on the other hand, also serve as
interfaces and channels of communication
between the two countries and their cultures.
Insofar as the diasporas are increasingly
transnational, new orientations may be emerg-
ing, more diffuse than those to home and host
country. These developments are of great theo-
retical and political importance, and of direct
relevance to the ongoing debates in the Nether-
lands and other European countries on ‘multi-
cultural society’ and on ‘social cohesion’. 
Increasing mobility and improved communi-
cations have not only resulted in the formation
of significant Muslim minorities throughout
the non-Muslim world (and new immigrant
communities, both Muslim and non-Muslim, in
all Muslim countries). They have also brought
ethnic and religious minority communities in
the Muslim world (e.g. Alevis in Turkey, Ahmadis
and Shi'is in Pakistan) into closer and more reg-
ular contact with the surrounding majorities,
which has resulted in various forms of accom-
modation, adaptation, or conflict.
Transnational Islam
Related to the above is the great increase in
the flow of people and ideas across the globe
and the multiplication of centres from which
Islamic ideas are disseminated. Traditional Mus-
lim education always used to involve a certain
amount of travel to different teachers and
schools, and confrontation with different envi-
ronments; but in this respect, too, there has
been a qualitative change. Mass literacy and the
new media are reaching much wider audiences
than were ever touched by traditional Muslim
education. The same media convey also other
than Islamic messages, which forces Muslims of
all levels of education to formulate their beliefs
and values in contrast to alternatives.
A whole range of Muslim international and
transnational institutions has come into exis-
tence, from inter-governmental forums to Islam-
ic investment banks and international Islamic
universities. Some institutions, such as the Mus-
lim World League and the World Association of
Muslim Youth, have extensive international
bureaucracies and are largely deterritorialized.
Others, such as the Muslim Foundation or the
Institute for Muslim Minority Affairs, are based in
the West, which has contributed to their detach-
ment from specific national or regional ties. Mus-
lim diasporas, though not renouncing
ethnic/national ties to their home countries, are
also playing key roles in the establishment of
transnational (or non-national) Muslim institu-
tions in the ‘guest countries’.
Modern d acw a movements were once
‘national’ in that they concentrated their activi-
ties mostly in one country, but there are now a
growing number of transnational d acw a m o v e-
ments. Local forms of Islam no longer are con-
trasted primarily with a privileged (and highly
idealized) Arabian Islam as the source of inspi-
ration for reformers. New transnational forms
of Islam offer themselves as the models to be
emulated. The originally Indian movement,
Tablighi Jama'ah, has grown into a multination-
al network of d acis (‘missionaries’) stretching
from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The thought
and organization of Egypt’s Muslim Brothers
are not only emulated in other Arab states but
have had a significant impact in countries as
Turkey and Indonesia. Iranian shi'i thinkers
have, since the Islamic Revolution, exerted a
considerable influence on Muslim discourse in
many Sunni countries. A branch of Turkey’s
Nurcu movement has established an impres-
sive network of schools in the Central Asian
republics. Muslim thinkers based in European
and North American universities contribute sig-
nificantly to new Muslim discourses that are
less nationally grounded. ♦
The International Institute for the Study of Islam in the
Modern world (ISIM) promotes interdisciplinary scholar-
ship on social and intellectual trends and movements in
contemporary Muslim societies and communities. It will
coordinate and carry out research on Muslim responses to
the various challenges and opportunities associated with
modernity, modernization, and processes of globaliza-
tion. The Institute recognizes the relevance of traditional
scholarship on Islam (Arabic philology, textual studies of
the Qur'an, hadith and other texts, religious studies, etc.)
to the understanding of contemporary processes, and will
make optimal use of the available expertise in these fields.
ISIM News4 I S I M  N E W S L E T T E R  1 / 9 8
I n s t i t u t e
I S I M A Short Description
of the ISIM
The ISIM develops and conducts research on
social, cultural, economic, political and intellec-
tual developments in the Muslim world and
Muslim communities in the West. Although the
emphasis is laid upon recent and contemporary
developments, historical dimensions are taken
into account. The ISIM’s research approaches are
expressly interdisciplinary and comparative,
covering a broad geographical range encom-
passing all relevant geographical areas: North
Africa and the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa,
Central Asia, South and Southeast Asia and the
Muslim diasporas in the West. 
Borne out of a national initiative in which coop-
eration with Dutch universities and research
schools is paramount, the ISIM is also clearly
international in orientation. The ISIM will inte-
grate existing expertise in the Netherlands in its
programmes and will combine resources and
expertise of academic institutes in the West and
in the Muslim world. 
R e s e a r c h
Research constitutes the core activity of the
ISIM. The Institute follows open and flexible
research policies aimed at mobilizing scholarly
interest and support at both national and inter-
national levels. The ISIM research agenda con-
tains:
• Long-term joint research programmes;
• Ateliers, short-term joint research projects;
• Individual ISIM research projects.
The research is to be executed by the academ-
ic staff of ISIM in conjunction with PhD, Post-
doctoral and other fellows, who are recruited
nationally and internationally. ISIM Chair-hold-
ers comprise the main academic staff of the Insti-
tute. The Chair-holders are to select, design, and
execute long-term research programmes in con-
sultation with the ISIM Academic Committee
and the participating universities and research
schools. They cooperate with staff of other
national and international institutes, in particu-
lar research schools and project-proposing bod-
ies. Suggestions and proposals for research are
invited from all interested parties through
announcements in the ISIM Newsletter. Joint
proposals which link up with research in various
regions are to be given preference. Application
forms and information about the criteria for
evaluation and selection will be made available.
Long-term Research
P r o g r a m m e s
Long-term research programmes constitute
the core of the ISIM research. They will be
designed to stimulate interdisciplinary research
that concentrates on social, socio-economic,
political, and intellectual developments in the
Muslim world, particularly those that have so far
been under-researched. The programmes are
comparative in the sense that they encompass
two or more geographical regions of the Mus-
lim world. Each programme consists of a num-
ber of thematically linked projects. The pro-
grammes will be set for a maximum period of
five years. The selection, design, and execution
of these programmes are the responsibility of
the Programme Director, who preferably is an
ISIM Chair-holder. PhD students are sponsored
within the framework of these programmes.
The output of the programmes will comprise
PhD theses, monographs, and/or major works
summarizing the research. A report, translating
the results for a wider audience, with recom-
mendations for future policies and research, will
be made available.
A t e l i e r s
ISIM organizes ateliers: short-term research
projects in which a small number of researchers
work closely together for a maximum period of
three months. The ateliers are designed to
stimulate cooperation between scholars from
different disciplines, regional specializations,
and scholarly traditions. They aim at the
strengthening of interregional cooperation in
r e s e a r c h .
Individual Research Projects
ISIM offers scholars of international standing
the opportunity to engage in research work in
the Netherlands for a maximum of three
months. These distinguished fellowships pro-
mote cooperation with leading figures and
institutes in the field of the study of Muslim
societies and communities. Junior researchers
who have demonstrated the ability to conduct
innovative research will be given the opportu-
nity to engage in individual research.
Academic Staff
There will be a nucleus of three ISIM Chair-
holders who form the backbone of the Insti-
tute, headed by the Academic Director. These
full-time professors will be appointed at partici-
pating universities in the Netherlands. The ISIM
Chairs have been created to support and
attract highly-qualified scholars of internation-
al standing who have the task of placing the
Institute firmly on the map. They will consti-
tute a firm link between the participating uni-
versities/research schools and ensure a strong
national base for the ISIM. The Academic Direc-
tor is appointed to the ISIM Chair at Leiden
University. The Director is in charge of the vari-
ous functions of the ISIM and supervises all of
its activities. In close consultation with the
Academic Committee and the participating
research schools and institutes the ISIM, the
Academic Director and the other ISIM Chair-
holders will select, design, and execute
research. In addition they will coach, tutor, and
supervise the ISIM students at the Advanced
and PhD Degree levels. Some may be involved
in supporting the educational programmes at
the participating universities/research schools.
They will supervise, when necessary, visiting
fellows and other guests of the Institute in
their research.
F e l l o w s h i p s
A constant influx of researchers serves to
ensure that the horizons of the Institute are con-
stantly broadened and that high academic stan-
dards are upheld. The ISIM will support research
fellows at various levels and in a number of
capacities. They will contribute to the long-term
joint research programmes, create ateliers for
the execution of short-term research, or conduct
individual research. There will be ample room for
visiting fellows who will serve as bridges
between the ISIM and the outside world. Sabbat-
ical stays will be made available for staff of par-
ticipating universities and research schools.
Application forms and information on the crite-
ria for evaluation and selection will be distrib-
uted.
E d u c a t i o n
The targets the ISIM has set in the field of edu-
cation are to create a pool of expertise on devel-
opments in the fields of Islamic societies, institu-
tions, practices, and doctrines upon which the
academic community, policy makers, and soci-
ety at large can draw. The activities add a sub-
stantial new initiative to current PhD research
programmes in the study of modern Islam and
Muslim societies. The ISIM seeks to attract talent-
ed students from the Netherlands and from
abroad. In cooperation with the participating
universities/research schools, ISIM is planning to
develop three instruments by which to reach its
educational goals:
• Educational programmes and courses at var-
ious degree levels and in various formats, in
particular at the Advanced and PhD degree
l e v e l s ;
• Support for existing international program-
mes and for new initiatives in the field;




I n f o r m a t i o n
The ISIM aims to strengthen existing library
collections in the Netherlands related to Islam
and Muslim societies and communities, in view
of improving the availability of reference and
research material on recent and contemporary
developments thereof. The Institute intends to
establish library/documentation exchange
agreements with universities in the Muslim
world. The aim is to exchange costly works of
references for materials that are difficult to
access by scholars outside of the Muslim world.
ISIM has it own website (http://isim.leide-
nuniv.nl) and WWW server and is developing a
database. The creation and maintenance of an
Internet gate to pertinent academic sites on the
Internet is another undertaking of the ISIM,
improving access to digital data, in particular to
libraries, documentation and information ser-
vices, news agencies, periodicals and other pub-
lications in the Muslim world and/or by Muslim
organizations. The database will provide up-to-
date information on researchers and specialized
institutes in order to stimulate international
cooperation and, in particular, to facilitate
access to expertise and documentat i o n .
ISIM’s central mode of disseminating infor-
mation about its activities as well as other
activities in the field of contemporary Islamic
studies will be through this Newsletter, which
can also be found on the ISIM Website.
Outreach activities
In addition to the academia, ISIM addresses
itself to non-university educational institutes
and public bodies. Dissemination of informa-
tion to society at large is a vital aspect ISIM’s
public service function. Expertise on contem-
porary Islamic issues is to be made available to
various audiences through the following
means: issuing reports which render scholarly
research results accessible to all; training and
refresher courses for those who require knowl-
edge about Islam and Muslim societies and
communities in their work; and support for
institutes which initiate training for those who
have frequent contacts with Muslims in their
p r o f e s s i o n .
O r g a n i z a t i o n
The Board is the highest authority of the ISIM.
It is responsible for establishing strategy and
approving activity plans, budgets, and accounts.
The Board consists of the presidents of the par-
ticipating universities. For the year 1998 the
Board has appointed Prof. W.A.L. Stokhof as
Director in Charge. He has drafted the constitu-
tional documents which were signed by the
Founding Partners on June 30, 1998.
Working Group
The Director in Charge is assisted by
a Working Group consisting of:
• Dr M. M. van Bruinessen
(Utrecht University)
• Prof. P. T. van der Veer
(University of Amsterdam)
• Prof. E.J. Zürcher
(Leiden University)
Apart from the drafting of documents,
they are involved in the search for an Acade-
mic Director and in the formation of the
Academic Committee and the International
Advisory Committee, which will be appoint-
ed by the Board later this year.
The Academic Committee will advise the
Board and the Director on all academic affairs, in
particular on the design and execution of the
research. The International Advisory Committee
will serve to anchor the Institute in society and to
provide advice on the strategies to be adopted
by the Institute in its national and international
environment. 
A small office staff supports the director and
Working Group. Dr D. Douwes (Leiden Universi-
ty/Nijmegen University) acts as academic coor-
dinator and ISIM Newsletter editor and Drs M.E.
Bakker as administrative coordinator. ♦
ISIM sounding board meetings
One apparent expression of the national /international interaction is the
ISIM sounding board meetings. The opening day of the Institute is to
serve as the first such meeting. With the support of the Minister for
Development Cooperation subsequent meetings will take place in cities
of the Muslim world with respected centres of learning. These meetings
are fundamental to the ISIM for they serve as a medium for introducing
the ISIM to relevant scholarly audiences, as well as for reflecting upon
institutional plans and policies. The second meeting is scheduled for
March 1999 and will take place in Cairo.
The International Institute for the Study of the Islam in
the Modern World (ISIM) was founded by the University
of Amsterdam, Leiden University and Utrecht Universi-
ty. The Institute is funded, in addition to these latter, by
the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research
(NWO), the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science
(OC&W) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs / Develop-
ment Cooperation. The constitutional documents were
signed on June 30 of this year.
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The West
Y V O N N E  Y A Z B E C K  H A D DA D
Since the early 1970s, Western Europeans and North
Americans have demonstrated increasing concern over
the latest chapter in the Western encounter with Mus-
lims. This concern is focused on the current trend of
human migration from South to North and from East to
West, with the potential of altering the ethnic and reli-
gious composition of Western nation-states and, what
some fear, their democratic and capitalist traditions, as
well as liberal social values. To those in the West who
believe in the purity of race, civilization, or culture, or in
a supersessionist ‘Judeo-Christian’ worldview this
movement of people is a menacing threat to their cher-
ished ideals of a homogeneous Western society. For
many, it increasingly represents a significant demo-
graphic shift that posits a major cultural challenge
whose precise consequences are unpredictable and
unforeseen since they require a variety of adjustments
by the host countries and by the new immigrants.
Towards the Carving of
Islamic Space
i n ‘the West’
The Muslim encounter with ‘the West’ is an
on-going drama that has intertwined the histo-
ries of the two peoples for over fourteen cen-
turies. While the actors have changed, past
experiences ranging from peaceful coexistence
and cooperation to mutual vilification and
armed conflicts influenced the collective and
invented memories of both Muslims and West-
erners and tend to colour their relationship.
Two distinct features mark the current
encounter between Muslims and the West. The
first is the assumption of world leadership by
the United States with the consequent creation
and empowerment of the state of Israel and the
promotion of the idea of a superior ‘Judeo-
Christian’ worldview by some sectors of West-
ern society. The second is the growing Muslim
emigration, settlement and acquisition of citi-
zenship in the West: in Western Europe, and
established countries of European migration
such as Australia, Canada, Latin America, South
Africa, and the United States.
It is estimated that there are about eighteen
million Muslims living in the West. The majority
in Western Europe were recruited as temporary
guest-workers with the full expectation that
they would eventually return to their home-
lands. The emigration to the Americas during
the last quarter of the twentieth century came
initially from the educated classes seeking
higher education, better economic opportuni-
ties, and political and religious freedom. Since
then, asylum seekers and refugees have signifi-
cantly augmented the diversity of Muslims in
the West. In the process, Muslim communities
have been transformed from collectivities of
migrant, predominantly male labourers to
immigrant families, from sojourners to settlers,
and from transients to citizens. Attempts by
various Western nations to halt Muslim migra-
tion have led to the creation of Muslim minori-
ty communities which increasingly appear to
have become a permanent fixture in the West.
Each Western nation has a particular relation-
ship with its immigrant population that has
been conditioned by its colonial legacy, its his-
torical memory, and its traditional perception
of its former subject people as well as its her-
itage and perception of its role in the world.
Each is in the process of developing policies
and models for the treatment of its newest citi-
zens who are challenging its perception of its
liberal traditions and religious tolerance. These
range from containing Muslims as permanently
foreign, encouraging their integration, promot-
ing their assimilation, or forging them into dis-
tinct manageable ethnic minorities. Canada,
which identifies itself as a multi-cultural soci-
ety, encourages and subsidizes the mainte-
nance of distinctive cultures. The United States
has experimented with a variety of models
beginning with ‘Anglo conformity’, to melting
pot (until discovering that there were too many
unmeltables), to equal religious conglomer-
ates: Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish. Current-
ly, two controversial paradigms compete for
adoption. The first, promoted by Christian fun-
damentalists, the Jewish community, and a
large number of politicians, identifies America
as grounded in Judeo-Christian values. Its crit-
ics note that such a definition threatens the
separation of religion and state, maintaining
the current power structures, confining Bud-
dhists, Hindus, Muslims, and peoples of other
faiths and values to the periphery. The second
model advocates a pluralistic society, which
celebrates difference, raising fears of the divi-
sion of America into ethnic identities, or ‘griev-
ance groups’.
At the same time, Muslims have been grap-
pling with the problem of living in the context
of an un-Islamic environment. The initial con-
cern came out of the experience of ‘minority-
ness’ in the Indian context. The late Abu al-A‘la
al-Mawdudi travelled to Europe, the United
States, and Canada admonishing Muslims to
eschew integration into their new environment
or leave the West lest they lose their soul in its
wayward ways. Other scholars have insisted
that such an opinion is misguided since the
proper interpretation of Islamic law allows Mus-
lims to live outside the abode of Islam, as long
as they have the freedom to practise and prop-
agate their faith. Still others are of the opinion
that Muslim presence in the West provides
them with an unprecedented opportunity to
fulfil their Islamic duty to propagate the faith. In
the process, they not only obey God’s com-
mandment to call people to Islam, they also
help to redeem Western society from its evil
ways and restore it to the worship of God.
Advice on how to survive in the West comes
from a variety of quarters. H.H. Bilgrami (direc-
tor of the World Federation of Islamic Missions,
Karachi, Pakistan) prescribed a programme of
Islamic education that inculcates an ideological
i d e n t i t y :
a . To maintain the means whereby Muslims in
the West remain conscious of their identity;
b . To ensure a dynamic element which can face
the onslaught of the Western cultural influ-
ence on the minds of Muslim children;
c . To ensure that Muslim minorities remain con-
scious of their position as an ideological
group with values different from those of
n o n - M u s l i m s ;
d . To function as a source of information about
Islam to non-Muslims;
e . To serve as a means for the propagation of
Islam, which is the sacred duty of every Mus-
l i m ;
f . To ultimately raise a strong ideologically-
integrated community for the consolidation
of the ummah to the basis of unity.
The conscious effort to define Muslims as dis-
tinct became the concern of Zain el-Abedin, the
founder of the Institute for Muslim Minority
Affairs in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. He, too, worried
about Muslim loss of identity in the West. To
protect the community from disintegration, he
prescribed developing Islam as an ethnicity,
erecting ramparts not only to keep the non-
Muslims out, but more importantly, to hold the
Muslims in. Thus he identified important ideo-
logical constructs and behavioural distinctions
as indispensable markers of the cultural divide
between Muslims and Westerners. For him, the
West becomes a laboratory where a now mod-
ern identity is to be fused, one that fosters par-
ticular behavioural patterns, promotes a com-
mon language, distinctive customs and tradi-
tions, recognizable styles of dress and food,
among other cultural distinctions. These are
easier to identify and particularize, than the
effort to inculcate ideas because they are more
tangible. At the same time, he was aware that
ethnicity could be very divisive given the diver-
sity of migrant groups. The difficulty would be
in determining whose language, customs, or
behaviour is more Islamically legitimate.
Furthermore, he noted that ethnicity itself is
un-Islamic. Thus while cultural distinction pro-
motes cohesion, and functions as a barrier to
being absorbed or assimilated into a multi-cul-
tural society, it may also veer from the truth of
Islam which affirms that ‘physical traits, cultural
traditions, dress, food, customs, and habits are
subordinate or subsidiary to their main doctri-
nal identity, that God created differences in
people in order to facilitate recognition, that
the true identity is determined by the manner
in which a person or group of any race, colour
or physical type approaches the business of liv-
ing, uses his faculties, selects ends and means
for his worldly endeavours.’ *
Some Muslims have become active in the
mosque movement in the West and are defin-
ing the mosque as the centre around which
Muslim life should revolve. For a growing num-
ber strict adherence to ritual practice in the
adopted country marks the boundaries of faith.
Announcing the need for a clean space for daily
prayer, the act of praying, donning Islamic
garb, refraining from eating pork and improp-
erly slaughtered meat, as well as fasting during
the month of Ramadan have become self-delin-
eated boundaries that help immigrants feel
secure, distinct, and outside the bounds of pol-
lution. For some, conforming to Islamic prohibi-
tions has become a conscious act of witness of
a distinctive faith despite public ridicule and a
demonstration of steadfastness and persever-
ance in the face of social obstacles to their per-
formance. Muslim immigrants and their chil-
dren are aware of the necessity of dealing with
prevalent pre-formed stereotypes, honed over
centuries of conflict and competition. They also
have to deal with the increasing rhetoric of
demonization and prejudice propagated in the
United States by right wing public intellectuals
(Pat Buchanan and George Will), Christian fun-
damentalists (Jimmy Swaggart and Pat Robert-
son), and Zionists (Bernard Lewis, Daniel Pipes,
Steve Emerson, and Charles Krauthamer). In
Europe, they have to cope with the rise of xeno-
phobic statements of right wing European
political parties such as the Front Nationale in
France, Vlaams Blok in Belgium, Republikaner
in Germany, and the Centrumpartij of the
N e t h e r l a n d s .
The public discussion about the Islamic
threat accompanied by violence against Mus-
lim life in Europe and North America as well as
acts of terrorism perpetrated by Muslims have
heightened tensions. Islam is accused of being
a religion that is devoid of integrity and pro-
gressive values, one that promotes violent pas-
sions in its adherents, a menace to civil society,
and a threat to the peace loving people of the
world. Muslims are cast as bloodthirsty terror-
ists, whose loyalty as citizens must be ques-
tioned since they are obsessed with the
destruction of the West.
Muslims in Europe and North America are
aware that they have little political power to
influence the government, the media, or the
elites in the West. They have very few channels
of communication to policy makers. A variety of
factors hamper effective participation in the
political process including the lack of experi-
ence of participating in political activities, the
fear of the consequences of political involve-
ment, and lack of experience in grass roots
organizations or coalition-building. They also
lack seasoned leaders and efficient organiza-
tions that are able to forge coalitions with other
groups in order to bring about change and
influence legislation.
To Muslims in the West, the situation is
becoming increasingly threatening. Azzam al-
Tamimi of Britain has recently identified it as a
state of crisis. Options promoted for survival of
the community in the seventies have not suc-
ceeded. His assessment is that while not all of
the obstacles that appear in the relations of
Muslims with non-Muslims in Western societies
are fostered by Muslims, the more dangerous
and difficult ones are the consequence of Mus-
lim perceptions and behaviour. Some Muslims
erroneously seek to overcome these obstacles
through melting into Western culture and
abandoning some or all of their Islamic identity.
Others insist on ignoring these obstacles by
resorting to isolation and hiding in cocoons.
For al-Tamimi, this discrepancy in dealing with
the crisis has led to the sundering of relations
between the generations. On the one hand is
the generation of the fathers and mothers as
well as grandparents who have an emotional
and cultural tie to the original homeland and
who hold on to the same customs and tradi-
tions whether or not they accord with their new
environment. On the other hand is the genera-
tion of the children and grandchildren who
have no emotional ties to the homeland of the
fathers, and find little of value in their customs
which are seen as counter-productive and an
impediment to progress in the society in which
they are born. Thus the new generation is in
need of a new paradigm that can provide a
comfort zone as it carves a space for Muslims as
part and parcel of the West.
Muslim presence ‘within the gates’ is chal-
lenging Westerners’ self-assured perceptions of
their liberalism, pluralism, democracy, and tol-
erance. Still open to discussion is whether
these Western traditions are broad enough to
guarantee Muslims, not only freedom of reli-
gion and the right to propagate their faith, but
also to enjoy the culture of their choice. A r e
Western democracies liberal enough to make
room for Islamic input into the national consen-
sus, or will there be an insistence on a Judeo-
Christian culture? Will Western pluralism or
multiculturalism be flexible enough to provide
for Islamic input into the shaping of the future
of Western society? Or will Muslims continue to
be marginalized, ostracized, studied and evalu-
ated, always judged as lacking, and always the
‘other’? ♦
Dr Yvonne Y. Haddad is professor of Christian-
Muslim Relations, Center for Muslim-Christian
Understanding, Georgetown University.
N o t e
* Syed Z. Abedin, ‘The Study of Muslim Minority
Problems: A Conceptual Approach’,
i n : M u s l i m communities in non-Muslim States.
London: Islamic Council of Europe, 1980, p. 21.
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S u d a n
H E A T H E R  DE E G A N
In the summer of 1998, the Khartoum government and
John Garang of the Sudan People’s Liberation Move-
ment (SPLM) signed a temporary ceasefire in order that
international aid could reach the war-torn areas. Some
discussion has also taken place regarding the institution
of a new constitution, which would include the political
clauses of the 1997 Agreement. Although there is no
easy solution to the conflict in Sudan, one aspect seems
clear: if there is to be peace within the country, a political




The civil war that has raged in Sudan, apart
from a brief respite during the Jaafar Nimeiri
period since 1955, is estimated to have cost 1.3
million lives. A Peace Agreement was signed on
21 April 1997, between the Sudanese govern-
ment, under the leadership of President el-
Bashir, and the United Democratic Salvation
Front (UDSF), comprising the South Sudan Inde-
pendence Movement (SSIM), the Union of
Sudan African Parties (USAP), the Sudan Peo-
ple’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), the Equato-
ria Defence Force and the South Sudan Inde-
pendence Group (SSIG). Although the agree-
ment does not include the government’s chief
opponents, Colonel John Garang’s Sudan Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army (SPLA), or the leader of the
exiled Umma Party, El-Sadiq el-Mahdi, it does
outline a number of political issues, which, if
resolved, could provide the basis for a move
towards a conflict resolution.
Ethnicity and religion are seen as integral fac-
tors in the war: a predominantly Arab-African,
Muslim North against an animist or Christian
black African South. Certainly ethnicity and reli-
gion are major contemporary factors, but their
origins are historic. The 1962 Missionary Act
prevented the spread of Islam to the south of
the country and forged a religious tension with-
in the country. By 1983 and with the institution
of s h a r i a law, tensions were exacerbated. From
that time, State Minister of Foreign Affairs
Gabriel Roric believes, minority rights became
confused with religious rights. Yet it would be
erroneous to generalize about the conflict in
such terms as ‘the North-South Conflict’ or
‘Islam versus Christianity’ or ‘Arabism versus
Africanism’. In Sudan, the issue of nation forma-
tion, regionalism, ethnicity, religion, and eco-
nomic justice ‘have been left to accumulate
over time, without being resolved’.1
The civil war is essentially concerned with two
fundamental issues: firstly, the identity of the
Sudanese state and secondly, the question of
who gains control over the natural resources of
the south. Because of the area’s reserves of oil,
hardwoods and minerals and vast tracts of
unexplored land, the economic potential of the
south has been seen as the key objectives for all
parties. Yet ethnic diversity is complex in Sudan.
The 1996 census reported a population of 27
million people. According to an earlier census
conducted in 1955/56, the only one that includ-
ed ethnic origin, there are 19 major ethnic
groups. These groups can be further divided
into 597 smaller sub-groupings, speaking over
100 different languages. Around 60 per cent of
the population are Muslim; 15 per cent are
Christian and the remainder adhere to tradition-
al religions. The demographic composition has
been altered through years of civil war and eco-
logical disaster, but one of the important
aspects of the April 1997 Peace Agreement is
that it attempts to address some of these socio-
ethnic imbalances through its federal structure.
The Peace Agreement,
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The general principles contained in the
peace agreement signed on 21 April 1997, aim
to attain a ‘just and lasting peace’. The docu-
ment declares that ‘only a sustainable peace
based on justice, equality, democracy and free-
dom can lead to a meaningful development
and progress which would assist in the solu-
tion of the fundamental problems of the peo-
ple of Sudan.’ Concerning the basic issue of the
relationship between religion and the State,
the agreement states that Sudan is a multi-
racial, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and multi-
religious society. Islam is the religion of the
majority of the population, and Christianity
and the African creeds are followed by a con-
siderable number of citizens. Nevertheless, the
basis of rights and duties shall be citizenship,
and all Sudanese shall equally share in all
aspects of life and political responsibilities.
The status of s h a r i a is arguably the most con-
tentious constitutional issue and its repeal has
continually been called for by the SPLA as a
conditional step if negotiations are to take
place between the SPLA and the government.
On the crucial issue of s h a r i a, the parties to the
April agreement decided on a complex formu-
la. Laws of a general nature that were based on
general principles common to the states
would apply at the national level, provided
that the states had the right to enact any com-
plementary federal legislation on matters
peculiar to them. In other words, s h a r i a w o u l d
not be abandoned at the national level but it
was not to intrude to the governance of the
regions. 
The terms of the rights and freedoms accord-
ed to every person are far reaching and would
not be out of place in a liberal democracy. Yet
Hasan Turabi asserts that the emphasis in the
Sudanese model of Islam is on ‘rights and
obligations’ in which there is no coercion but
equally ‘no freedom of will in the Western
sense’. 
The relationship between religious identity,
citizenship, and the State is critical. Particularly
significant is the idea of religious freedom
based on the principle that affords the individ-
ual not only the right to choose for himself or
herself, but also the protection against any
compulsion. In a sense, this right grants the
general population individual freedom. It also
represents a commitment on the part of both
the State and the organizations within civil
society to ensure and enhance political rights.
Sudan’s political system has organized struc-
tures and processes of decision-making.
D r Ghazi Salahuddin Alabani, the Secretary
General to the Congress, describes the system
as containing the ‘bare rudiments of a democ-
ratic system’. The Western pluralist model is
seen as too divisive but the Sudanese system
does involve a range of representatives from
trade unions, professional associations, tribal
chiefs and so on, who tend to become involved
at the state level. Ideas can be individualistic
without party discipline but this structure is
regarded as more democratic than previous
governments with political parties which ‘were
never representative’.
One cause of conflict within the country has
been identified as regional inequity with
regard to the distribution of productive assets,
and educational health and social services. The
Peace Agreement contains a section dealing
with wealth sharing, one clause of which
states: ‘The federal government shall lay down
a comprehensive economic and social plan to
develop the country in general and to bridge
the gap between the various states in particu-
lar, so that within a definite period, a parity in
provision of basic needs such as security,
employment, water, food, education, health
and housing could be reached’.
In order to consolidate economic policies,
Sudan’s economy is moving towards a free
market focus. Hassan Turabi refers to the coun-
try’s privatizing economy as one which aims to
be more efficient. Emphasis is now placed on
the productivity of farmers and agricultural
improvement, and the government has given
the production of food for domestic and
regional consumption priority status. Women
are encouraged to cultivate their land, grow
food and exchange and barter in cooperation
stores. As women became more productive in
home agricultural pursuits such as growing
food, keeping chickens and so on, large-scale
acreage can be devoted to growing cash crops
which earn foreign currency through exports. 
The country, however, faces difficulty in
looking towards an expansion of its productive
base when previous productivity has been low.
The lack of basic commodities such as petrol
holds back efficient production. In addition,
there have been major problems in gaining
foreign investment since the Gulf War and the
country’s deteriorating relationship with the
IMF. Sudan looks to the Middle East, China, and
Malaysia to provide external funding, but that
may not be quite so readily forthcoming now
that the economies of South East Asia are in
trouble. More generally, some Sudanese com-
mentators suggest that liberalizing the econo-
my is undesirable and may fuel ‘old fears of
ethnic exclusion from positions of power and
wealth’. ‘The government must be cautious in
its privatization programme. Otherwise, dis-
posing of commercial enterprizes will give
undue advantage to capital rich, better posi-
tioned and well-established Northern mer-
chants and industrialists whom, rightly or
wrongly, non-Northerners in the South, East,
and West consider to be responsible for their
economic miseries and whom they eye with
suspicion and jealousy’.2
Although the Agreement is for an interim
period of four years, it can be shortened or
lengthened according to the recommenda-
tions from the Coordinating Council. The remit
of the Council is broad. The Coordinating
Council is responsible for supervision, socio-
economic planning, confidence building,
peace nurturing, policy making and political
mobilization. It is accountable to President el-
Bashir and provides a link between the govern-
ment and the Southern States. In order to be
viewed as non-partial and impartial, its compo-
sition must reflect an appropriate balance
between the different parties in the conflict.
The security arrangements during the inter-
im period of the Agreement are particularly
important in establishing the basic elements of
conflict resolution. The South Sudan Defence
Force (SSDF) will remain separate from the
National Army and will be stationed in their
locations under their command. However,
police, prisons, civil defence, and public securi-
ty in the Southern States will be drawn from
the people of the area and the presence of the
Sudanese armed forces will be reduced once
violence has stopped. A joint Ceasefire Com-
mission is to be established to monitor cease-
fire violations and the disengagement of
troops in the Southern States. 
The Agreement also accedes to the right of
the peoples of Southern Sudan to ‘determine
their political aspirations and pursue their eco-
nomic, social and cultural development’
through the process of a referendum to be
held before the end of the interim period. The
options contained in the referendum will pre-
sent a choice between either unity or seces-
sion. 
C o n c l u s i o n
The perennial conflict in Sudan has hardly
created an environment conducive to the rem-
edying of economic disparities and social
injustice. The Peace Agreement of April 1997 is
of course, only partial, in that its signatories
represent a segment of the range of opposi-
tionists within the country. The central ques-
tion is how likely is the agreement to result in a
measure of success? As Dr Atabani, Secretary
General of the National Congress asserts, ‘Gov-
ernment is not divine. The government is
accountable to the people ultimately’. In a
sense, the 1997 Agreement has gone some
way towards demonstrating an understanding
of the problems confronting different groups
within Sudan and in identifying a number of
key political aspects, all which could help
lessen tensions and offer the possibility of a
‘suitable peace’ for all people. ♦
Heather Deegan is head of International Studies,
School of History and Politics, Middlesex University.
This is a shortened and updated version of the article
‘Conflict in Sudan: The Peace Agreement of April
1997’, Africa Insight, 27, 3, 1997 
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S e n e g a l
M A MA D O U  D I O U F
It is not easy to say exactly when Islam first established
itself in our region. On the other hand, one can be sure
that this religion infiltrated progressively from the cen-
tral valley of Senegal or, to be precise, from the kingdom
of Tékrour. To understand the influence of Islam in
Senegambian societies, one must first trace its complete
history from the conversion of War Jabi, the 11th centu-
ry king of Tékrour, via the colonial conquests to the pre-
sent day. Between these dates, social movements in-
spired by Islam took various forms according to the
moment, the regions, and the ethnic groups, favouring
always transactions between the influences and modifi-
cations provoked by Islam and the Senegambian cul-
t u r e s .1
Paths of Islam
i n S e n e g a l
A large part of Tékrour’s fame is due to its sta-
tus as the first Black kingdom to convert to Islam.
Its economic power lay in its location on the
edge of the Sahara, which enabled it to benefit
from trade between North Africa and the Bilad-
es-Soudan, the Black African countries. It exerted
control on some of the commercial routes along
which gold and slaves were transported from
the South to the North, and cowries, arms and
horses in the opposite direction.
Arab traders carried products, male and
female slaves, and a religion – Islam – to this part
of Africa. In the 11th century, the importance of
economic interests and the close intermingling
of economic and political activities and religious
interdependence motivated the conversion of
the sovereign, War Jabi. His subjects followed his
example.
The distinctive face of the first wave of
Islamization restricted itself to court Islam: well-
read marabouts – usually Arabs or Moors, with a
total absence of natives – and the peasant mass-
es depending on their rural religions, were total-
ly impervious to the new faith. The beginning of
the slave trade that was gradually to kill off the
economy of the Sahara and the Sahel (which fell
into a deep crisis with the shift of commercial
activities to the Atlantic coast and the mouths of
the Senegal, Gambia, and Casamance Rivers)
closes this first sequence.
With the expansion of the slave trade, Euro-
pean trading posts multiplied, as did wars and
raids within and between the kingdoms. In
effect, war was the means of producing slaves
and one consequence of the strong European
demand beginning in the second half of the
17th century was a generalization of violence, a
profound economic and social crisis and feverish
migrations of certain peoples and social groups.
The upheavals resulting from the slave trade
were the origin of a very strong protest and
resistance movement led by the marabouts. This
movement, which in its ascendant phase
attempted to seize power in the Senegambian
kingdoms, is known as the Marabout War (1673-
74). Initiated by a Moorish marabout, Nasr-al-
Din, it shook all of the northern lands in the
region.2 The quick victory of the marabout party
was short lived. The traditional aristocracies
enjoyed the armed support of the slave traders
of the coastal trading posts who had an interest
in putting a stop to insurgents hostile to the
Atlantic slave trade. In spite of their brief success
and the violence of the repression that followed,
the marabouts and the Muslim communities
had, for the first time, succeeded in mobilizing
the principal victims of the violence of the slave
trade.
The second face, born in a time of frequent
famines, wars and pillaging, imbued Islam with
the following characteristic traits: a warlike, mili-
tant orientation; an increasing hostility towards
the ‘Christian’ slave traders and the ‘pagan’ tradi-
tional aristocracies; and a resilient ability to
recover and to restructure human communities
which had been, at first, traumatized by the vio-
lence of the slave trade and then of colonization.
This reorientation, which continues unabated
today in new forms in the face of the economic
crisis, rests on the erosion or the redefinition and
the reformulating of the community structures
and the challenging, dissolution or division of
political power and command; ‘The Muslim
community has a specific composition. It is
multi-ethnic and bases its existence not on some
filiation or reference to a common ancestor, but
on a religious conviction which puts the com-
munity ideal before all else while exalting it and
affirming it in daily life. Work being the same for
everyone, it pushes aside the obvious exploita-
tion of the disciple by his marabout… Group sol-
idarity is no longer based on ethnic member-
ship; it transcends it to favour the community of
faith. Muslim communities exist in networks
which are within and beyond states. Their politi-
cal appeal transcends national frontiers. In this
way are forged the frameworks of a new histo-
ry’.3 Finally, the Marabout War enlarged the
Islamized area of Senegambia by attaching the
northern regions of the wolof country to the
toucouleur country. Here strong Muslim commu-
nities (some of them in the minority), were very
attractive to their neighbouring communities,
demonstrating great capacities for resistance
and offensive action when confronted by tradi-
tional power, while creating the first training
centres for native marabouts in these new terri-
tories.
The failure of the marabouts in their attempt
to control the whole of northern Senegambia
did not put an end to the holy wars or jihad. Mus-
lim communities continued to revolt against the
aristocracies, the slave traders and then the
expeditionary forces, from the second half of the
17th century up to the creation of the AOF
(French West Africa) in 1895.
This sequence closes with the first great victo-
ry of the Muslim communities in the Fuuta Tooro
in which the toorodo marabouts seized power
and put an end to the denyanke regime, which
they accused of paganism. In fact, while exerting
tyrannical power, the denyanke practised a lax
form of Islam. These characteristics explain the
considerable mobilization of the masses to sup-
port the insurgents. They accused them of pil-
laging their own subjects to supply the Saharan
slave trade and of being unable to guarantee the
protection of the kingdom against foreign incur-
sions, notably by the Moors.
The toroodo revolution of 1776 was thus a
revolt of the oppressed. Its instigator was
Souleyman Baal, while Abdel Qadir Kan assured
its success.4 He became the first Almami of Fuuta
Tooro with the establishment of the Muslim
theocracy, founded on a new political morality
and whose order rested on the sharica. The
toroodo authorities sent missionaries and war-
riors throughout the whole of Senegambia and
lent their unfailing support to all Muslim com-
munities to promote Islam and to overturn the
traditional aristocracies.
This religious proselytism, which coincided
with the beginning of the colonial conquest,
opened a third sequence – that of the jihad of
the 19th century – the objectives of which were
to destroy the pagan aristocracies, to convert
the population and to put a brake on the territo-
rial expansion of the colony of Senegal (Saint
Louis and Gorée).
One figure totally dominates this sequence: El
Haj Oumar Foutiyou Tal, whose action touched
the whole of Senegambia and the loop of the
Niger. Oumar’s work was taken up and amplified
by his disciples, of whom the best known were
Maba Jaxu Ba, Cheikhou Amadou Madiyu and
Mamadou Lamin Dramé. El Haj Oumar was born
in Fuuta Tooro around 1794 into a family of
toroodo minor nobility. He led a spectacular holy
war against the traditional aristocrats and the
colonizers in the regions of Upper Senegal-Niger
from 1852 to 1864, after having undertaken a
long journey to Mecca and the Arab and African
Muslim countries, between 1825 and 1832. Dur-
ing the pilgrimage, at the foot of the Ka’aba,
Oumar was initiated into the tariqa (way) tijaan.
He was raised to the rank of Caliph of the broth-
erhood for West Africa.
Between 1854 and 1857, he controlled several
states on the right bank of the Senegal River
(Gidimaxa, Bundu, Khasso and Kaarta). His
repeated calls for an uprising of the Muslims of
Kajoor, Bawol, Jolof, Fuuta Tooro, and Saint Louis
against their rulers mobilized the governor of
Senegal, General Louis Léon Faidherbe, against
the ‘toucouleur’ marabout. After several skir-
mishes with the French, El Haj Oumar turned his
forces eastward. In 1859, he seized the bambara
kingdom of Senegal before defeating the
alliance of Ségou and Macina, thus creating the
biggest pulaar Muslim empire in West Africa. He
abandoned Senegambia to the French forever.
Oumar met with his death on the cliffs of Bandi-
agara following the insurrection of the peul of
Macina in 1864.
Of the marabouts who followed in the foot-
steps of Oumar, three deserve mention: Maba
Jaxu Ba, Cheikou Madiyu, and Mamadou Lamin
Dramé. With them the phase of warrior Islam
ended. Other marabouts attempted to repeat
the jihad adventure briefly but to no avail. Islam
took on a new face – that of the Sufi path of the
brotherhoods – an Islam which rejected military
holy war and favoured the constitution of solid,
stable, and productive communities.
The new sequence merges with the ancestry
of the principal Senegalese brotherhoods, Qad-
diriyya, tijaan, and mouride. On the one hand it
marks the end of armed opposition between the
Muslims and the traditional aristocrats following
the victory of the expeditionary forces and, on
the other, the permanent admission of the
brotherhoods into the project of colonial
exploitation.
The Qaddiriyya Brotherhood 
The Qaddiriyya was the first brotherhood to
establish itself in Senegal. It was introduced
there following the reform movement initiated
by Mactar-al-kabir Kunta, one of the greatest
scholars of Timbuktu in the 18th century. In
order to accelerate the Islamization of West
Africa and to purify the message, he sent numer-
ous disciples into the main regions of the Sudan.
One of them, Bounama Kounta, arrived in Kajoor
at the beginning of the 19th century. His excel-
lent qualities as a trader and his erudition gained
him access to the royal court in Kajoor.
The king of Kajoor granted him a fief on
which his successors founded Njassan, the holy
place and religious centre of the Kounta branch
of the brotherhood. In fact, the q a d i r b r o t h e r-
hood was subdivided into several, more or less
rival branches, each having its own marabouts
and holy places. The q a d i r sphere of influence is
confined to the regions of Thiès, Loga, the out-
skirts of Dakar, and several pockets in
Casamance. Demographically speaking, the
Qaddiriyya is the smallest of the great Sene-
galese brotherhoods. 
The Tijaaniyya Brotherhood
It has already been mentioned that El Haj
Oumar introduced this brotherhood into West
Africa. His initiative was continued by various
charismatic leaders. Each of them marked out
his own territory for his religious undertaking.
El Haj Saïdou Nourou Tall (1879-1980), a
grandson of Oumar, had numerous disciples
and a large influence among the populations of
the Senegal valley and towns such as Dakar and
Saint Louis. He played a significant role in Sene-
galese political life from the colonial period
until his death. For his disciples, the political
and religious success of Saïdou Nourou was not
translated into economic success compared to
that of the mourides.
El Haj Malick Sy (1855-1922) was the founder
of the principal W o l o f branch of the t i j a a n. He
was first a wandering marabout before decid-
ing to make a pilgrimage to Mecca. Afterwards
he settled in Saint Louis, then at Tivaouane
where he established his Z a w i y a. Today, this
town is the holy city of this religious branch. El
Haj Malick launched a vast programme of pros-
elytism and religious education. He appointed
marabout teachers at the commercial stops
along the railway and in the cities, thus impart-
ing a strong intellectual and didactic orienta-
tion to Senegalese Islam.
Upon the death of the founder, his son
Ababacar Sy (1890-1957) succeeded him and
assumed the title, recognized by the colonial
administration, of Caliph General of the t i j a a n.
He had to confront the opposition of his two
younger brothers, El Haj Mansour Sy and
Abdoul Aziz Sy. At the end of World War II, this
opposition had taken a political turn: the Caliph
supported the partisans of Léopold Sédar Sen-
ghor, the Senegalese Democratic Block, while
his two brothers took sides with the French
Section of the Workers’ International (SFIO) of
Lamine Gueye. This confrontation within the
brotherhood has left indelible stains on the his-
tory of the brotherhood.
The defunct Caliph General, Abdoul Aziz Sy
(1905-1997), credited with great erudition and
a deep sense of justice and political compro-
mise, succeeded his brother in 1957. He too
had to confront the insurrection of the late
Caliph’s children, one of whom, Cheik Ahmed
Tidiane Sy (1920- ), has been one of the princi-
pal figures in the politico-religious life of Sene-
gal since the end of the 1950s. He is the moral
guide of a movement of young Muslims, the
Moustarchidin wal Moustarchidati, which was
the principle opposition party to the power of
the President of the Republic during the 1990s.
Accused of being at the instigation of the
bloody riots of 16 February 1994, the son of this
marabout, who is the moral leader of the orga-
nization, was imprisoned for a year.5
The main commemorative religious festival
of the t i j a a n is the celebration of the birth of the
Prophet Mohammed, the G a m o u, which is an
evening recitation of the Koran and a revalida-
tion of the brotherhood’s collective memory.
Every year, this religious ceremony brings thou-
sands to Tivaouane. As did the colonial admin-
istration, the Senegalese government sends a
strong delegation.
Today, the t i j a a n branch of the Sy is pro-
foundly shaken by internal crises provoked by
the struggles for power and antagonistic politi-
cal positioning of the principal marabouts who
are immersed in partisan political quarrels. The
multiplication of political parties and manifold
dissidence within the party in power have led to
a restructuring and rearrangement of alliances
and vote-catching groupings which are trau-
matizing the marabout families, certain seg-
ments of which found themselves profoundly
opposed to the others.
The Niass de Kaolack branch was founded by
Abdoulay Niass (1850-1922) but the principal
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creator was his son El Haj Ibrahima Niass (1902-
1976). An erudite and charismatic marabout, he
succeeded in establishing his brotherhood firm-
ly in the Gambia and the north of Nigeria. Like
Cheik Ahmed Tidiane Sy, with whom he allied
himself in creating a political party opposed to
Senghor, Niass was a political player of the first
order. The great success of this branch of the
tijaan is, thanks to its Gambian and Nigerian con-
nection, the fact that it took root in the United
States, notably in Chicago and Washington DC.
The Mouride Brotherhood
Demographically speaking, the mouride
brotherhood has fewer followers than the t i j a a n
brotherhood but, in terms of organization, disci-
pline and its capacities for mobilization and
economic entrepreneurship, it has the most
influence. In spite of critical episodes and seri-
ous confrontations with the colonial administra-
tion, by directing the development of the
groundnut industry (the product of colonial
exploitation) it was able to interfere in political
affairs by very quickly granting itself a privileged
p o s i t i o n .
Today, the economic, social, and religious
networks of Mouridism extend throughout the
world, most notably in the marketplaces of
international commerce. This ‘spider web’
assures them control of Senegalese commerce
and of the informal S a n d a g a sector – the big
market and the small shops in the adjacent
streets in the centre of the Senegalese capital
are the bridgehead of their influence. The holy
city of Touba and the minaret of the grand
mosque (Lamp Fal) symbolize their attachment
to one earth (the Bawol) and to one ideology
and source of inspiration: Mouridism, the cen-
tral values of which are the cult of work, success,
discipline and absolute obedience to the mar-
about (J e b ë l u ) .
The b a w o l - b a w o l reference, the mouride
attributes, and inclusion in a genealogy of
which Ahmadou Bamba Mbacke is the ultimate
expression, drawn out on a holy land (Touba),
and captured completely in a monument, the
mosque and its minaret, offer an identity
which is exhibited throughout Senegal. Its
most spectacular moment is the great M a g a l
which sees not much fewer than a million peo-
ple converge on the town. Every year, the
M a g a l commemorates the return from exile of
the founder of Mouridism, Ahmadou Bamba.
Amadou Bamba Mbacke (1850-1927) was
the son of a former Kadi of Kajoor, close to
Maba Jaxu and Lat Joor. He lived for a certain
number of years at the Kajoor court. On the
death of the d a m e l of Kajoor in 1886, he settled
in MBacké-Baol and began to attract a consid-
erable and growing number of t a a l i b e ( d i s c i-
ples), from among the poor, peasants and
slaves to princes who had been traumatized by
the violence of colonial conquest.
Although he only viewed his actions in a
spiritual context and his resistance to coloniza-
tion in a passive sense, his notoriety and influ-
ence alienated him from the colonizers. He was
arrested and deported to Mayombe in Gabon
where he stayed from 1895 to 1902. The M a g a l
commemorates his departure into exile. This
episode, the origin of the Mouride collective
memory, constitutes the framework for the
miracles of Bamba: the prayer on the carpet
held up by the waves of the ocean; his resis-
tance to the attempts of his French jailers to
debase him; and the domestication of the
dense forest, of wild animals and supernatural
b e i n g s .
His return to Senegal was of short duration.
He was once again deported by the colonial
authorities – this time to Mauritania where he
stayed from 1903 to 1907, the date on which
he returned to Senegal to remain under house
arrest in Jolof. Ahmadou Bamba’s deportations
increased his fame and the number of t a a l i b e
only grew. In 1910, it finally dawned upon the
French that Bamba was not plotting a jihad.
They allowed him to found his holy city of
Touba and, in 1926, to make a start on the
great mosque of Touba in which he is buried.
The understanding with the French opened
up new territories for the Mourides who
adhered to Bamba’s message of ‘work is a form
of prayer; it sanctifies’. They therefore support-
ed the expansion of growing groundnuts. The
marabouts developed a particular relationship
with the colonial administration and their own
marabout way of representing the peasantry.
From this time, the marabouts installed them-
selves as the inescapable intermediaries
between the colonial administration and the
rural masses.
The other great figure of the saga of this first
Mouride period was the faithful disciple (the
‘man to do and undertake everything’) of the
marabout, Cheik Ibra Fal, called Lamp Fal (1858-
1930), who founded the sub-brotherhood of the
Baay Fal. His name is closely associated with
that of the founder of Mouridism. Because of his
noble, warrior background as a c e d d o (a tradi-
tional Wolof warrior), he symbolizes the link
between the old W o l o f political formations and
the new communities of the brotherhood. His
integration, at the periphery of the latter,
favoured the granting of the right to transgress
certain Islamic prescriptions: the consumption
of alcohol and a dispensation from regular
prayer. The c e d d o and the slave warriors rushed
towards this opening.
The Baay Fal branch of Mouridism retained
the clothing and certain aspects of the c e d d o
way of life: long hair, wide leather belts encir-
cling their loins, multi-coloured gowns, half a
pestle to use as a club, drum music and religious
chants deeply influenced by the W o l o f ‘ p e a s a n t ’
rhythm and beat and an expressiveness in danc-
ing which is now found in contemporary m b a l-
a x (dance music). Of the totality of the teaching
which issued from Ahmadou Bamba – the piety,
obedience, discipline and work – Baay Fal h a v e
retained only the last element. Their devotion,
dedication and commitment to the quest and to
work in the service of the brotherhood and of
the marabouts have assured the primitive accu-
mulation of the brotherhood. Like the other
brotherhoods, the Baay Fal sub-branch has a
Caliph General and has been fragmented into
several ‘houses’ (branches).
Trade and the cultivation of groundnuts
favoured the rapid enrichment of the mouride
community and its leaders. Today, a blind belief
in work and economic success has innervated
the entire brotherhood.6
On the death of the founder of Mouridism, a
dispute arose regarding the succession
between his brother, Cheik Anta Mbacke (1878-
1930), a prosperous businessman, also known
as ‘the brotherhood’s banker’, and his eldest son
Mamadou Moustapha Mbacke (1880-1945). The
colonial administration preferred the latter who
was the real organizer of the brotherhood. He
maintained the structure, the hierarchy, the
principle of absolute submission of the t a a l i b e
to their marabout and the cult of d i g g ë l
(marabout prescription). He accelerated the
construction of the mosque, the cultivation of
groundnuts and the territorial expansion of
Mouridism which extended beyond the W o l o f
groundnut basin to reach the s e r e e r and the city
dwellers of the colony of Senegal.
The succession to Mamadou Moustapha
Mbacke created the same difficulties as that of
his father, with a conflict between his eldest
son Cheik Mbacke, also known as G a ï n d é
Fatma (1905-1978), and his brother, Falilou
Mbacke (1885-1968). Benefiting from colonial
support and that of Léopold Sédar Senghor,
the most influential politician of the period,
the latter became Caliph General while his rival
was supported by Lamine Gueye, who was
entering a phase of political decline. Having
failed to control the brotherhood, Cheik
Mbacke devoted his life and his energy to the
construction of an economic empire which
was to make him one of Senegal’s most impor-
tant private successes, investing both in the
production and the commercialization of
groundnuts and salt, as well as fishing and
r e a l - e s t a t e .
Falilou Mbacke continued the work of his
brother by consecrating the mosque in Touba
and by strengthening relations between the
marabout hierarchy and the BDS, Senghor’s
party which would later become the Progres-
sive Senegalese Union (UPS). His importance in
the history of the Mouride brotherhood lies in
the fact that throughout his reign he main-
tained the unshakeable support of the peasant
masses. It was also during this caliphate that the
fragmentation of mouridism into increasingly
numerous ‘houses’ was accentuated, as was the
acquisition of a certain autonomy vis-à-vis the
central authority of the brotherhood by the
m a r a b o u t s .
The death of the Mouride marabout coincid-
ed with the intensification of social movements,
notably strikes by workers and students. For the
first time, the urban crises were now combined
with peasant unrest, which thanks to the unfail-
ing support of the marabouts had always been
contained. The causes of this were: the end of
French subsidies to the groundnut industry,
which was henceforth aligned at a lower world
price (an alignment which entailed a lowering
of producers’ prices and a fierce erosion of the
incomes of peasants and marabouts); an exacer-
bation of the debts owed by peasants; and
increasingly frequent recourse to brutal meth-
ods of recovery by the Senegalese authorities.
Even worse, this marked the start of the cycle of
droughts which would accelerate the exodus of
peasants from the groundnut basin to the
towns and towards commercial activities. 
This context led the new Caliph General to
inaugurate a new style. The seventh son of the
founder, Abdou Lahat Mbacke (1905-1989),
took charge of the grievances of the peasants
whom he publicly defended, notably at the
annual M a g a l in Touba. However, he did not
break with the regime which he continued to
support while developing autonomy for himself
and his community. He will certainly be remem-
bered by the Mouride community under his
nickname ‘the Builder’. Indeed, he was the archi-
tect of the urbanization of Touba, the centre of
gravity where a mosque was completely fin-
ished under his caliphate. He constructed an
immense library and set up a print-shop to pre-
serve and disseminate the works of the founder.
He was simultaneously the architect of the
brotherhood’s financial security and of its
entrance into the city, with the control of the
commercial sector by the Modou-modou ( i t i n e r-
ant traders, organizers of the informal sector,
importers of household electrical appliances
and rice, small industrialists, haulage contrac-
tors, etc.) Today, the success of Mouride urban
economic enterprise can be read in all of the
features that bear traces of Mouride identity.
The followers of Mouridism have become the
masters of all the urban markets in Senegal and
have woven dense networks of solidarity
throughout the markets of the world, through
which they circulate capital and offers of work
with an unrivalled security. These changes mark
the end of the ‘groundnut marabouts’ and her-
ald in the era of the ‘wheeler-dealer’ marabout.
The secular marabout, Abdou Lahat, was suc-
ceeded by the erudite Abdou Khadre Mbacke,
the imam of the mosque of Touba for two
decades. His caliphate was of short duration
(1989-90). He preferred meditation and the
silence of prayer to his predecessor’s flamboy-
ant personality and clear-cut political stand in
favour of President Abdou Diouf. He passed
away on 13 May, 1990.
Abdou Khadre was succeeded by Serign
Saliou Mbacke (1915- ). Closer in style to his pre-
decessor, he seems to wish to put an end to the
brotherhood’s political engagement. No longer
having a secretary to maintain a link with politi-
cal power, the new Caliph seems to be opting
for a return to the original Mouridism and agri-
cultural activities. He has thus succeeded in
obtaining the declassification and the defor-
estation of the last protected forest in the west-
ern centre of Senegal – Khelcom. Nevertheless,
he has resumed the urbanization of Touba by
deciding to enlarge the mosque and complete
the construction of an Islamic university begun
by Abdou Lahat Mbacke. Certainly his style
leaves more room for the activities of different
branches of Mouridism, notably the young
marabouts looking for economic and financial
opportunities and for lucrative political patron-
a g e .
The organization of the brotherhood is hierar-
chical. It relies on the relationship of submission
of the t a a l i b e to the marabout. The latter may
require the former to make a contribution in
kind, money, or work in the fields just as he may
tell him how to vote, which must be obeyed
without any sort of hesitation or question. On
the other hand, the marabout undertakes to
save the soul of his disciple. He must also act as
his intermediary with the bureaucracy and
modern institutions. He must help him in time
of need. Even if the relationship tends to favour
the marabout, the latter does have his duties
towards the t a a l i b e. From their marabouts t a a l-
i b e civil servants derive the support needed to
occupy the highest positions in the administra-
tion and the government.
Beyond these contingencies, it is clear that
the brotherhood system has been the particular
form of appropriating Islam of certain Sene-
galese societies which, at the same time, have
made of it a syncretic way of conserving/ex-
pressing their traditional religiosity. Senegalese
Islam has followed varied and unstable paths,
embracing all of the economic, political, social,
and cultural sectors. Today, in the diversity of its
brotherhoods, in its idioms and its areas of
predilection, it is attempting to construct an
identity removed from the influence of the rul-
ing class and the ruling party. If the Mouride
brotherhood fulfils itself in its economic activi-
ties and in its venture to achieve modernization
and internationalization rooted in its own val-
ues, the t i j a a n will not succeed in freeing them-
selves from the constraints of political vote-
catching. Probably the convergence of the dif-
ferent brotherhood identities is the principal
obstacle to developing so-called fundamental-
ist religious movements. This would probably
result in the marabouts’ direct participation in
the political arena. ♦
Dr Mamadou Diouf is professor at Cheikh Anta Diop
University/CODESRIA, Dakar.
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L A M I N  S A N N E H
The relationship between religion and politics, between
church and state, has been a well rehearsed issue in Mus-
lim thought and practice, because Islam emerged fully
into history as a dual tradition of church and state, and
because as such Muslims have been less sanguine than
Europeans about making a rigid separation between the
secular and the sacred, or between the public and pri-
vate domain. By virtue of such history and by reason of
the subsequent Western secular expansion in the Mus-
lim world, there is widespread reaction to the legitimacy
of national secular governments among contemporary






The Western colonial encounter with Muslim
Africa had a direct impact on the pre-colonial
legacy of church-state relations. In general the
encounter helped strengthen the tradition of
Muslim religious and political integration, either
through direct provocation or through concilia-
tion and collaboration. Thus the British invasion
of north Nigeria provoked resistance among the
guardians of the Muslim theocratic state found-
ed in 1804, forcing the British to use conciliation
and concessions to overcome that resistance
and legitimize their power. The British proceed-
ed to cut a deal with Muslim leaders: there
would be no undue interference in religious
institutions and local customs, but instead the
colonial administration would work through
those religious structures to govern the people.
In effect, Muslims would become co-partners in
the colonial enterprise.
The French colonial policy was a variation of
the British one. In theory, the French demanded
total surrender and commitment from their
Muslim subjects, setting up the colonial bureau-
cratic state to reformulate and regulate Muslim
affairs, with military muscle added for demon-
strated effect. In practice, however, bureaucratic
or military confrontation was too costly a way to
achieve permanent subjugation, and so the
French decided to invest in the Muslim rosary
and the ink pot to reach the hearts of the people.
As a result, pious saintly figures were courted
and patronized; they were invited to state func-
tions. sent on pilgrimage to Mecca at state
expense, and treated to lavish official blandish-
ments. Muslim learning was endowed, schools
supported, colonial administrators trained in
Arabic language and literature and in Islamic
subjects, Arabic works collected and translated,
and libraries furnished with Islamic books, man-
uscripts and journals. By thus identifying them-
selves with Islam’s intellectual and educational
heritage, the French hoped to earn the lasting
gratitude and respect of their Muslim subjects,
which in many significant places they were able
to do.
Yet it became clear that this policy of colonial
reinforcement was contradictory, because the
justification of colonial rule as the transmitter of
Western enlightenment and progress sat awk-
wardly with the contrasting logic of the colonial
system as the propagator of Islam. Ultimately,
colonial rule would have to abdicate to the Mus-
lim agents it had successfully raised and trained,
handing over to them the fruits of power and the
machinery of a modern state.
Thus both in the British and French cases, the
Muslim religious and political impulse was
strengthened with the decision to conciliate and
reward. A certain identity of interest came to
exist between administrators and Muslim lead-
ers, allowing the imperial overlords to press one
of two options: either colonial rule could contin-
ue through strategic alliance with Muslim struc-
tures and institutions, or else it could cease for-
mally through an equally strategic handing over
to predisposed Muslim elites. In so far as Britain
had an official Muslim policy, one colonial
authority described it in the 1870s as follows:
‘The Mohammedan question is regarded by the
Government as one of the most important in the
future of west and Central Africa. If Islam is prop-
erly understood, if its youth inoculated with
British civilisation and British ideas are utilised by
British administrators and merchants, it will give
England a wider and more permanent influence
upon the millions of the Sudan than can possibly
be wielded by any other agency.’1 In the particu-
lar case of north Nigeria and its large and signifi-
cant Muslim population, the British targeted the
Muslim political elites, the emirs, as indispens-
able to this Islamic policy. The administrators
reasoned that ‘the placing at the disposal of the
Emirs of the resources of an ordered State
inevitably strengthened and developed all
Moslem institutions in Northern Nigeria.’2
Colonialism became the Muslim shield, and
the riposte to the West’s religious minimalism. In
one example in British administered Adamawa
in Nigeria, the resident colonial officer presided
over a meeting called by Muslims who headed
the Native Authorities set up by the British. The
meeting would receive charges from the Mus-
lims against the Danish missionaries of the
province for allowing the classes for religious
instruction to be taken by village catechists in
mission schools. The meeting, held at Yola, the
provincial headquarters, considered how these
classes were in fact political platforms producing
‘young rebels’, i.e., a class of young people not
under the direct influence of the Muslim Native
Authorities. The colonial administration backed
the Muslim demands against missionary objec-
tions, for abolishing the religious instruction
classes.3 Thus colonialism became the Muslim
shield, and the guarantor of Islam as the public
alternative to Christianity for Africans.
The Roots of Controversy:
Integration or Separation?
The issue of integrating religion and politics
plunged post-independent Nigeria into a major
constitutional controversy when the military
government of General Babangida, who ruled
from 1985 to 1993, enrolled Nigeria as a member
of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). To
challenge that decision the Christian association
of Nigeria (CAN) was formed in 1986 as an ecu-
menical grouping of Protestants, Catholics and
African Independent Churches. CAN issued a
statement protesting the federal government
backing for sharicah courts in north Nigeria and
asking for an identical public status for Christian-
ity. Yet CAN’s strategy of demanding privileges
for Christians comparable to those being offered
to Muslims set it on the Muslim side of the fault
line, with Christians wheeling and dealing on a
stage Muslims constructed for their own pur-
pose. For example, the Kaduna Branch of CAN
published a statement asking the government
to offset any concessions to the sharicah with
similar concessions to Christians by establishing
a Christian constitution based on ecclesiastical
courts.4 Muslims welcomed CAN’s platform,
forcing a catch-22 upon Christians by challeng-
ing them to say which they preferred, ecclesiasti-
cal canon law, English Common Law, or secular
law. The debate as it has been conducted in
Nigeria has been a one-sided affair in which
Muslims have taken the offensive and Christians
have reacted with high decibel slogans about
pluralism and multi-culturalism, and with strate-
gies of ecumenial unity striking for their
ephemeral, tactical skittishness. If, by contrast,
the example of Christendom and its disastrous
consequences for genuine pluralism and multi-
culturalism were available to Muslims, it might
calm passions and provide instructive lessons
about the liabilities of religious territoriality in
Africa or elsewhere. In that case, the secular
state, shorn of its anti-religious bias and con-
ceived as a pluralist apparatus, might be less
objectionable, and might thus remove any con-
spiratorial odor from Christian support for such a
state. It turns out, however, that events have pre-
empted the issue, with the regime of General
Babangida acting in 1989 to allow sharicah court
jurisdiction in the north, thus setting aside the
position taken by Christians.
International Muslim solidarity has aided and
abetted national efforts, and has distracted local
Christian attempts to respond to Muslim initia-
tives. After several years as an observer, Nigeria
in 1986 joined the OIC. The OIC was set up fol-
lowing the Third Conference of Islamic Foreign
Ministers in March, 1972 and was registered with
the United Nations in February, 1974. A number
of Islamic agencies was established within the
OIC whose religious mandate was stated as the
commitment ‘to propagate Islam and acquaint
the rest of the world with Islam, its issues and
aspirations.5 Membership in the OIC was limited
to sovereign nation states which are Muslim by
definition, although several states with minority
Muslim populations have joined, including
Benin, Sierra Leone and Uganda. However,
somewhat incoherently, India and Lebanon,
which have significant Muslim populations, have
not been allowed to join. In other respects the
OIC has applied stringent confessional criteria,
from deciding on the venue of its meetings to
granting economic assistance from its $2 billion
development fund and awarding scholarships.
However, such historical cooperation has not
removed all Muslim grievances, so that their
need for trans-national solidarity has pitted Mus-
lims against the West as the source and guardian
of the secular national state, a state that divides
Muslims and sets at naught the just claims of the
ummah.
Thus, in spite of differences of culture and lan-
guage, and in spite of a common desire to suc-
ceed economically, such religious groups are,
even in the West where they have chosen to
immigrate, in the words of legal manuals,
‘bound together by the common tie of Islam that
as between themselves there is no difference of
country, and they may therefore be said to com-
pose but one dar [i.e., dar al-Islam, ‘the abode of
fraternal Islam’]. And, in like manner, all who are
not [Muslims], being accounted as of one faith,
when opposed to them [i.e., Muslims], however
much they may differ from each other in reli-
gious belief, they also may be said to be one dar
[i.e., dar al-harb, ‘the sphere of war and enmity’].
The whole world, therefore, or so much of it as is
inhabited and subject to regular government,
may thus be divided’ along these lines.6
C o n c l u s i o n
The intellectual challenge to the modern
West is whether it can conceive a modification
of the separation of church and state to allow a
degree of interdependence. Too much is at
stake in the importance of the State as a non-
corporate, non-doctrinaire institution to allow
it to fall victim to Enlightenment scruples
about not mixing religion and politics. The
pragmatist liberal scruple that proceeds upon
religion in the fashion of individual entitle-
ment and free speech is in one sense the spoilt
fruit of the original insight about keeping Cae-
sar and God separate, about ensuring religious
freedom against state power and jurisdiction.
That insight became twisted into religion as
individual enlightenment and free speech, as a
rights issue under state jurisdiction, in fact as a
matter of private, individual choice without
public merit. So Muslim critics are correct that
rights without God are meaningless, but mis-
taken to require from that a religious state.
Muslims are right that if we only have human
authority as final arbiter of human rights, then
there simply is no basis for saying one individ-
ual has rights of person and property against
the multitude: against the individual, the mul-
titude’s will is inexorable and final by reason
merely of numerical preponderance. Human
rights as such is meaningless in that environ-
ment precisely because the individual has
been assured no God-given rights. That is why
human rights must presume a public tribunal
insulated from the tyranny of numbers by
being grounded in faith in the divine right of
personhood, a faith that fosters the twin cul-
ture of rights and obligations, of freedom and
community. Yet we have to say that the reli-
gious view also needs qualifying. A church-
state integration is bound to threaten civil
society, so that in one move of state capture of
religion the brakes are removed from political
excess and in turn applied to freedom and
commitment, in effect pressing political expe-
diency into the service of a false absolute.
The modern West would do well to appreci-
ate the crucial role of religion and politics in
the Muslim world rather that to persist with
the secular liberal preference of ‘commodify-
ing’ religion for short-term political goals. Alex-
is de Tocqueville noted this tendency, saying
government by habit preferred the useful to
the moral and would, therefore, require the
moral to be useful. Muslim tradition represents
it differently, arguing for the proximity of
church and state on the grounds that religion
is too enmeshed in life to exclude it, though
historical experience suggests that integrating
the two damages both of them. Governments
that anoint themselves with religious warrants
endanger themselves. We need the safety wall
of separation thus to tame the State and to cre-
ate a public space for religion and also to foster
pluralism and minority rights. ♦
Dr Lamin Sanneh is D. Willis James Professor of
Missions and World Christianity, professor of History,
Yale University.
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TA S S A D I T  Y A C I N E
The legislative elections of June 1997 have enabled an
apparently new political map to be drawn up. From
these elections emerged a coalition government com-
posed of ministers representing the RND, the FLN and
the MSP (Mouvement de la Société pour la Paix [Move-
ment of Society for Peace], formerly Hamas, the moder-
ate Islamic political tendency described in more detail
below). These three parties constitute the current
majority in the Assembly – a majority which gives Presi-
dent Zeroual a degree of room to manoeuvre.
The HAMAS Movement
A Moderate
F a c e o f A l g e r i a n
I s l a m i s mFor its part, the parliamentary opposition ismade up of parties occupying about a hundred
seats. Some of these parties are very old; oth-
ers have appeared more recently. The former
are characterized by the charisma of their lead-
ers, the leaders of the national movement.
Essentially, they are the FFS (Hocine Aïr
Ahmed’s Front des Forces Socialistes), the PRS
(Mohammed Boudiaf’s Parti de la Révolution
Socialiste; which dissolved itself in 1979), the
PCA (Parti Communiste Algérien which was
later to become the PAGS) and the MDA
(Ahmed Ben Bella’s Mouvement pour la
Démocratie en Algérie). As their acronyms sug-
gest, the PRS and the FFS, as well as the PAGS,
remain attached to the principles of the revo-
lution in its socialist sense. Ben Bella’s MDA,
which arrived late in the day, advocates
democracy and does not abandon the idea of
modern Islam. They recruit from the older gen-
eration (those who experienced the Algerian
War) but also from younger people: those who
are discontented with the system. As far as the
FFS, the PRS and the PAGS are concerned, they
are composed of intellectuals who are looking
for an ideological and political doctrine (social-
ism and democracy in the case of the first two
parties, socialism without democracy in the
case of the PAGS and democracy without
socialism in the case of the MDA). In addition
to a radical reform of the system that it has
always advocated, the FFS has succeeded in
opening itself up to other demands: the Berber
culture and gender equality. Generally speak-
ing, almost all of these parties are open to
progress and the separation of politics and reli-
g i o n .
Recent Opposition or
R a d i c a l I s l a m i s m
It is the Islamists who are mobilizing the most
and who are mainly recruiting among the
working class (the FIS) and the more favoured
classes (Hamas, Nahda, etc.). Roughly speak-
ing, one could say that two main currents run
across the opposition parties as a whole: radi-
cal opposition to the government such as the
old FIS (dissolved). This movement has given
birth to at least two armed branches (MIA and
AIS), as well as the GIA. With the ‘truce’ of 1997,
the old FIS is attempting to return to the polit-
ical stage. The guerrillas, led by the GIA, are, of
course, opposed to negotiation. The Islamist
area is troubled by bloody disputes according
to the objectives of the various factions which
appear to follow different strategies. The GIA,
on one side infiltrated by the security services
and by groups linked to the organized crime
surrounding it are also in favour of the eradica-
tion of everything which does not conform to
their vision of the world. The armed wing of
the FIS (the AIS) seems more politicized than
the GIA and it is no coincidence if the govern-
ment undertakes negotiations with represen-
tatives of the AIS, thus ‘killing two birds with
one stone’: it is a way of excluding the GIA and
the political leaders of the old FIS. 
‘Moderate’ Opposition
or Islam à la Carte
This is composed of Islamists who are militat-
ing in favour of the institution of an Islamic
republic but within the context of ‘republican’
order. Through their participation in political
life, these parties are trying to reconcile reli-
gion and modernity, opposition and govern-
ment and not opposition to the government,
as can be seen with Hamas which, led by Mah-
foud Nahnah, has become the Movement of
society for civil peace – one of the important
parties on the political scene.
HAMAS (MSP)
If ambiguities, contradictions and demagogy
are the characteristics of government, then the
latter is not alone in making use of these
because opposition parties have recourse to
the same practices. With the RCD and Euahadi,
we are dealing with the ‘radical’, anticlerical
opposition to the government while Mahfoud
Nahnah’s Hamas constitutes a moderate ‘reli-
gious’ opposition to the government since it is
the only one (with Djaballah’s Ennahdha) to
officially embody Islam. But the Islam to which
Hamas lays claim is very open and modernist in
appearance compared with that advocated by
the old FIS.
Since Algeria gained independence, Hamas,
now the MSP, has been represented on the
political scene by its charismatic leader Mah-
foud Nahnah. Arabist in the eastern manner,
linked to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the
Sheikh is nonetheless far removed from other
Islamists both in terms of image and strategy.
Physically, the Sheikh resembles any other
modern-day Arab or Muslim leader. Dressed in
an expensive Western suit and tie, his beard
neatly trimmed, he gives the impression of
membership of a modernist elite which is nev-
ertheless linked to Islam. In fact, Hamas em-
braces a middle class from the business world
(tradesmen) but also Arabist technocrats and a
scientific elite. Hamas’ social base distinguish-
es itself diametrically from that of the FIS
sphere of influence. Contrary to the FIS, which
extols social justice, Hamas bases its strategy
on order and thus respect for the ‘prince’.
It is doubtless for this reason that Sheikh
Nahnah will very soon distance himself from
the radical Islamists. Is this really based on
principles of tolerance and open-mindedness
or political calculation? We shall never know.
Since 1988, he violently opposed Ali Benhaj
whom he calls a fanatic. He was, at first, equal-
ly opposed to the formation of Islamic political
parties before creating one himself. According
to Nahnah’s project, it is the State as a whole
which must be re-Islamized. Sheikh Nahnah’s
project is not far removed from that of the fun-
damentalists of the 1940s in that it is based on
the moral and religious education of society,
preaching and charitable action. He shows
himself favourable to the emancipation of
women and their participation in modern soci-
ety, thus granting them the opportunity to
improve and raise themselves but while
remaining within the context of Islamic law.
According to the Sheikh, women are equal to
men in the context of the family code (inspired
directly by the Sharia) that is currently in force
and which does not recognize this equality
that Sheikh Nahnah nevertheless makes his
hobby horse.
Contrary to that of his rivals, Mahfoud Nah-
nah’s strategy thus consists of compromising
with the system while making token conces-
sions. As in the struggle which opposed the
radical nationalists (Messali Hadj) and the oth-
ers (the moderates, UDMA and Oulémas unit-
ed), the struggle here consists of claiming the
paternity of Islam, thus legitimacy. Hamas is
showing itself open (is it?) by making conces-
sions with the aim of gaining the sympathy of
the population which was hostile to the old FIS,
in the hope of winning over the ‘middle-class’
strata which had little sympathy for the ‘secu-
lar’ democratic parties. He is encouraging com-
merce, private enterprise, the participation of
women in development, etc. With the FIS
banned, the Sheikh has all the room he needs
to channel an entire ‘Islamist’ population that is
now in disarray. His situation as a representa-
tive of Islam in a position of strength (with Dja-
ballah’s Ennahdha) – in other words, aligning
itself with the government – does not entirely
earn him credit. On the contrary, because, in
the eyes of the radical Islamists, Hamas discred-
its itself by siding with the government. He
allows the system to use religion in the same
way as it uses secularity. None of these contra-
dictions embarrass Hamas which exists legally
not because it represents Islam but because
basically it poses no danger to the existing sys-
tem. The last elections are there to prove that
Nahnah is the man of the moment. He has suc-
ceeded in granting himself real legitimacy by
capturing part of the old FIS’s power base. Nah-
nah knows how to bend his shoulders to
achieve his final objective: to wait and compro-
mise in order to share power legally.
Perhaps recent events (following the mas-
sacres of the summer of 1997) will lead to a re-
composition of the political scene, particularly
in view of the civil truce initiated by the FIS and
its armed wing, the AIS (Armée Islamique du
Salut, or Islamic Salvation Army). If the radical
Islamists return to the political scene (even
under a different banner), they will unquestion-
ably contribute to a change in circumstances
and, in a way, to an intrusion on their rivals’ pre-
serves. With the civil truce, the government will
have succeeded in fragmenting the Islamist
movements in the hope of isolating the GIA
who are continuing to practise their own
bloody form of guerrilla warfare. In that it is
eminently political, the game played by moder-
ate Islamists appears from this fact to be more
profitable than that of the radicals. ♦
Dr Tassadit Yacine is a lecturer at the École des
Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS).
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Islamic cultures have inherited and
d eveloped a legacy of urbanism that
s t retches back to the ancient
civilizations of the Middle East.
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such as that of historic China Islamic
societies formed themselves into
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H A M O U D S AL H I
Following the ‘bread riots’ of October 1988, the Islamist
movement was the biggest benefactor of the introduc-
tion of democracy in Algeria, quickly amassing huge
political support and winning landslide victories in local
and legislative elections. But instead of using its newly
acquired power to install democratic principles
throughout Algeria, the Islamist movement fell victim
to its own aspirations. Today, as Algeria observes the
tenth anniversary of the October riots, certain conclu-
sions are self-evident. Overall, Algeria’s Islamist leader-
ship has proven ill equipped to handle its success or its
own agenda.
Algeria’s Islamist
M o v e m e n t
Victims of Success
The Riots
The typical Algerian who demonstrated in
the country’s major cities, now a decade ago,
was compelled more by immediate economic
concerns than long-term political goals like
democracy. For years, Algerians suffered the
consequences of failed economic policies and
had finally grown frustrated with chronic
unemployment, inadequate wages, inflation
and substandard housing. Those who took to
the streets in October 1988 protested for basic
necessities, hoping to get the government’s
attention if not economic reform.
Political pluralism was not on their agenda:
the FLN’s (National Liberation Front) one-party
system of government maintained such firm
control of opposition activities inside the coun-
try that it became too difficult to engage in
political activism against the State. As such,
opposition leaders like Ait Ahmed of the Social-
ist Front Forces (FFS) and former President
Ahmed Ben Bella concentrated their activities
within Europe, trying to mobilize Algerians liv-
ing abroad, not locally, against the FLN’s politi-
cal monopoly. Furthermore, Algerians were dis-
inclined to pursue pluralism as the opposition
groups were widely perceived as weak and ‘out
of touch’ with the population.
In this way, the religious Islamist opposition
was somewhat an exception. Though active,
the Islamist movement was too divided to
effectively challenge the state authorities when
the bread riots occurred. The Islamists, howev-
er, were succeeding in relating to Algeria’s dis-
heartened society and capitalizing upon the
failure of the FLN’s secular approach to devel-
opment. More importantly, they channelled
the population’s mounting anger against the
government to their own advantage: collecting
huge sums of money from donors, they pro-
moted themselves by constructing privately-
run mosques and responded to social needs by
providing houses for newly-weds and Islamic
dresses for young girls.
Effects of the Riots
Following the October riots, the political liber-
alization initiated by President Benjedid was
welcomed by Algerians of every ideological
stripe: in less than six months, more than 50 par-
ties were formed. Unlike any other time, Algerian
leaders were now seen debating, criticizing each
other and government policies. Behind the
scenes, however, the FLN retained its colossal
powers and continued to privatize the economy,
relaxing laws on importation and price controls.
For the vast majority of Algerians, the quick
combination of democratization and privatiza-
tion was proving disastrous. Government poli-
cies were benefiting a privileged few who
could seize new opportunities in the markets.
In contrast, the Algerian state struggled with
international debts due to a sharp decline in oil
revenues, forcing the FLN to relinquish some of
its social welfare responsibilities, particularly in
health care, education and housing.
The government’s failure to address the socio-
economic problems of the masses had a tremen-
dous impact on the Islamist movement, now
legalized and represented by more than 15
political institutions. Specifically, it legitimized
the Islamists’ struggle for a better state and even
rallied enough militant support to make violent
change an option. With social disparities even
more glaring, the Islamists had become the
voice of the impoverished. As democratic
change slowly became a part of Algerian life, the
Islamist movement was growing rapidly and
evolving into the most potent political force in
the country.
Rise of the Islamist Movement
Undoubtedly, the Islamists’ greatest success
was in connecting with Algeria’s abandoned
youth – those who failed in school and in the
labour market and who were portrayed as soci-
ety’s losers. To them, the mosques became a
place of refuge where respect and understand-
ing could be found, where the state’s policies
and the government’s shortcomings were to
blame for their personal failures. Armed with a
new attitude and seen as being in touch with
God, the abandoned youth quickly regained
respectability in society, something it clearly
owed to the Islamist movement and no one else.
Although the budding Islamist movement was
gaining momentum, internal strife hindered its
development as a viable political entity. Though
bonded by common religious symbols, sets
within the movement were increasingly divided
over political strategies and ideological issues
and appeared to be moving in two distinct direc-
tions: one towards greater unification and the
other towards fragmentation. Before 1988,
many religious and political disagreements were
left to be sorted out in the mosques. This contin-
ued during the democratization process; all
Islamists seemed united in their antagonism
towards the secular state, but sharp differences
remained over how Islam was to solve Algeria’s
problems. Ultimately, the mosques themselves
became host to disputes, contributing to frag-
mentation within the movement.
Ideological Divisions
Divisions within the Islamist movement have
existed since the 1970s between the Liberal-
Algerianites, Djeza’ara, who advocated an
indigenous form of Islamic activism and the
Shoyoukh, ‘elder persons’, who believed in
linking Algeria’s Islamist movement with the
Mashreq’s, particularly the Muslim Brother-
hood of Egypt. The differences between Djeza-
’ara and Shoyoukh have centred on how they
perceived the role of Islam in modern society
and in governmental policies. 
The Djeza’ara have followed Malek Bennabi,
an Algerian scholar and philosopher. Educated
in France in the 1950s, Bennabi later lived in
Egypt and returned to Algeria when it became
independent. Bennabi’s thoughts encompass
elements of Western modernity and Islamic
traditions and intend to reconcile these two
contradictory facets of Algerian life. To
Bennabi, Western civilization can be beneficial
to the Muslim world, especially in the areas of
science and administration. But Bennabi has
also criticized Western civilization for its moral
decay and has urged Muslims to be cautious in
what they take from it. Bennabi has been influ-
ential among university students and others
who believe that openness to Western culture
is necessary for Algeria’s development and,
more recently, parties such as the Algerian
Islamic Assembly.
In contrast, the Shoyoukh have long con-
tended that the Algerian religious establish-
ment lacked the intellectual background to
form a religious doctrine without the Mashreq’s
help. Many of this group were former students
of Sheik Abdel Hamid Bin Badis, the founder of
the Ulama Association, a reformist movement
formed in 1930 to combat France’s coloniza-
tion and prepare Algerian society for indepen-
dence. During the 1970s and 1980s, many
leaders sought to establish ties with the Egypt-
ian Brotherhood in an attempt to link the
Algerian struggle for an Islamist state with oth-
ers in the Mashreq. Now, the reformist ideas of
the Shoyoukh are represented by many mod-
erate Islamist parties, like Hamas, even though
an alliance with the Mashreq is no longer
s o u g h t .
Despite their differences, the Djeza’ara and
the Shoyoukh have shared a common disdain
for the FLN’s overall treatment of religion,
especially its moves to impose state control
over mosques. Additionally, the two Islamist
camps have both supported incremental social
change and working to change Algeria’s politi-
cal structure from within society.
Since the mid-1980s, however, this moderate
approach has been shunned by the younger
Islamist recruits who reject peaceful change
and adhere to a strict interpretation of Islamic
texts. Known as Salaf, in reference to the fol-
lowers of the Prophet Mohammed and his way
of life, this camp espouses the ideas of many
militant thinkers, including Egyptian Seyyed
Qotb and Pakistani Abou Alla al Mawdudi.
These recruits have come to see Islam through
the eyes of Iranian revolutionaries, Afghan
rebels and older militant Islamists who have
provided literature and tapes about radical
Islam. It has been this younger set that has so
markedly radicalized the Islamist movement in
the 1990s, as many of them have become mem-
bers of groups preaching violence as a means
of change. Consistent with their role models,
the ultimate goal of these recruits is to estab-
lish a Sharia state, the rule of religious authori-
t y .
When the October events occurred, no oppo-
sition group – religious or secular – was in a
position to effectively organize the Algerian
masses with the intent to impose a new politi-
cal order. In the absence of a charismatic lead-
ership, the Islamist movement grew but the
loyalty of its adherents was mostly directed to a
local leader, not a national figure. As a result,
while the Islamist movement was expanding, it
also became increasingly prone to fragmenta-
tion. Generally, people were joining Islamist
institutions out of religious conviction, not for
political reasons. Consequently, many found
themselves supporting political parties that did
not necessarily represent their views. This was
characteristic of the membership of the FIS.
Rise and Fall of the FIS
Soon after Algeria’s democratization process
began, the Islamist movement was dominated
by a single party, the Islamic Salvation Front
(FIS). Unlike other Islamic political parties,
which had strict recruitment policies, the FIS
recruited various types of people, regardless of
their educational background, gender or race.
This open-door policy gave the FIS a truly pop-
ulist appeal and helped it to cinch victory in
the electoral polls of the early 1990s.
But other FIS policies were partly responsible
for the fragmentation of the movement. On
several occasions, FIS leader Abassi Madani
declined invitations to attend the gatherings
of other political parties, even making a mock-
ery of some. Instead of acting as a unifying
force within the movement, the FIS alienated
the smaller Islamist groups. In addition, the
FIS’s open-door recruitment policy brought
serious divisions within the party’s own politi-
cal structure; with so much diversity, it seemed
impossible to maintain the democratic spirit at
all times. The FIS’s second-in-command, Ali
Belhaj, exacerbated the problem with his
repeated objections to democracy, calling it an
alien concept and a source of evil. Having
never visited a democratic state, Belhaj was
merely reiterating what other militant thinkers,
particularly Qotb and Mawdudi, had written.
Still, since the FIS included members from the
Djeza’ara, Shoyoukh and Salaf camps, Belhaj’s
position fuelled more disagreement among
the ranks.
It was increasingly evident that for Madani
and Belhaj, the struggle in Algeria was not for
democracy, but rather for the establishment of
a Sharia state. Several instances indicated that
the FIS leadership was more interested in accu-
mulating political power than in actually shar-
ing it. The FIS acted as if it were a state within
the Algerian state, setting up courts in the
mosques to punish violators and creating its
own military force, the Armed Islamic Salva-
tion. Furthermore, the FIS leaders appeared
tolerant of political violence; they stood silent
when militant Islamists from their own ranks
formed the menacing Armed Islamic Group.
Then, in June 1991, they called for a strike to
boycott the country’s electoral laws, a strike
that later turned bloody as over 500 people
died in clashes with the state police. It is also
notable that, until recently, the FIS had not
condemned the horrific violence perpetrated
by some militants against Algerian civilians.
Of all of its shortcomings, the FIS’s biggest
mistake was to underestimate the Algerian
military. With its overwhelming success in the
local elections in the early 1990s, the FIS
became overconfident, believing that it could
topple the military politically. The FIS went so
far as to solicit soldiers to join its ranks in an
attempt to rescue the State from its malaise of
corruption and socio-economic problems. This
was a gross miscalculation; the military saw the
FIS’s call as a threat to its national supremacy.
In response, the military forcefully intervened
before the FIS could win an absolute majority
in the 1992 parliamentary elections and
rewrite the Algerian constitution to its own
terms. Shortly thereafter, the FIS was officially
banned. But since the ousting of the FIS from
the formal political arena, the smaller Islamist
parties have also failed to lay claim to the
Islamist leadership or to put an end to the ter-
rorism carried out by certain extremist groups.
Undoubtedly, the Islamist movement was a
major political force in Algeria during the ini-
tial stages of its democratization. Ideological
fragmentation and the spread of militant
Islam, however, has since undermined the
movement and spun it out of control. In retro-
spect, the Islamist movement misused the
democratic process, but did not escape the
consequences of that abuse. ♦
Dr Hamoud Salhi is a journalist for Gulf News.
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E g y p t
I M AN  F A R AG
The discourse on education in Egypt uses key terms
such as reform and crisis. It is rare to find a society that
is satisfied with its educational system. What seems
important here is to analyse that which is considered as
related to education. In other words, to what extent
education is considered among the major causes of
societal problems or, as the magic solution to these
p r o b l e m s .
E d u c a t i o n a l
D e b a t e
in Egypt
On the one hand, educational policies are
mainly guided by socio-economic orientations
and the Egyptian case is nothing but the illus-
tration of the irreconcilable social choices that
may emerge in a neo-liberal context. On the
other hand, this debate is embedded in what
seem to be competitive cultural choices and
the educational debate often borrows the
terms of identity. The Islamic idiom here plays
the role of a common language, but it does not
imply any prior agreement on the meaning of
the key terms of this language. Finally, the
ongoing educational debate takes place in a
society characterized by a high rate of illitera-
cy. The latter subject is discussed less passion-
ately than other topics. This has to do with the
social interests which are directly affected by
education rather than by its absence; it seems
that those who share literacy and who are con-
cerned by the struggle over central values,
seem also to share a common view on those
who are excluded from education. They are
commonly perceived as an obstacle to Egypt’s
successful entry into the twenty-first century.
One can identify three points in this debate.
First, it seems that those who produce knowl-
edge about education are very little concerned
with the relationship between their own criti-
cal discourse and the knowledge they have
acquired via schooling. The only type of dis-
course that gives room to such a testimony
seems to be autobiographies. But this kind of
literature shares another feature of the ‘objec-
tive’ discourse. It is the assumption that the
past is always better than the present. Here
again, one may wonder about this vision of his-
tory based on steady regression. Finally, as for
the participants in this public debate, we note
the absence of some of the main actors:
schoolteachers are hardly present, as if being
only part of the problem.
Reconsidering Polarities
It is quite simplistic to reduce the debate to
the familiar opposition between two options
setting tradition against modernity, or even
allegedly secular against religious views of the
world. This goes for trends within the State’s
apparatus itself. Supporters of the social agen-
da of neo-liberalism perceive education as a
way to correct some side-effects of economic
liberalization. They are more concerned with
social exclusion than poverty and they call for
the partial withdrawal of the State and the
introduction of an economic rationale; they
may belong to Islamic or to secular trends as
well. Those who defend education as a means
of class restructuring do stress the view of edu-
cation as a social right and the role of the State
as guarantor. Here also, cultural options are
not homogeneous. When it comes to social
choices, the extreme views, either neo-liberal
or exclusively state-centred, are quite marginal
and there is room for consensus on the central-
ity of education in realizing competing objec-
tives ranging from equality to the formation of
a highly qualified elite. There is a common con-
cern about both development and identity
whatever their definition is, and the education-
al debate shows similarities in antagonistic
o p i n i o n s .
Overestimation of the role of schools seems
closely related to the self-perception of the
Egyptian elite. What seems more difficult to
understand is the fact that Egypt is often per-
ceived by its elite as characterized by millenni-
al continuity, while being constantly threat-
ened by civilizational invasion. The quest for
identity does not seem to create tremendous
problems in the daily life of millions of Egyp-
tians, while the debate on the identity of Egypt
is the most recurrent. One of the issues of this
latter relates to educational programmes; it
seems that language, history, civil education
and religious programmes are subjects of pas-
sionate debate, while mathematics does not
arouse the same interest among intellectuals.
Despite the importance of educational
reform as a ritual theme, the educational issue
in Egypt was reshaped in the 1990s. This is
essentially due to re-islamization, which acts
more as a common reference than as a homo-
geneous trend. It may take the form of an
oppositional trend but some of its aspects con-
tribute to the preservation of the social order.
Rather than perceiving these processes of re-
islamization as stemming solely from the
Islamic movements, it seems possible to relate
them also to the official discourse of the State.
Schools did not represent one of the major
issues in the debate on re-islamization, till this
debate centred on political violence. This sug-
gests that daily and common practices of re-
islamization, including those directly related to
education, were not perceived as a political
threat or as a challenge to the dominant values
before the confrontation between the State
and the participating component of the Islam-
ic trends.
On one hand, political violence is perceived
as a by-product of the educational system.
According to the defenders of this view, this
has to do with the kind of pedagogic authority
exercised within the school. It is said to be
undemocratic and based on obedience. The
role of school is reduced to a mechanical trans-
mission of knowledge, which is said to be
memorized without any criticism nor any
reflection on the values that stand behind it.
For some, educational programmes do not
stress the civic and universal values and carry
an extremist view on religion. For others, these
programmes are intentionally Westernized
and it is the lack of their Islamic component
that prompts the demand for religious knowl-
e d g e .
On the other hand, the debate addresses the
question of Islamist propaganda within
schools. It is said that there is an Islamist plot to
direct young students to the faculties of peda-
gogy and to indoctrinate students in the
schools through sermons and books, not to
mention the conflict over the veil between
some students and their families and the Min-
istry of Education. Unsurprisingly, both sides
were quoting the same references: the individ-
ual’s freedom and the sharica. The effect of this
debate was an eventual politicization of a prac-
tice which is not obviously a political one.
From Reform to Privatization
In the early 1980s a critical discourse on edu-
cation emerged from within the highest level
of the State. This discourse did not deny at first
the legacy of the Nasserist Etat-Providence.
But it pointed out the dysfunctional aspects of
these orientations, especially the fact that so-
called ‘mass education’ has affected quality, a
controversy familiar to Egypt since the 1930s.
This discourse underlined the fact that the
generalization of free schooling should be
maintained along with access to higher educa-
tion which should be more related to job
o p p o r t u n i t i e s .
Nowadays the agenda for policy reforms
contradict former truths. Public provision of
education is said to be largely responsible for
existing inequities and inefficiencies associat-
ed with schooling in developing countries.
This means that the pricing system should play
a role in allocating educational services and
that State involvement in this sector should be
reduced. The neo-liberal agenda argues that
governmental resources are not sufficient for
expanding schooling and not equally allocated
as for basic education, which concerns the
majority and does not receive the correspond-
ing resources.
The political concern was reflected in two
practical orientations: reform and profitability.
The aim of reform here is to rehabilitate public
schools. Educational reforms were directed
toward the renovation of school buildings, the
modernization of educational programmes
and the enhancement of teachers’ skills and
working conditions. This goes too for the
implementation of a medical insurance plan
for students and for the school nutrition pro-
gramme in disadvantaged areas as an incen-
tive. Analysts underline the fact that there
should be an immediate impact of schooling
on the daily life of students and their families
in disadvantaged groups as they are allegedly
unable to perceive the future prospects nor to
invest time, money or energy in schooling on
the basis of these prospects.
It would be oversimplifying to describe this
concern as a retreat of the State. However,
profitability of what is supposed to be a public
service, raises constraints. The implicit rule
here is that profit-earning or at least cost effec-
tive schooling has to be partial and gradual. It
should remain at the margin of the public sys-
tem and should be accepted at least by the
people who are ready to pay for a public ser-
vice which is perceived as being of better qual-
ity than the standard free service. In other
words, profit-earning has to respond to – if not
create – a solvent social demand. Policy mak-
ers seem convinced that when people have to
pay they are more concerned about the ratio-
nal use of public services.
Reform and profitability are competing ori-
entations. Profitability in high-performing sec-
tors may contribute to depreciating the other
disadvantaged sectors which are in need of
reform. The private sector’s logic within public
services has been gradually introduced in
other sectors due to the claim that the paid
services may raise funds in order to improve
free services. This policy has contributed to the
creation of a dual public system; if this logic
has a limited effect in a sector like transport,
the situation is different when it comes to edu-
cation because it has durable effect on the
structure of social opportunities.
With partial privatization within public
schooling, come genuine private schools and
their great variety. The new private schools
range from the leisure-class schools to the
ones for the lower middle class in so-called
informal areas, from the allegedly modern
schools according to Western criteria to the
Islamic schools. Since the early 1960s, private
schooling includes not more than 6% of the
total number of students. But this reduced pro-
portion confirms the social selection, and evi-
dence from field studies has proved that a
great proportion of the students of the top fac-
ulties comes from private schools.
Concerning projections, some authors
described the reform of educational pro-
grammes as a long-term selection process aim-
ing to reduce future demand or at least to
drive this demand to basic education. This
could explain the reshaping of educational
programmes, often described as lacking in crit-
ical thinking, abstract and disconnected with
the environment. It seems that basic education
programmes are now oriented towards a more
operational profile to meet the needs of a
majority of students who will be driven to work
and not to study further, as basic education
conceived as an ultimate educational cycle.
Surely, Egypt will continue to produce edu-
cated people, but it is said that the rate must
be determined by the needs of a market which
is also said to be a global one. One of the leit-
motifs of the discourse holds that for Egypt
education is a matter of national security. This
statement is an accurate summary of the situa-
tion: on one hand it reflects a deep concern; on
the other hand, it expresses the nature of this
concern. As for national defence, internal secu-
rity and the preservation of private property,
education becomes one of the major attribut-
es of the minimal State directly guided by a r a i-
son d’état. It will take time before the effective
results of the neo-liberal orientations affect
social practices which have their own tempo.
Furthermore, neo-liberalism has to deal with
its own illegitimacy and the deeply-rooted eth-
ical perception of the State. Despite the neo-
liberal orientations, the State still acts as if it
were assuming full responsibility for people’s
welfare and asks them to respect the corre-
sponding virtues of allegiance and patience,
while protest movements continue to address
the paternalistic State.
As for the cultural orientations regarding
education, they are merely the combined
effect of Americanization, Islamization and sta-
tism. Concerning social choices too, the pre-
sent state offers paradoxical faces. ♦
Dr Iman Farag is a researcher at the Centre d’Études
et de Documentation, Économique et Juridique et
Sociale (CEDEJ), in Cairo.
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J o r d a n
J O N A TH AN  B E N T H A L L
It is a mass-produced plastic model of the octagonal
Dome of the Rock shrine in Jerusalem. Two circular
strips of paper glued round it depict the ceramic-faced
outer walls. There is a slot for coins to be inserted in the
roof, and the dome slides off so that coins can be taken
out. Mudar, the organiser of the Islamic Zakat Support-
ing Committee for the Palestinian People, gave me this
collecting mosque in Amman, Jordan. I was there con-
ducting a research project to study Islamic philanthropy
and obligatory alms (z a k a t). Well, souvenir models of
Christian churches are two a penny all over the world,
and it would be incredible if some with slots for coins
had not been made somewhere; but I do not remember
seeing one. Could it be that my gift from Mudar has
something to say about a difference between the two
r e l i g i o n s ?
The Qu'ran’s
C a l l t o A l m s
Zakat, the Muslim
Tradition of
A l m s - G i v i n gIt is a mistake to react against the Islamopho-
bia common in the West by accepting a rose-
watered version of Islam as a social panacea.
However, mainline Islam does not get nearly
enough credit for the imperative to give alms,
which is deeply entrenched in the Qu'ran and
traditional authority. Z a k a t is one of the five
‘pillars’ of Islam. Unlike other great sacred
books, the Qu'ran sets out the basic headings
of the budget and expenses of the state, and
historically anticipated by some 12 centuries
the principle of what we call social security.
More people should know of the existence
today of big Islamic relief agencies such as the
International Islamic Relief Organisation,
whose headquarters is in Jeddah and which
operates in countries including Bosnia and
Somalia. Some of the Red Crescent national
societies are highly thought of within the Red
Cross international movement: for instance,
the Iranian Red Crescent, which has special
expertise in earthquake relief. Though the
international movement is strictly secular, the
ethos of the Red Crescent national societies is
underpinned by Islamic tradition.
Mudar’s committee in Amman is more of a
grass-roots operation, of a kind which has rele-
vance to the future of the Middle East. Z a k a t
was originally a form of wealth tax, and some
Islamic states such as Pakistan have tried to
reintegrate it with the official taxation system,
which predictably results in layers of bureau-
cracy. In Jordan, giving zakat is optional but is
encouraged by the government through tax
concessions. Mudar’s committee is licensed to
raise funds in return for a 10 percent contribu-
tion to the government’s own central z a k a t
fund. The committee has eight employees and
collects primarily during the month of
Ramadan, when giving alms is specially meri-
torious, but also throughout the whole year by
means of telephone, fax, videotapes, mail-
shots, and other techniques. Its main activities
are food relief to the West Bank and Gaza, ‘car-
avans of charity’ (mobile health services to iso-
lated villages), scholarships, income-generat-
ing projects and – above all – sponsoring
orphans. Orphans, defined for this purpose as
children without fathers, are specially favoured
by Islamic charities because of many Qu'ranic
injunctions, and because the Prophet Muham-
mad was an orphan himself.
Mudar is in his early thirties, an educated
moderate Islamist living in Jordan. His commit-
tee is affiliated to the Muslim Brothers, who are
particularly active in charitable affairs and who
also form in politics the equivalent of a loyal
opposition to the Hashemite monarchy.
Mudar was insistent on the importance of
trust in matters of charity, with the implication
that the people at large do not trust govern-
ment departments. This is no surprise, for the
concept of trust is fundamental to the English
law of charities. But the commitment to door-
to-door charitable giving has strengthened
Islamist movements in the urban areas of the
Middle East where governmental provision
falls short of often pressing needs. In Jordan, as
in neighbouring countries, when a breadwin-
ner dies it is common for the widow and
orphans to be visited by one of the Islamist
groups and financially supported – which is
remembered in the neighbourhood when the
time comes for a political choice. Studies in
both Egypt and Israeli Arab villages confirm
that local welfare services provided by Islamic
groups are on the whole more effective than
state-sponsored alternatives.
This fusion of politics and religion tempts
some western commentators to infer that
Islamists are like Leninists, politically motivat-
ed tribunes who ruthlessly manipulate popular
sentiment. But this is a misinterpretation. All
popular movements tend to get taken over, to
some degree, by demagogues. But the Qu'ran-
ic imperative to help the poor was vital to the
beginnings of the Muslim Brotherhood in
1920s Egypt and remains an important con-
stituent in most present-day Islamist move-
ments, even when some of their factions have
turned to political violence. By contrast, the
Bolsheviks had no time for private charity and
immediately dissolved all the philanthropic
institutions of pre-revolutionary Russia.
I have no reason to believe that Mudar’s
committee is not strictly humanitarian in the
disbursal of its funds. He told me that a West
Bank orphan will be treated the same way
whether his father was a martyr or an informer
– though I could not check up on this claim.
However, the committee’s appeal literature is
politically emotive, depicting helpless women
and children in confrontation with Israeli sol-
diers. The committee’s logo shows the entire
territory of Palestine (including Israel) superim-
posed on the Dome of the Rock, and this repre-
sents implicitly a rejection of the Oslo accords.
Their collecting mosque thus embodies the
view that the conflict is like any other one of
colonial liberation.
Islamic philanthropy seems to have concen-
trated until recently on helping first, compatri-
ots and second, fellow Muslims. Many tradi-
tional readings of the Qu'ran taught that only
Muslims should be given z a k a t. The main
thrust of the large Islamic relief organisations
funded by the Gulf states is to help poor and
oppressed Muslims – fair enough, considering
the huge numbers of Muslim refugees and the
poverty of many Muslim states – and their
work also includes building mosques and
sponsoring religious education. More recently,
liberal interpretations of the Qu'ran, such as
Sheikh Al-Khayyat’s, have argued that z a k a t
must be paid to the ‘poor’; that is, all the poor.
At the same time, some of the international
Arab charities are gaining a new standing in
the corridors of Geneva by making a point of
extending part of their relief work towards
non-Muslim communities in need.
Z a k a t is a major support in the Islamist case
against both capitalism and communism.
Some ideologues such as Sayyid Qutb claim
that z a k a t is a specifically Islamic concept
superior to Christian charity because, being in
principle mandatory, it neither exalts the giver
nor demeans the recipient. In English, much
confusion has been caused by the conflation of
two entirely different senses of the English
word ‘charity’: charity as spiritual love, or the
New Testament agape, and charity as alms.
This ambiguity has allowed Christians, when
they put their alms in a collection plate, the
luxury of assuming that they are engaged in an
act of spiritual love. Modern churches, by using
terms such as Christian Stewardship, try to
bring the practice of alms-giving back to its
historical origins, where there is hardly more
than differences of emphasis between Jewish,
Christian, and Muslim teaching: all say that
wealth belongs to God rather than to us.
Many New Testament texts praise material
poverty and attack the love of money. Yet in
practice it was within Christianity that capital-
ism emerged, and very few Christians today
give away all they have to the poor. The Islam-
ic prescription of z a k a t – payment of one forti-
eth of one’s assets per year, with many refine-
ments of detail – has much in common with
the references to tithing found in the Penta-
teuch. In general, Islam is more down-to-earth
and practical about money than Christianity.
The many Qu'ranic injunctions to give alms are
reflected today in popular preaching and reli-
gious education; but Muslims are also advised
to keep some money for themselves and to
give in keeping with social rank.
One Jordanian, a civil servant with the min-
istry of religious affairs, neatly defined z a k a t
for me as ‘financial worship’. This is surely a
concept alien to mainstream Christianity.
Back to the collecting mosque. I hope not to
find too many plastic churches with slots and
removable spires, for that would disprove my
hypothesis. But I would be happy to come
across the equivalent thing in synagogues, for
in their teaching about wealth the Jewish and
Islamic traditions have much in common. ♦
Jonathan Benthall is director of the Royal
Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and
I r e l a n d .
This article was first published in The Times Higher
Education Supplement of 3 January 1997, pp. 15-16.
© Times Supplements Limited, 1996.
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K u r d i s t a n
C H R I S T I N E  AL L I S O N
The Yezidis of Kurdistan have been called many things,
most notoriously ‘devil-worshippers,’ a term used both
by unsympathetic neighbours and fascinated Western-
ers. This sensational epithet is not only deeply offensive
to the Yezidis themselves, but quite simply wrong.
Yezidism is not devil-worship, but something far more
elusive, and interesting.
The Evolution of Yezidi Religion
From Spoken Word
to Written Scripture
Yezidis probably number about 250,000
(though reliable statistics are difficult to find)
and their largest communities are currently
found in the Dihok, Mosul and Sinjar areas of
Northern Iraq. Under the Ottoman Empire,
Yezidis played an influential role in Kurdish
tribal confederations, but successive persecu-
tions reduced their numbers and drove waves
of emigrants into the Caucasus, where they
played a notable role in the republics of Arme-
nia and Georgia. Many of the Yezidis of Eastern
Turkey were by the second half of the twenti-
eth century living in small, poor villages sur-
rounded by hostile neighbours, and were
often reduced to practising their religious and
cultural rituals in secret. They have moved e n
m a s s e to Europe, mainly Germany, and the
troubled situation in Northern Iraq has
prompted many prominent members of the
community there to follow them.
The Yezidis are not Muslims. They do not
claim Islamic identity; the majority of them dis-
approve of attempts during the 1970s, enthu-
siastically backed by Arab nationalist groups,
to depict them as Ummayads (largely on the
basis of the somewhat suspect derivation of
the name ‘Yezidi’ from the Caliph Yezid ibn
Mu’awiya). Some Orientalists, such as Roger
Lescot, posited a purely Islamic origin for the
Yezidis, but such interpretations ignore impor-
tant elements of Yezidi mythology and prac-
tice which undoubtedly have ancient Iranian
roots. Historical sources tell us that Yezidism as
we now know it grew from the establishment
in Kurdistan of the ‘Adawiyya order of Sheikh
‘Adi ibn Musafir (c. 1073-1162 CE); Yezidi texts
and customs show that the enormous influ-
ence of Sheikh ‘Adi and his order was overlaid
upon a background of more ancient beliefs.
However, there is not enough evidence to
describe this ancient Iranian religion fully, nor
to trace the interplay between it and the Islam-
ic elements in Yezidism. We may note some
tantalizing similarities between the religion of
the Yezidis and that of other groups who do
claim Islamic identity, such as the Ahl-e Haqq
of Iranian Kurdistan, but too much speculation
on origins soon founders on lack of evidence
and risks missing some of the defining aspects
of Yezidism today.
This religion, which has aroused so much
antagonism, is difficult to summarize succinct-
ly. It is not a religion of the Book; its holy texts
are oral and literacy was formerly forbidden to
Yezidis. As a religion of orthopraxy rather than
orthodoxy, it has no single statement of faith
embracing all Yezidis and no single way of
praying. It is a belief-system in a very loose
sense, with many variations in practice
between individuals and communities. To gen-
eralize, seven Holy Beings are venerated,
chiefly Melek Tawus (the Peacock Angel identi-
fied by some non-Yezidis with Satan). These
may be incarnated in human form many times
and are called k h a s, enabling the Yezidis to
incorporate holy figures from other religions.
Islamic figures thus venerated include cAli, the
Caliph cAbu Bakir and Hasan al-Basri; from
Christianity, Jesus is equated with the Yezidi
Sheikh Shems. The overriding importance of
respecting purity is obvious not only in the
Yezidis’ attitude towards the elements, partic-
ularly earth and fire, but also in their caste sys-
tem. Many outsiders have remarked their
taboos, particularly the apparently bizarre,
such as those on eating lettuce or wearing blue
c l o t h e s .
Non-Yezidis, almost invariably people of the
Book themselves, found this religion without
apparent dogma highly deficient. Its holy texts
as became known to Westerners were dis-
missed as childish and nonsensical, as if they
were attempts at Western-style ‘theology’,
without any consideration of their purpose or
use in the Yezidi cultural context. For them,
because Yezidism apparently lacked the ingre-
dients of a ‘proper’ religion, its spirituality must
be bogus (and the Yezidis mentally deficient)
or deceptive (and the Yezidis dishonestly hid-
ing a deeper secret). Sunni Muslims tended to
presume less esoteric secrets; as with the Ale-
vis, it was often automatically assumed that
different rules of purity implied lack of cleanli-
ness, and festivals where men and women cel-
ebrated together to be orgies.
The best way for contemporary scholars
studying Yezidism to avoid the above preju-
dices is to try to understand how the adherents
perceive their religion and what it means to
them. A good medium for this is the interview.
Perhaps we may call this the ‘oral religious
studies interview’; it is certainly more akin to
the oral history interview than the anthropo-
logical interview. Questions about dogma and
exegesis may be meaningless to the Yezidis,
but those about practice and emotional
responses can be very revealing. If one has
heard pious Yezidis talk about the k h a s, or met
the tiny group who lead a life of prayer at the
sacred shrine of Lalesh, it is hard to doubt the
reality of Yezidi spirituality, despite the lack of
formal ‘theology’.
This traditional spirituality will no longer be
enough for the Yezidi community as it
becomes more urban and literate. In Europe in
particular, young Yezidis need a religious iden-
tity with core beliefs and concepts which can
be debated intellectually and explained to out-
siders, not expressed merely through non-
European practice and odd taboos. They are
beginning to rebel against such fundamental
rules as marrying within caste. Senior Yezidis
realize that the future of their community in
Europe is at stake, and have begun initiatives
to collect all relevant oral traditions and forge a
written scripture, and to reform some of the
taboos. Yezidism will change from an oral reli-
gion of orthopraxy to a scriptural religion of
orthodoxy, yet even such a fundamental
change will be in keeping with its traditions, as
it has always evolved to suit its environment,
borrowing elements from elsewhere when
n e c e s s a r y .
Yezidism is very unlike textbook Islam, but
perhaps its spirituality has something to show
us about possible ways of studying more main-
stream Islamic groups. In rural areas of Kurdis-
tan, there are many illiterate people who are
devout Muslims but whose knowledge and
expression of their religion is rooted more in
the orthopraxy of ‘folk religion’ than in Islamic
scriptural texts. Oral religious studies is a
developing field in Near and Middle Eastern
studies, and may have much to teach us, not
only about minorities, but also about the Mus-
lim majority. ♦
Dr Christine Allison is a lecturer in Anthropology
a t the School of Oriental and African Studies,
University of London.
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What will be the face of Islam in the twenty-first centu-
ry? A preoccupation with the future is always acute at
the turning of a century, still more so at the turning of a
millennium. The speculation about world futures, from
the optimistic ‘Endism’ of Francis Fukuyama to the pes-
simistic ‘Clash of Civilizations’ of Samuel Huntington, is
already well under way in the West.
The Muslim
Middle East
i n t h e 2 1s t C e n t u r y
In the predictions of these generalists, Islam
and the Muslim world receive fairly short shrift,
at least as far as their internal evolution is con-
cerned. The generalists have been criticized by
the area specialists, on the usual grounds that
the generalists do not know enough about
Islam or Muslims to generalize. But the critics
have yet to engage in the same kind of con-
trolled speculation, or to provide alternatives
of their own. Over the last century, the most
commonplace prediction for the future of
Islam has been its renaissance along Western
lines. Commenting on the trend in Islamic
thought in the 1880s, the English poet-explor-
er Wilfrid Scawen Blunt wrote that it ‘stood in
close analogy to what we have seen of the re-
awakening of the Christian intellect during the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in Europe and
its adaptation of orthodox doctrines to the sci-
entific discoveries of the day.’1 An American
observer put the same idea this way in 1963:
‘Perhaps the Arab world in this century is in the
first pages of a renaissance that may ultimately
be comparable to the changes that took place
in Western society in the fifteenth century.’2 ‘ I f
my suspicion is correct,’ writes a leading Amer-
ican anthropologist in 1998, ‘we will look back
on the latter half of the 20th century as a time
of change as profound for the Muslim world as
the Protestant Reformation was for Christen-
d o m . ’3 This expectation of reformation is a
recurring theme in the Western vision of Islam.
It leaves nothing to predict but the proximate
emergence of a Luther, followed by the mod-
ernization of Islam and the emergence of
democratic governance. Yet while the twenti-
eth century has been the stage of numerous
‘revolutions’ in the name of the people or the
nation or Islam, it could well be argued that
Muslims have failed to resolve issues which
appeared on their agenda a century ago.
Indeed, the more instructive analogy may not
be with the fifteenth century in Europe, but
with the end of the nineteenth century in the
Middle East.
1900 and 2000:
B A C K  T O  T H E  F U T U R E
Indeed, there are striking parallels between
the end of the nineteenth century and the end
of the twentieth. And if repetition is one possi-
ble scenario, analogous reasoning may offer
some clue to the future.
The global context
It is the global context which defines the
parameters of action in the Middle East. Then
as now, preservation of the status quo in the
Middle East was a prime interest of the great
powers. The European order itself seemed sta-
ble: there had been no major European war
since the end of the Franco-Prussian war in
1871. Great Britain, anxious to guarantee its
access to India, became effective guarantor of
the existing order in the Middle East. The foun-
dations of that order were being eroded by
nationalism in Egypt, and Britain had acted to
protect the route to India by occupying Egypt.
Yet it also became the champion of the territo-
rial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and led
the powers in shoring up the status quo.
Is this not similar to the situation today? The
West now also enjoys a long peace, secured
through détente and the end of the cold war.
Under the Pax Americana, the US guarantees
the world’s access to oil at reasonable prices,
and when that access has been challenged, the
US has moved to restore and keep its peace, as
it did following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
The US role in managing the Arab-Israeli peace
process is no less an example of its status as
ultimate guarantor. The US largely acts off
shore, without the need for prolonged occupa-
tions, but its ability to project power is still for-
m i d a b l e .
Ultimately it is the US that underwrites the
stability and status quo of the Middle East. But
if a repetition is possible, then perhaps the
Middle Eastern order will be buffeted by some
dramatic shift in the international order. It has
always been difficult for one outside power to
maintain hegemony in the Middle Eastern sys-
tem, the very structure of which invites chal-
lenges. A century ago, there was a Pax Britanni-
ca, but the first decades of the twentieth cen-
tury saw a gradual emergence of continental
powers rivalling Britain in Europe and over-
seas. These rivalries were carried over into the
Middle East; they ultimately led to war and the
break-up of the Ottoman Empire. If rivals to the
United States emerge over the next twenty
years, might their rivalry spill over into the Mid-
dle East? Unified Europe is on the doorstep of
the Middle East, has a vital interest in its stabil-
ity, and is already staking out independent
policies. When China begins to emerge from
the role of regional power to that of a world
power, the Middle East will be of paramount
importance to it, on account of China’s grow-
ing energy needs. If Europe and China assert
themselves in the Middle East, might this
undermine or upset the order America now
g u a r a n t e e s ?
The Domestic Stalemate
At the end of both centuries, the regimes of
the region seemed not only stable, but unas-
sailable. In the Ottoman Empire, Sultan Abdül-
hamid II had come to power in 1876, and
would continue until 1908, a reign of 32 years.
In the Qajar Empire, Nasir al-Din Shah had just
ended a 48-year reign, which had commenced
in 1846 and ended with his assassination in
1896. Their long personal rule epitomized the
long period of political immobility that
seemed to characterize the last two decades of
the last century.
Today, too, the Middle East is ruled by the
same men who ruled it a generation ago and
more. King Hussein has ruled Jordan since
1953. King Hasan has ruled Morocco since
1961. Asad has presided over Syria since 1971.
Qadhdhafi made his coup in Libya in 1969.
Arafat has been chairman of the PLO since
1969. Kuwait’s Emir has ruled Kuwait since
1978, with help from foreign friends who
restored him to his throne. Iraq’s Saddam Hus-
sein has been president since 1979, and
Egypt’s Mubarak since 1981. The Arab lands
are today the last preserve of protracted indi-
vidual rule in the world. This is a symptom of
political immobility, of a failure to find any way
to regulate political change. In this respect, the
parallel between the end of both centuries is
almost exact.
But the first decade of the twentieth century
saw two constitutional revolutions, in both the
Ottoman Empire and Iran. Is it possible that
beneath the surface of today’s authoritarian
rule, there are forces coalescing that could try
to establish limits on the arbitrary powers of
rulers? Might these forces be capable, in
another decade or so, of effecting constitu-
tional revolutions? (Today we would probably
call them ‘democratic revolutions.’) Whether
they would succeed is another matter, but the
turmoil they would unleash might see the tri-
umph of the same populist forces that first
appeared in the beginning of this century, in
the guise of nationalism.
The Islamic Factor
Towards the end of the last century, there
had been a revival of Islam, and even an Islam-
ic revolution in Sudan. That revolution, taking
a millenarian and Mahdist form, had defied the
great power of the day, Britain, and had estab-
lished an Islamic state in 1885 that lasted thir-
teen years, until Britain destroyed it by force.
Elsewhere in the Muslim world, other revivalist
movements seemed to threaten the status
q u o .
Does this not closely parallel our own times?
This, too, has been a period of Islamic revival.
There has been an Islamic revolution in Iran,
also with strong millenarian overtones, defy-
ing the great power of our own day, America.
(The US was traumatized by the seizure of the
American embassy in Tehran in ways reminis-
cent of the shock delivered to Britain by Gor-
don’s fate at Khartoum.) Elsewhere, in the rest
of what used to be called the ‘Northern Tier,’
Islamists have made themselves felt in Turkey,
and they have taken complete power in
Afghanistan. South of Egypt, bulwark of US
influence in the Arab Middle East, Sudan is also
under Islamist rule. And of course other
Islamist movements have emerged to chal-
lenge the status quo.
But the first decade or so of the twentieth
century saw the containment, then the
decline, of Islam as a focus of political alle-
giance. Is it not possible that in a decade’s
time, the Islamic revival will also appear as a
phase that exhausted itself, as other ideologies
of power more directly inspired by the West
make their long-delayed comeback? Already
there are signs that the Islamist surge has been
blunted. Might it even be reversed?
The Minority Factor
A century ago, European and local minorities
in the Middle East were at the peak of their
influence, from Algeria to Tunisia, from Egypt
to Syria. They were the engines of economic
growth, and they formed a target of growing
Muslim resentment.
The new nationalism identified the erosion
of minority power as an immediate objective,
so that no minorities exercise this kind of influ-
ence in any Arab state today. But today, a con-
centration of five million Jews in the state of
Israel, with strong links to the West, has
acquired immense military and economic
power. As in the past, this exercise of non-Mus-
lim power in the heart of the Muslim world is
the cause of a continuing Muslim resentment.
Might the erosion of Israel’s power remain a
prime objective of the Arab world, whether
pursued through diplomacy or confrontation?
If so, the Arab-Israeli conflict, rather than end-
ing in final peace agreements, may have
entered a new phase.
More parallels could be drawn, some more
persuasive than others. The historian might
well be tempted to borrow the phrase coined
by an American athlete: déjà vu all over again.
Still, the repetition of history is not its replica-
tion, and many of today’s realities have no par-
allel. Two are particularly striking: the dissemi-
nation of weapons of mass destruction, and
the explosion of populations. These are the
two wild cards that could well shatter the exist-
ing political and social structure of the Middle
East and bring on ungovernable change. They
would create difficulties not only for the West,
but dangers for the peoples of the Middle East
i t s e l f .
Islamic Reformation?
No doubt, there will be crises and changes –
but a reformation? A century ago, the great
Islamicist Ignaz Goldziher predicted that Islam
could be regenerated from within – not
through a ‘return to the Qur'an’ which, ‘con-
trary to the laws of historical evolution, risks
putting Islam behind instead of modernizing
it,’ but rather through bold, rational reinterpre-
t a t i o n .4 It did not happen. In the twentieth
century, some Muslims simply abandoned
Islam for Western doctrines, and others opted
for the ‘return to the Qur'an,’ embodied in a
militant and aggrieved fundamentalism.
If a reform is in the making, the work of adap-
tation has not yet even begun. An American
historian of Islam has put it succinctly: ‘The
ideas that will be taken as the most authorita-
tive synthesis of Islam and modern conditions
fifty years from now have not yet been thought
and are not on the current agenda.’5 If the
thoughts have not been thought, if the issues
have not been defined, then the twentieth
century can only be described as an opportuni-
ty lost. Its repetition is something even a faith
as vibrant as Islam can ill afford. ♦
Dr Martin Kramer is director of the Moshe Dayan
Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies,
T e l Aviv University
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S A S K I A G I E L I N G
Audiovisual material played a vital role in the Iranian
revolution of 1978/79. Khomeini’s use of audio cassettes
is well known, but the internal opposition against the
Shah also made frequent use of visual material to spread
their ideas. After the proclamation of the Islamic Repub-
lic, the new leaders continued this system. They regard-
ed the use of wall paintings, posters and billboards, as an
effective method for propaganda and mobilization,
since many of their supporters were illiterate.
The Iconography
of the Islamic Republic
of Iran
Two examples of iconography of the Islamic
Republic are presented here. Most of the visual
topics are presented in a religious setting. As a
rule, the social or political message are com-
bined with themes taken from Islamic, mainly
Shi'ite history. Islamic symbols and motifs
(such as the Kacba, the Dome of the Rock, and
Husayn) are frequently used, but the artists
also employ motifs and symbols such as the
dove, which have their origin in Christianity.
Where the style of the posters is concerned,
traces of many twentieth century currents in
European painting can be discerned, from
Catholic romanticism and symbolism to expres-
sionism and social realism. In some of the
posters the influence of modern cinema and
advertising artwork is also clearly visible.
1. The martyrdom of Husayn
In 680/61, on the day of cÂshûrâ', the Tenth
of Muharram, the third Shi'ite imâm Husayn
was killed in a battle with an Umayyad army on
the plain of Karbalâ' in what is present-day
Iraq. This fight was the outcome of an uprising
against the Umayyad Caliph Yazîd, planned by
Husayn in order to revive Islam. Shi'ites consid-
A D V E R T I S E M E N T
er Husayn’s death as one of the crucial events
in history. Traditionally, Husayn’s martyrdom
to the cause of Islam has been regarded as a
unique event in history, impossible to emulate
for ordinary Muslims. This traditional view
contrasts with the revolutionary interpreta-
tion illustrated in picture 2.
Many Shi'ites see Husayn’s role as that of an
intercessor between man and God; and partic-
ipation in the annual rituals and commemora-
tion services during the first days of Muharram
is seen as essential for obtaining a place in Par-
a d i s e .
2. Kull yawm cÂ s h û r â '
During the Iranian revolution, a more revo-
lutionary interpretation of Husayn’s death
gained the upper hand. Husayn’s struggle for
the defense of Islam was presented as a model
and example for the Iranians. His sacrifice and
martyrdom were not unique but could, and
should be emulated by every Muslim. During
the war with Iraq, the leaders of the Islamic
Republic emphasized that in Iran a re-enact-
ment of the Karbalâ' event was taking place:
Kull yawm câshûrâ', kull ard Karbalâ' (every day
is câshûrâ', every place is Karbalâ'), emphasiz-
ing how much the Iranian population was pre-
pared for martyrdom. ♦
Dr Saskia Gieling studied Arabic and Islam
a tt h e Catholic University of Nijmegen.
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Uni ted Ar a b Emi r ate s
S A T I  M OO K E R J I
The black veil is still by and large in place, but is the
woman behind it in the stereotyped position of subju-
gation and dominance that much of the world associ-
ates with her, especially in the workplace? This article
examines the position of Muslim women in the work-
place in one of the richest Gulf countries, the United
Arab Emirates (UAE). 
S u b j u g a t e d
t o What Extent?
Women in
t h e Workplace today
in the United Arab
E m i r a t e s
The Arab Work Force
The Arab work force is unique in the sense
that it employs more expatriate workers than
nationals. According to a study prepared joint-
ly by the Arab Monetary Fund and the Arab
Fund for Economic and Social Development in
1995, the Arab work force accounts for around
28 per cent of the population, which is a very
low ratio compared with international levels.
The study says this ratio stands at 49.1 per cent
in industrialized nations, 43.7 per cent in other
developing countries and 50 per cent in the
world at large. The study further indicates that
the Arab work force in the 22-member Arab
League was estimated at around 67.5 million in
1993 and was expected to grow by 3.3 per cent
annually till 1995, and at 3.6 per cent between
1995 and 2000. This would add 2.3 million
workers per year until 1995 and around 3 mil-
lion per year between 1995 and 2000. Women
workers in the Arab world form nearly 19 per
cent of the total work force compared with 43
per cent in Western industrial countries and 35
per cent in Third World countries. The study
also expresses concern about the fact that in
the Gulf, regional states are heading for an
internal labour imbalance as the work-force is
growing faster than demand. Growth in the
number of female workers at around 4 per cent
during the 90’s has exceeded that of male
workers, and consequently the base of demo-
graphic pyramid labour supply exceeds
demand. With more women getting educated
and professionally qualified, jobs which were
previously filled by expatriates are being
sought by nationals.
History and Today
Historically, Islam recognizes the important
role that women play in society. Ayesha, the
daughter of the Prophet, was said to have led
an army of 30,000 soldiers. It is reported in the
Qur'an and from history that women not only
expressed their opinions freely in the Prophet’s
presence, but also argued and participated in
serious discussions with him and other Muslim
leaders of the time. In this century, Turkey, Pak-
istan and Bangladesh have had women politi-
cal leaders. But Ciller, Bhutto and Rahman
come from privileged backgrounds, and the
gap between them and the average Muslim
woman is quite vast.
A question which arises frequently, especial-
ly in the case of many Muslim countries, is why
do women so often come out in second place
professionally? This point was highlighted
recently by Dr Moza Ghobash, Professor of
Sociology at the Emirates University of Al Ain
in Abu Dhabi while speaking at a forum on
‘Women and Management: Challenges and
Opportunities for the Year 2000’, which I
attended. Ghobash pointed out that this oppo-
sition stems from a male reluctance to see a
woman assume ‘charisma’ and social standing,
and has its roots not in Islamic precepts, but
rather in practice. While Islam makes it the
paramount duty of men and women to learn,
and the woman is ordered by God, as is the
man, to learn, to read, to seek the truth and to
educate herself. Unfortunately, reality lies else-
where. Details of a recent study on the under-
representation of young Muslim women in
higher education and professional employ-
ment reveal that Muslim women are ‘often per-
ceived as an invisible and unobtrusive element
of the labour market and under-utilized in
terms of their potential as human resources
contributing to the economy’ (Q-News Interna-
t i o n a l, No. 284, January1998). The study found
that Muslim girls face intense family pressure
to select feminine career options like home
economics, and are actively discouraged from
pursuing interests in engineering or manage-
m e n t .
In interviewing people over the years, during
the course of my travels for writing, I have
been told time and again that this kind of fam-
ily reticence largely stems from the fact that a
man would not like a wife who is more educat-
ed than he is, and therefore can command
more social standing. Girls consequently feel
pressurized to conform, to groom themselves
to be wives and mothers. Individual career
aspirations are rarely an option. Families too
are concerned with social pressure and accep-
tance. If a daughter is perceived to be a maver-
ick or aggressively career-minded, her chances
in the marriage market are lessened and the
family faces humiliation from social peers.
Muslim men in some countries are unwilling to
share economic power with their wives, fear-
ing competition from within the home, and a
relative loss of position and power in the work-
place. Their world is a comfortable monopoly
and they guard it well. Roles are clearly
defined, one is the breadwinner, the other the
homemaker, and overlapping of roles is usual-
ly frowned upon. Yet, changes are coming
about and nowhere is this more evident than
in the UAE today.
The United Arab Emirates
Some Arab countries of today find more and
more of their womenfolk stepping outside the
threshold of their homes to find their own
place under the sun. The United Arab Emirates,
a country which is a confederation of seven
Emirates, namely Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah,
Ajman, Ras Al Khaimah, Fujairah and Umm Al
Quwain, seems to be leading the way in this
r e g a r d .
In a significant move which springs to atten-
tion from my travels even ten years ago, when
national UAE women were wary of interacting
with strangers in the workplace, and few were
gainfully employed, today’s working woman in
the UAE is an increasingly central figure, hold-
ing responsible positions in the private and
public sectors. One of the main reasons for this
is the increase in numbers of educated women.
Today, more women than men are opting for
higher education, and better still, are complet-
ing their studies instead of opting out halfway
– always an easy option for people who have
among the highest per capita incomes in the
world. In terms of numbers, the number of
female students in schools went up from 4 per
cent in the 1970’s to more than 50 per cent in
the ‘90’s. Most of these girls go on to finish
their college education, after which a suitable
job is just a step away. The large number of
working women in the age group of 25 years
and below is having a domino effect on their
siblings and friends. They become role models
for the young, an active group of increasingly
independent and outspoken women, who now
come out openly to proclaim, ‘I have ideas just
like any other person, man or woman. I have a
particular viewpoint that I would like to put
across, that I would like to see bear fruit’
(Kawther Mohammed Ahmed, Assistant Branch
Manager of the National Bank of Dubai to Gulf
News, 4 Dec 1996). 
In the UAE, participation of women in the
labour force has risen from 5.3 per cent in 1980
to 12 per cent in 1995, according to a UAE
socio-economic development report. The Min-
istry of Information Yearbook for 1997 attrib-
uted this significant rise to the government’s
policy of providing equal educational and pro-
fessional opportunities to men and women to
further the development of it’s total human
resource group. A percentage increase of
women in the total population was also cited
as a reason for the increase. In the UAE, many
women are employed in the government sec-
tor, particularly in the areas of education and
health. Interestingly enough, their numbers in
the federal civil service are also on the rise, cur-
rently accounting for almost 40 per cent of the
total employees. Women are also breaking
new ground in the police force, with a growing
number of policewomen performing various
functions from criminal investigations to cus-
toms control.
Male Bastions Stormed
A women’s team from UAE’s General Depart-
ment of Protective Security recently won a
gold medal in the US in 1997. The General
Department of Protective Security carries out
specialist protection services on behalf of the
government which includes protecting VIP vis-
itors and trade establishments. Protective ser-
vices at this level require highly complex
knowledge and training, which include shoot-
ing with various types of weapons, and mental
and physical development to react effectively
in hostile and dangerous situations. A large
number of women have also entered the last
all-male bastion – a military school only for
women, the Khawla Bint Al Azwar Women’s
Military School in Abu Dhabi. All women join-
ing the School have an intermediate level
school certificate and after training serve in the
armed forces for at least five years. The six-
month training course includes field training
on self-defence and combat techniques, in
addition to tactical and theoretical courses. At
the end of the course, candidates have to pass
an examination which qualifies them to gradu-
ate with a military rank. A significant number
of women have shown interest in the course
and the numbers are rising each year.
Women in the UAE today are found in almost
all spheres of economic activity. Banking is
perhaps their most preferred vocation, fol-
lowed by other government services, such as
police, customs and other regulatory services.
The last year has seen their numbers increase
in the private sector as well, where their level
of education normally determines the position
they hold. Some join the managerial cadres,
while others have come to terms with holding
non-managerial jobs, thus making them com-
petitive in the job market along with expatri-
ate workers. Traditional career options for
women also hold great appeal, such as nurs-
ing, teaching, and social welfare.
C o n c l u s i o n
The case of the UAE presents a break with
many other Muslim societies even today,
where for example in nearby Saudi Arabia,
women are still not permitted to drive or be
seen in public without the mandatory black
veil. What seems worth noting in the case of
the UAE is not so much the exact numbers of
women in paid work; but that in the 1990’s, in
sharp contrast to even the 1970’s, the ‘working
woman’ is operating as an increasingly central
figure; and seems to have appeared alongside
the ‘housewife and mother’, as a paradigmatic
feminine subject in the social, economic and
cultural discourses of the UAE. She is certainly
today one of the icons around which the UAE’s
position as a ‘modern’ Muslim country is legit-
imized; and this iconic figure is premised –
both covertly and overtly – on the working
woman rather than the housewife. ♦
Sati Mookerji is a freelance journalist based in India
and writes on India and the Middle East.
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D u b a i
P O R O MA  R E B E L L O
Modesty is fashionable. Long black gowns called a b a y a s
cover many women from head to toe, and the h i j a b o r
scarf covers the head and is draped over the shoulders.
Since it is generally difficult to say whether religion or
culture dictates this sartorial choice, it remains a debat-
ed issue, both within and outside academia. Contests
about the position and place of women are a continuing
feature of Muslim (and perhaps all) societies. Critiques
about the ‘Western style’ of modernization have
increasingly become centred around the question of
women’s chastity, modesty and sexuality. As is almost
always the case, it is on the figure of the woman that the
responsibility of maintaining tradition and upholding
family values becomes centred.
P o l i t i c s
of Fashion
in Dubai
The A b a y a, G a l l a b y a and H i j a b
Interestingly, even the stark black a b a y a
makes a fashion statement of its own. Some
are in lustrous silk, some in more staid fabrics,
some have borders embroidered with an
exquisite hand, and the garment looks like ele-
gant evening attire, albeit very modest. Under
the a b a y a, women wear long gowns or g a l-
l a b y a s which is the traditional Arab dress for
women in the region. G a l l a b y a s are long, wide-
flowing dresses with long sleeves, and come in
a variety of materials and colours. For normal
daily activity, cotton or thin polyester is pre-
ferred, while heavy silks and shimmering satin
make for evening wear. Designers are now also
experimenting with chiffon, georgette, lace
and velvet. Often the robes draw on the talents
and skills of calligraphers and draughtsmen
and use miniature art and embroidery, gold
and silver ribbon work, lead crystal, pearls,
sequins, beads and semi-precious stones. Most
of the decorative embroidery is at the throat,
covering the frontal part of the garment, at the
base of the sleeve and near the ankles. Decora-
tive work on the body of the garment is less,
except of ornate gowns worn during weddings
and religious functions. G a l l a b y a s come in an
explosion of colours, emerald green, purple,
fuchsia, brilliant blues, sunflower yellow, and
ever dramatic favourites of gold and silver.
Moroccan designs and animal motifs are
among the favourite decorative patterns.
Designers are now experimenting with slightly
bold touches like one-shoulder-off gowns with
a lace stole showing glimpses of the bare
s h o u l d e r .
The h i j a b too, does not escape the changing
trends in fashion. They are sometimes beaded,
fringed, sequined, and ornately decorated.
Weddings give an opportunity for local
designers to indulge their most ornate fan-
tasies. The traditional white wedding gown,
much like gowns worn at Christian weddings,
are normally high-busted, with a narrow waist
and flowing lines from the hips. The embroi-
dery and decorative work is splendid, with
pearls, sequins, precious stones, lace, ribbons
and diamanté – the limits are set only by the
designer’s imagination.
Designer Wear
If women wear the all-covering a b a y a a n d
the h i j a b, and below the a b a y a, mostly their
g a l l a b y a s, then what are some of the biggest
names in fashion doing in Dubai, vying for a
small market of a few million people? Armani,
Givenchy, Gucci, Ralph Lauren, Jean Louis
Scherrer – the list is endless. They are all here,
along with the ready-to-wear big names like
Mex’x, Benetton, Giordano, Laura Ashley, Liz
Clairborne, and others. In addition, many Asian
designers from India, Pakistan and the Philip-
pines have also set up major retail outlets to
cater to increasing local demand. And most of
the demand is from the very fashion conscious
urban middle class woman, who can afford
their prices. She may wear the a b a y a a n d
below it the gallabya along with the h i j a b , b u t
she has a keen eye for Western fashions as well.
Quite often, under the a b a y a, one can faintly
make out the trendy cut of a Givenchy cre-
ation. Depending on the occasion, women
dress to please themselves, be it a Gucci origi-
nal or a casual T-shirt from Benetton complete
with Levi’s jeans and Armani belt. Interestingly
enough, while the dictates of fashion would
have women show off what they are wearing,
the abaya, quite contrarily, covers the ultimate
fashion statement.
The Politics of Fashion
The decision to veil or not to veil has attract-
ed wide media attention in recent times. Writ-
ing from the viewpoint of someone who lives
and works in one of the more ‘modern’ Gulf
cities of Dubai for several years now, one sees
that the a b a y a and h i j a b have assumed a cen-
tral place in issues of ethnicity and identity in
what has largely become an expatriate society.
This short article is informed from the perspec-
tive of what anthropologists would perhaps
term ethnography. They are essentially some
reflections on discussions which I have had
with Muslim women in Dubai who are simulta-
neously co-workers and friends. Their decision
whether or not to wear the a b a y a and the
h i j a b, and its signification are seemingly
important issues for them.
What comes out repeatedly in these discus-
sions is that if they choose to wear the a b a y a
and the h i j a b, they do so more as a symbolic
gesture that marks them out as honourable
and respectable women who wish to avoid any
undue attention. They say, for them, the h i j a b
signifies i f f a (modesty), t a h a r a (purity), t a q w a
(righteousness), h a y a (bashfulness) and that it
is their iman (belief or faith). When asked
whether or not it is also an act of obedience,
they do agree. But at the same time, they take
great pains to make a finer point of distinction:
that generally speaking, working class Muslim
women find that the h i j a b gives them a sense
of worth, both individually and socially; while
for urban, middle class women generally, it can
be more because of the superintendence of
Islamic law and tradition.
Discussions seem to indicate that for the
urban, middle class women at least, covering
their bodies with the a b a y a and veiling their
heads and faces with the h i j a b have taken on
meanings at multiple levels. At one level, it is
not merely covering themselves, but more
importantly, it is also behaviour, form, man-
ners, etiquette and appearance in public.
Thus, in this aspect, dress is merely one facet
of a greater totality of being a Muslim woman.
This allies closely to issues of morality and
purity, in being like Caesar’s wife, i.e., above
suspicion. In any case, amongst immediate
and extended family, she has the freedom to
dispense with the a b a y a. Thus, we find a dis-
tinction being made between ‘private’ and
‘public’ spaces.
At another level, there are fascinating con-
tradictions. For instance, when below the
a b a y a, the woman chooses to wear decorated
g a l l a b y a s or trendy Western and Asian design-
er creations, she is constructing her own, per-
sonal ‘private’ space. Furthermore, as men-
tioned above, while contradictorily enough,
the a b a y a covers the designer fashion state-
ment; at the same time, it also gives the
woman more freedom in a way to participate
in the ‘public’ sphere.
It is the dichotomies between the so-called
First World and Third World feminisms which
are critical in the conceptualization of women
and gender to Islam. Is Euro-American theo-
rizing in feminism appropriate in the context
of Muslim societies like the Gulf countries? My
discussions seem to indicate that women col-
leagues and friends in Dubai are explicitly or
implicitly articulating aspects of such ongo-
ing debates in their talks with me. They are
always ready to discuss their decisions of
wearing the a b a y a and h i j a b or not, and cer-
tainly wish to clarify any misconceptions
which I may have about it. Those who do not
wear the a b a y a or the h i j a b are generally the
ones who are more critical about any so-
called ‘Islamic atmosphere’ at their places of
work (should it exist) where they implicitly
feel a pressure to conform to ‘Islamic’ dress
codes and behaviour. For others, who do
wear the the a b a y a and the h i j a b, at one level,
it is a personal decision, taken after long con-
sultation with relatives and friends. At anoth-
er level, it is a highly charged political gesture
– a way for them to engage in ‘modernity’ on
their own terms.
In Dubai at least, from where the data for this
article are mainly based, the abaya and the hijab
are not as much a domain of political contest as
Saudi Arabia or Kuwait for example. That fact in
itself is an interesting problem. In one way, it is
definitely a form of protest against a perceived
sense of a so-called ‘Western’ modernity: and
what better way to explicitly mark difference
than the abaya and the hijab? But is it just this, or
can there be other levels of resistance as well?
Should this protest not also be looked at within
the framework of the globalizing forces of Islam
today, and the intricate, multi-layered relation-
ship of such forces to the development of a dif-
ferent ‘Middle Eastern modernity’? ♦
Poroma Rebello is a freelance journalist
c u r r e n t l y based in Dubai who writes on social
a n d political issues.
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D a g e s t a n
D M I TR I  M A K A R O V
Calls for, and practical attempts of introduction of the
s h a r i a laws are the core issue of the contemporary
process of Islamic resurgence in the North Caucasus. In
1997 the Chechen Republic officially proclaimed itself
an Islamic State living by the s h a r i a. Despite some short-
comings of the Chechen experience in this respect, the
idea of the s h a r i a’s enactment is nevertheless getting
more public attention and proponents in other north-
Caucasian republics, Dagestan in particular.
E n a c t i n g
the S h a r i a L a w s
in a Dagestani
V i l l a ge*Historically, Dagestan has been the majorcentre of Islamic culture in the whole NorthCaucasus. Through the years of Soviet rule peo-
ples of Dagestan, Avars and Dargins in particu-
lar managed to keep their Islamic traditions
alive. That is why the difficulties of the transi-
tion to the post-Soviet development and the
aggravating crisis of Dagestani society, espe-
cially its spiritual-ethical dimension, provoked a
reaction with discernible Islamic overtones. The
government’s inability to put an end to the
spread of crime, drug addiction, alcoholism,
prostitution and other moral deviations little
known to Dagestanis’ life-style before p e r e s t r o i-
k a, draws many people to consider Islamic reli-
gious and juridical principles as a means to
society’s spiritual and moral recovery, and pos-
sibly a way to the establishment of more right-
eous socio-political order.
There are two major forces pushing the cause
of Islamization in Dagestan: the official Muslim
clergy represented in the Spiritual Board of the
Muslims of Dagestan (SBMD) and adherents of
Islamic fundamentalism, generally but not
quite correctly called ‘Wahhabis’. They are bit-
terly opposed to each other. The SBMD is con-
trolled by followers of sufi sheikhs and thus
advocates the ideology of Sufi brotherhoods
(‘tariqat’), which has been dominant in Dages-
tan since the early Middle-Ages. So, official cler-
gy condemns ‘wahhabism’, whose presence
became noticeable in Dagestan only since the
late 1980s, as a an ideology ‘imported’ (from
Saudi Arabia), which is absolutely alien to
Dagestani traditions and which is nothing more
than a tool of dividing the Muslims and a reli-
gious disguise for those seeking political power
and personal wealth.
On their part, the ‘Wahhabis’ blame the Sufi
‘tariqat’ Islam for having distorted the authen-
tic Islamic beliefs and practices established by
the Prophet Muhammad, for various reasons.
One reason is because the sufis allegedly wor-
ship their sheikhs (saints) alongside Allah which
is incompatible with the basic Islamic principle
of monotheism (t a w h i d); another reason being
that they have introduced many new traditions
that did not exist in early Islam and left out
many others that are essential to Islamic doc-
trine (such as j i h a d). Criticizing the cooperation
between the SBMD and Dagestani authorities,
the ‘Wahhabis’ accuse the tariqatist Sheikhs of
selling the religion to the ‘unbelieving’ secular
g o v e r n m e n t .
Despite this rivalry between ‘tariqatists’ and
‘Wahhabis’, the results of their accumulated
efforts leads to further Islamization of the soci-
ety. Yet, while the official clergy and sufi broth-
erhoods are concerned mostly with building
their institutional infrastructure and religious
propaganda through the opening of new
mosques, ‘madressas’, Islamic charitable foun-
dations, publishing religious books and news-
papers, celebrating religious holidays and orga-
nizing pilgrimages to Mecca; the ‘Wahhabis’
skilfully combine this agenda with practical
efforts to introduce Islamic regulations into
daily life of some local, and mostly rural com-
munities. Although institutional resources and
access to mass-media are relatively more limit-
ed for the ‘Wahhabis’, they undeniably hold the
initiative in practical, on-the-ground Islamiza-
t i o n .
In sharp contrast to the behaviour of the
SBMD leaders who, just a few years ago had
made an abortive attempt to convince the gov-
ernment to declare Friday an official holiday in
Dagestan, and still tend to appeal to the
authorities on every small issue; the ‘Wahhabis’
in recent years have persistently worked on
establishing the Islamic order in regions where
they feel most self-assured. Thus, the contours
of Islamic enclaves in some villages of Buinaksk
and other districts have been in the making
since 1995-96. In August, the villages of Kara-
makhi, Chabanmakhi, and Qadar, proclaimed ‘a
separate Islamic territory governed by s h a r i a
laws’. By the beginning of September this con-
flict was resolved through an agreement
between the ‘Wahhabis’ and the authorities,
which brought the villages back under the
political and administrative control of the gov-
ernment. The agreement tacitly accepted the
socio-cultural hegemony of the Islamists at the
local level, leaving them free to keep the s h a r i a
rulings applicable in the villages.
No less challenging for the government, a dif-
ferent pattern of Islamization can be observed
in Kirovaul, a village in the Kyzilyurt district
(about 50 km. west of Makhachkala). Kirovaul is
one of those many villages that emerged in
1940-70 due to the enforced resettlement of
mountainous a u l s ’ dwellers in the plains of
Northern Dagestan. It has some 3 000 inhabi-
tants, almost all of them Avars. 70% of them
came from the village of Sildi, Tzumada r a y i o n,
and the rest came from other Tzumada villages. 
By the early 1990s, its population had also
become divided into adherents of traditional
‘tariqat’ Islam and ‘Wahhabis’. The ‘Sildis’
turned out to be more disposed to fundamen-
talist ideology, and by now almost half of them
are considered ‘Wahhabis’, while there are vir-
tually no ‘Wahhabis’ among those coming from
other villages. Thus, the ‘Wahhabis’ make up
roughly 1/3 of Kirovaul’s population.
Ideological controversy could not be avoid-
ed. Religious disputes had been occurring even
during prayer times in the village mosque. To
prevent these disputes from disrupting the
prayers, it was eventually decided to pray sepa-
rately: the ‘Wahhabis’ were to stay at the exist-
ing mosque, and the ‘tariqatists’ began to con-
struct a new mosque for themselves. The solu-
tion had been negotiated peacefully and satis-
fied both parties. Since then the relationship
between the followers of the two trends has
been quite normal. It is amazing that the village
madressa ‘Sildi’ makes room for both ‘Wahhabi’
and ‘tariqat’ scholars teaching there side by
side. Contacts are also normally maintained in
everyday life. Children from Wahhabist and
tariqatist families play together, while in many
other Dagestani settlements they are dragged
into their parents’ quarrels (for instance, the
‘Wahhabis’ are often accused of inciting their
children to tease tariqatists’ children by calling
them ‘m u s h r i k s’, meaning ‘polytheists’). One
possible explanation of such unusual mutual
tolerance is the fact that the majority of
tariqatists in Kirovaul follow Naqshbandi
Sheikh Tadjuddin of Khasavyurt and not Sheikh
Said-Efendi of Chirkey, whose murids ( d i s c i p l e s )
control the SBMD and are consequently much
more hostile to Wahhabis.
Recourse to Islamic regulations is not some-
thing absolutely new in Kirovaul, whose inhab-
itants have kept much of the traditional moun-
tain dwellers’ respect for religious values. Sell-
ing of alcoholic beverages had been virtually
banned for several years. But this did not pre-
vent alcohol abuse from spreading. Intoxicated
persons were quite often seen in the streets
using foul language and provoking quarrels.
Besides, drug dealers from neighbouring
Chechnya started to come to the village, selling
‘anasha’ (a sort of narcotic) and recruiting local,
unemployed youngsters for their criminal net-
works. Thefts of livestock, crops and personal
property have become frighteningly frequent.
Families have been increasingly anxious about
the moral integrity of women and young girls.
Local police paid almost no attention to peo-
ple’s requests to restore safety and order,
which led many village dwellers to believe that
the police were corrupt and unreliable.
It is against such a background that the gath-
ering of Kirovaul inhabitants voted in May 1998
for the establishment of the s h a r i a court and
s h a r i a guard to fight alcohol and drug abuse,
theft and moral laxity. Tariqatists and Wahhabis
got equal representation among the 6 judges
(3 most competent scholars from each side)
and the guard, which consisted of some 40-50
people. Leaflets informing the population
about the principles of the s h a r i a s t r u c t u r e s ’
activity were posted on the mosques’ walls.
Then the s h a r i a guard started patrolling the vil-
lage streets, especially at night.
All those picked up in the street for appear-
ing drunk or committing theft are being
brought before the court, which determines an
appropriate punishment in accordance with
the s h a r i a. Of course, such measures as the cut-
ting off of hands or throwing stones have never
been applied, and the only punishment in use
is beating with a stick. The number of blows
depends upon the nature of the transgression.
There are no public floggings in Kirovaul. All
punishments are executed in the madressa
building in the presence of the judges and
guard members only. However, the names of
the punished become immediately known all
over the village.
At least within the first month of its activity
the s h a r i a guard did not face serious resistance
on the part of the transgressors or their fami-
lies. On the contrary, some women suffering
from their husband’s addiction to alcohol, start-
ed urging the s h a r i a guard to step in. Most of
the respondents in Kirovaul admitted that since
the enactment of the s h a r i a, the situation in the
village has become more safe and relaxed,
there have been less thefts and other crimes.
Assessing the implications and the prospects
of the Kirovaul experience however, one should
not overestimate its relevance for other regions
of Dagestan.
The initial success of the s h a r i a’s enactment
was facilitated by some peculiarities of the
microcosm of the Kirovaul society, such as the
relatively high incipient level of religious feel-
ings; relatively strong tradition of self-govern-
ment typical of mountainous and recently
resettled communities used to settling internal
problems by themselves, without recourse to
official authorities (the element of change is
that the power of Islam has become more pro-
nounced than the power of elders); and the
monoethnic composition of the village which
makes it difficult for the opponents of the
Islamization to hamper it by playing on inter-
ethnic rivalry. Besides, virtually all the Kirovaul
inhabitants are bound by ties of close or distant
blood relations; thus going against the s h a r i a
guard would be tantamount to going against
one’s own relatives, which is considered
extremely reprehensible by Caucasian tradi-
t i o n s .
The character of punishments applied and
the list issues regulated by the s h a r i a show that
the scope of Islamization in Kirovaul remains
rather limited. The Islamists confine mostly to
maintaining public order, and so far it is not
even clear how they would handle the issue of
‘immoral behaviour’ and if this implies the
enforcement of the veil and Islamic dress for
women. All socio-economic issues, including
the land ownership disputes that are so crucial
for Dagestan, and political and administrative
issues are regulated by state legislation. Enact-
ment of the s h a r i a does not seem to be a strat-
egy to drive out the state structures as much as
an attempt to fill the security void left by weak
and corrupt authority. 
The fate of Kirovaul will also depend upon
the local Islamists’ ability to restrain their ambi-
tions and to take public opinion into account. It
is essential to understand that people’s support
of Islamization is conditional to how much it
meets their social expectations rather than of
any special ideological commitment. If, in their
religious zeal, the Islamists go too far, if people
feel any infringements on their traditional val-
ues and life-style which do not necessarily cor-
respond to some Islamist blueprints, a substan-
tial part of the population risks turning against
the Islamists. As the s h a r i a structures lose their
legitimacy, it will be much easier for the gov-
ernment to split and neutralize the Islamist
forces. Conversely, as the local authorities are
losing faith in assistance from the central gov-
ernment, they may increasingly opt for joining
this protest movement under Islamic slogans.
It is obvious that the Islamization and enact-
ment of the s h a r i a do not necessarily imply
violent, separatist and anti-state inclinations,
as some incidents have shown. The issue of
integrating some Islamic legal regulations into
the legislation of Dagestan, and maybe some
other predominantly Muslim republics of
North Caucasus, should be paid more serious
a t t e n t i o n .♦
Dr Dmitri Makarov is a researcher at the Institute
o f Oriental Studies, Moscow.
* Fieldwork information was gathered during a trip
t o Dagestan in late June 1998 made with financial
support from the Economic & Social Research
Council, UK.
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C h i n a
DR U  C .  G L A D N E Y
The Turkic people known as Uyghur will most likely be
in the same situation at the beginning of the next mille-
nium as they have been for most of this one: an internal-
ly colonized people, subject to the Chinese nation-state.
How this came to be and how it might cease to be so is
the subject of this article. I argue that it is through the
model of internal colonialism that we might begin to
understand how it is the Uyghur, and other indigenous
peoples such as Tibetans, now labelled as ‘minority
nationalities,’ have been turned into ‘internal colonial
subjects’ despite being indigenous peoples in lands
they once called their own. Through initial occupation,
gradual integration through immigration, and finally
‘minoritization’ as a result of nationality policy, the
Uyghur (and perhaps many others like them) have been




The categorization and taxonomization of all
levels of Chinese society, from political econo-
my, to class, to gender, to religion, to ethnicity
and nationality represents a wide-ranging and
ongoing project of internal colonialism.
Though now long subsided, the debate pro-
voked by Michael Hechter’s (1976) history,
Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British
National Development, 1536-1966, led scholars
to consider applying Hechter’s model to many
other societies beyond England and Ireland.
Hechter suggests that the channelling of cer-
tain peoples into ‘hierarchical cultural divisions
of labor’ under colonial administrations led to
the development of ethnic identities which
superseded class. This ‘internal colonialism’ is
predicated upon the unequal rates of exchange
between the urban power-centres and the
peripheral, often ethnic, hinterlands. In his
study of ‘The Celtic Fringe,’ Hechter traces the
national development of the post-colonial
British state, as though these areas were still
under economic colonial exploitation. 
Internal colonialism was found to be applica-
ble to South Africa, Thailand, Sudan, Wales, Brit-
tany, Quebec, Austria-Hungary (as it was for-
merly), Scotland, Bangladesh, Cherokee Native
Americans, Chicanos in America, the Palestini-
ans in Israel, and the original intent behind and
reason for the success of Stalin’s nationalities
policy in the Soviet Union (Gouldner 1978:11-
14). The majority of these examples stress the
exploitation of the many ethnics, who are less
culturally literate in the dominant tradition, by
the few urban power elite who control access
to and distribution of capital. Interestingly,
though the theory was later criticized and gen-
erally abandoned for being too general and too
widely applicable, it was never applied to
China. It is quite ironic that while the People’s
Republic was founded on an ‘anti-imperial
nationalism’ (Friedman 1994), in the current
postcolonial world, at a time when most
nations are losing territory rather than recover-
ing it, China is busily making good its claims on
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Spratleys, as well
as jealously guarding its border territories.
Uyghur Ethnogenesis and
Internal Colonialism
Chinese histories notwithstanding, every
Uyghur firmly believes that their ancestors
were the indigenous people of the Tarim basin,
now known as Xinjiang. The Uyghur were rec-
ognized as a nationality in the 1930s in Xinjiang
under a Soviet-influenced policy of nationality
recognition that contributed to a widespread
acceptance today of continuity with the
ancient Uyghur kingdom and their eventual
‘ethnogenesis’ as a bona fide nationality. While
rebellions by Yakub Beg in the late 19th centu-
ry, and the short-lived establishments of the
Eastern Turkestan Republics (TIRET) in Kashgar
in 1933 and Yining in 1944, indicated Uyghur
attempts at resisting expanding Chinese colo-
nialism, these efforts failed just as those of the
Uzbeks and Tadjiks in Czarist and Soviet Central
Asia. 
‘Minoritization’ of the Uyghur became objec-
tified when they were recognized by the Chi-
nese state in 1950 as the Uyghur nationality,
and the region was recognized as the Uyghur
Autonomous Region in 1956. Chinese practices
of ‘integration through immigration’ has meant
the in-migration of Han Chinese since the
1950s, with populations increasing from an esti-
mated 5 percent in 1940 to 38 percent in 1990.
They then become known not as an indigenous
people attached to a region once their own, but
one of 55 minority nationalities in China, with a
documented population of 7.2 million in 1990
(with 98 percent, or 7.1 million in Xinjiang
alone). The Uyghurs are one of ten mainly Mus-
lim nationalities, with a total Muslim population
in China of nearly 20 million. The expropriation
of Xinjiang’s vast mineral and petrochemical
resources, with processing of petroleum prod-
ucts in the interior, primarily Lanzhou, and sold
on the international market (with revenues to
Xinjiang based on domestic prices) further fits
the internal colonialism model (see Dorian, Wig-
dortz, Gladney 1997). Finally, the development
of the tourist industry in the region as a ‘silk
road’ destination follows the line of touristic
development in the minority areas that Oakes
(1995) has also analysed as the results of ‘inter-
nal colonialism’ in the Southwest. The con-
structed indigeneity of the Uyghur poses an
alternative to Chinese historiographies of the
region, which is consonant with ‘internal’ colo-
nizing powers seeking to assert authority in a
region not previously their own. 
Chinese Nationalism and its
Implications for Minorities
After denying them for decades and stressing
instead China’s ‘national unity,’ official reports
have recently detailed Tibetan and Muslim
conflicts in the border regions of Tibet, Yun-
nan, Xinjiang, Ningxia, and Inner Mongolia.
With the March 7, 1997 bus bombings in Bei-
jing, widely attributed (though never verified)
to Uyghur separatists, coupled with the
Urumqi bus bombings on the day of Deng
Xiaoping’s 1997 memorial on February 25
(killing nine people), Beijing can no longer
keep them secret. The Yining (Ghulja) uprising
from February 2-7, 1997 that left at least twen-
ty-five dead and hundreds injured and arrest-
ed, has been heavily covered by the world’s
media. This distinguishes the last few events
from on-going problems in the region in the
mid-1980s that have previously met with little
media coverage. 
The government responded with a host of
random arrests and new policy announce-
ments. In Spring 1998, the National Peoples
Congress passed a New Criminal Law that
redefined ‘counter-revolutionary’ crimes to be
‘crimes against the state’, liable to severe
prison terms and even execution. Included in
‘crimes against the state’ were any actions con-
sidered to involve ‘ethnic discrimination’ or
‘stirring up anti-ethnic sentiment.’ Many
human rights activists have argued that this is
a thinly veiled attempt to criminalize ‘political’
actions and to make them appear as illegal as
traffic violations, supporting China’s claims
that it holds ‘no political prisoners.’ Since any
minority activity could be regarded as stirring
‘anti-ethnic feeling,’ many ethnic activists are
concerned that the New Criminal Law will be
easily turned against them. At the same time,
Han Chinese who stir up ethnic problems can
also be arrested.
Chinese authorities are correct in their
assumption that increasing international atten-
tion to the plight of indigenous border peoples
has put pressure on the regions. Notably, the
chair of the Unrepresented Nations and People’s
Organization (UNPO) based in the Hague is the
Uyghur, Erkin Alptekin, son of the Uyghur
Nationalist leader, Isa Yusuf Alptekin. There are
at least five international organizations working
for the independence of Xinjiang, known as East-
ern Turkestan, and based in Amsterdam,
Munich, Istanbul, Melbourne, and New York.
Clearly, with Xinjiang representing the last Mus-
lim region under Communism, Chinese authori-
ties have more to be concerned about than just
international support for Tibetan independence. 
Internal Colonialism and
Muslim Separatism
Practically speaking, China is not threatened
in the near future by the loss of its ‘internal
colonies.’ Such as they are, China’s separatists
are small in number, poorly equipped, loosely
linked, and vastly out-gunned by the People’s
Liberation Army and People’s Police. Local sup-
port for separatist activities, particularly in Xin-
jiang, is ambivalent and ambiguous at best,
given the economic disparity between these
regions and their foreign neighbours, which are
generally much poorer and in some cases such
as Tadjikistan, riven by civil war. Memories in the
region are strong of mass starvation and wide-
spread destruction during the Sino-Japanese
and civil war in the first half of this century, not
to mention the chaotic horrors of the Cultural
Revolution. China’s economic progress is an
important check on Uyghur secessionism: the
nearby alternatives are still not that enviable.
International support for Tibetan causes has
done little to shake Beijing’s grip on the region.
Many local activists are calling not for complete
separatism or real independence, but more
often issues express concerns over environmen-
tal degradation, anti-nuclear testing, religious
freedom, over-taxation, and recently imposed
limits on child bearing. Many ethnic leaders are
simply calling for ‘real’ autonomy according to
Chinese law for the five Autonomous Regions
that are each led by First Party Secretaries who
are all Han Chinese controlled by Beijing.
Recent moves suggest efforts to promote Chi-
nese nationalism as a ‘unifying ideology’ that
will prove more attractive than communism and
more manageable than capitalism. By highlight-
ing separatist threats and external intervention,
China can divert attention away from its own
domestic instabilities of natural disasters (espe-
cially the recent flooding), economic crises (such
as the Asian economic downturns drag on
China’s currency), rising inflation, increased
income disparity, displaced ‘floating popula-
tions,’ Hong Kong integration, Taiwan reunifica-
tion, and the other many internal and external
problems facing Jiang Zemin’s government. As
Bruce Kapferer has noted, nationalism ‘makes
the political religious.’ This is perhaps why reli-
giously-based nationalisms, like Islamic Funda-
mentalism and Tibetan Buddhism, are targeted
by Beijing, while the rise of shamanism and pop-
ular religion goes unchecked. At the same time,
a firm lid on Muslim activism in China sends a
message to foreign Muslim militant organiza-
tions to stay out of China’s internal affairs, and
the Taliban to stay well within their Afghan bor-
ders. In a July 1994 interview with Iran’s former
ambassador to China in Tehran, I was told that
Iran would never intervene in a Muslim crack-
down in China, despite its support for the train-
ing of Kubrawiyyah Sufi Imams from Gansu and
close foreign relations with China.
In a recent visit to the U.S., Defense Minister
Chi Haotian, declared: ‘We hope to see a peace-
ful settlement [regarding Taiwan] yet refuse to
renounce the use of force – The entire Chinese
history shows that whoever splits the mother-
land will end up condemned by history.’ This fol-
lows the new Chinese History Project launched
by Song Jian, Minister of Science and Technolo-
gy, aimed at writing a new chronology of China.
In a Science and Technology Daily editorial, pub-
lished May 17, 1997, Song Jian stated that the
project’s goal was to demonstrate its 6,000 year
‘unbroken, unilineal’ development. ‘Unlike those
in Egypt, Babylon and India,’ Song declared, ‘the
Chinese civilization has lasted for 5,000 years
without a break.’ The project, to be completed
by October 1, 1999, clearly will take a dim view of
anyone accused of separatism. As long as Mus-
lim activism is regarded as ‘separatism’, it will be
seen not only as going against China’s national
destiny, but against history itself. Xinjiang, in this
scenario, becomes just one of many former
internal colonies to be dissolved into the
advancing Chinese state, rather than the ances-
tral home known to the Uyghurs as Uyghuristan.
♦
Dr Dru C. Gladney is professor of Asian Studies and
Anthropology, University of Hawai’i.
The opinions in this article are the author’s alone.
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T a j i k i s t a n
G A B RI E L L E  VA N  D E N  B E R G
One of the customs of the Ismailis of Tajik Badakhshan
is the performance of a specific genre of religious poet-
ry, called madâh. In madâh, literally meaning praise,
the veneration of ‘Alî, the holy family of the Prophet
Muhammad, the Ismaili imams, and the 11th century
Ismaili poet-philosopher, Nâsir-i Khusraw, is expressed
in combination with mystical ideas common in Sufi
p o e t r y .
Religious Poetry
in Tajik
B a d a k h s h a n
Madâh is usually performed by one or two
men, accompanied by a rubâb and a daf. They
perform for their own community, which is in
most cases a small village or a certain quarter of
a town. Men, women and children may be pre-
sent: sometimes the men join the performers in
singing the refrains, but most of the time every-
body listens in silence to the performance.
Approving exclamations are expressed when
the madâh comes to an end, which is usually
after many hours.
Madâh is performed often as a ritual of mourn-
ing. It is also performed on Thursday evenings
and Fridays, or on the occasion of an anniversary
of one of the numerous holy places in Badakh-
shan. Holy places, called mazâr, are scattered
throughout the country. They contain the
remains of mystics or extremely pious men of
past times, surrounded by horns of the ibex.
The poetry sung in madâh is exclusively in Per-
sian. For many Badakhshanis, this is their second
language. In most cases one of the Pamir lan-
guages, Shughnî-Rushânî or Wakhî, is their
mother tongue. Persian has of old been in use as
a lingua franca of the area and as the language
for writing, since the above-mentioned lan-
guages did not have a script. Persian also served
as the language of religion, together with Arabic.
In a performance of madâh different forms of
Persian poetry are linked together. The begin-
ning of the performance is usually slow and
solemn. The first poem is often a ghazal. In the
course of the performance, the tempo rises. The
poems tend to be longer in the middle of a per-
formance, when versified stories are sung. In
between, quatrains or short prayers form a
pause.
Madâh poetry is largely orally transmitted.
The madâhkhâns, the performers of madâh,
state that the poetry comes from ‘the bayâz’,
notebooks with miscellaneous poems. Some
madâhkhâns keep a similar notebook with
poems written in Tajik script, used to memorize
the texts. Many poems sung in madâh are
attributed to classical Persian poets like Jalâl al-
Dîn Rûmî. Often these poems can be character-
ized as Sufi poems. Like many instances of clas-
sical Persian Sufi poetry, madâh is intended to
elucidate religious matters.
Madâhkhâns are not professional singers. To
be a madâhkhân is not even a profession. It is a
gift, from which one should not make money.
Therefore all madâhkhâns have other profes-
sions; many of them are farmers. They perform
madâh when requested. ♦
Dr Gabrielle van den Berg is assistant lecturer
i nt h e Department of Oriental Studies,
C a m b r i d g eU n i v e r s i t y
A Few Examples of Madâh Poetry
The first example is a mystical poem, addressed to a pupil on the
mystical path, literally a ‘searcher for unity (with God)’. The pupil, and
implicitly the audience, is accused of having too much pride and vani-
ty. The poet speaks for a divine initiator, who appears in all forms and
who stands above the cycle of beings. The listener is invited to heed
this Absolute Truth, which is invisible to the physical eye, unless the
outward eye is turned inwards, to the interior aspect of everything.
Awareness of the interior aspect of things and beings leads to an
understanding of the Secret. This secret is only known to the initiated. 
Oh you searcher of Unity, you are all the boasting I am looking for
Listen to my words because I am saying the words of God
Be the pupil of my heart in the school of learning
If you want me to open the door of secrets for you
If you want to serve in this divine horizon
Then be ready for my command and listen to everything I say
In this treasury of nine roofs there are four houses and six views
Know the talisman of the treasure of meaning in it – it is my world-
adorning Being
If you want to see my face then open the eye of Secret Knowledge
Because the worldly eye does not see a thing except my world-adorning
B e i n g
Where do you see me in the earthly world with this eye?
Since I am on a place and without a place, I stand above place and abode
If you want to know me then first know yourself
I know every one, I bring knowing and I am knowing
In that sense I have become visible so that you know that
I am wise as well as unwise, blind as well as seeing
Become drunk of the cup of longing so that you learn to know 
That I am sometimes wine, sometimes the cup and sometimes the cup-
b e a r e r
Although everyone is from God on his way to God, I am master of this all
Whatever be the place of highest essence, whatever be the place of lowest
essence 
I do not need anything and I am free from this all
You will not see anything but me, nor at the beginning, nor at the end
In this sense that I am hidden and always visible
For me, there is no change in meaning but in outward appearance 
I change sometimes and I appear in every form
The second example may be seen as a heterodox poem, in which cA l î
is more or less deified. The first part of the sixth line is a sort of spell
against the accusation of blasphemy; it is obvious that the composer of
this poem is aware of a possible reproach in consequence of his state-
ments. In the Ismaili religion, cAlî is not deified; but in the Ismaili doc-
trine of prophetic cycles he holds a key position as the wasî or deputy of
the Prophet Muhammad. The deputies in the different prophetic cycles
knew the secret meaning behind the outer form of religion. This secret
was only revealed to a limited number of initiates. One of the reasons
for the prevalence of cAlî in the poetry of Badakhshan may well be the
fact that cAlî as a deputy of Muhammad represents the inner dimension
of faith, which is deemed more important than the outer form. In this
poem, cAlî is identified with a number of prophets. It has been recorded
as well among the Ahl-i haqq of Kurdistan. The alleged author of this
poem is Shams-i Tabrêzî: but this is probably a false attribution.
Since the world came into existence, cAlî w a s
Since earth and time came into being, cAlî w a s
The king who was executor after the Lord, was cAlî 
Sultan of generosity, benevolence and liberality was cAlî 
Adam as well as Seth, Job as well as Enoch
The prophet Salih as well as David: it was cAlî 
First and last, exterior and interior
Devotee, place of worship and deity: it was cAlî 
Jesus came into being and spoke these words
‘The inner meaning of my story is: it was cAlî 
This is no blasphemy, these words are no blasphemy
As long as something is, cAlî will be; as long as something was, cAlî w a s
Listen to the luminous Lamech, so that you will know
That friend, who was this prophetic soul, was cAlî 
Gabriel came from near the incomparable Creator
In the qibla was Muhammad, but the goal was cAlî 
Moses saw in a dream that the kernel of prophecy
which he showed to the Pharaoh in Egypt, was cAlî 
The seal on the finger of Solomon the Prophet
That divine light that was in it, was cAlî 
That conqueror who on the fortress of Khaybar
destroyed the door with one stroke and opened it, was cAlî 
That mighty king who on the road of Islam
did not rest till he had success, was cAlî 
That mighty king who was one with the chosen Ahmad 
in the night of the Ascension, was cAlî 
The theme of the third example of madâh poetry is the transience of
this world. In all genres of poetry performed in Badakhshan, allusions
to the transience of the world are common. Admonitions not to attach
oneself to the world are eagerly listened to by the audience.
Do not feel secure in this world, for no rose or rose-bed remains
Do not be negligent in remembering God for in the body no soul remains
Do you not fear the day that you put your side against the earth?
For you, as an ornament not even a piece of turban and clothes remains
Surely there is a ray of the soul as a loan in the house of the body 
For life not even a ray of the sun in a small window remains
The kings of the world delighted in pride of their palace and throne
They were unable to consider ‘to me, nothing of this remains’
The greedy people have collected earthly possessions out of greed
Look, in the end not even earth in the hem of the skirt remains
Alas I spent the house of my life in negligence
Everything I threw in the wind and from the heap of corn no grain
r e m a i n s
Think well, for our past life does not return
Such is the portion formed by day and night: from going 
nothing remains
White became the eye of Jacob because of separation from Joseph
‘For my heart’s comfort nothing but the smell of the shirt remains’
Qalandar, if you boast Love for Him then learn from the 
n i g h t i n g a l e s
For no long nights to wail over separation remain 
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MA N O J  J O S H I Islamic Reformism
and Militancy
i n I n d i a
Roots of Islamic Reformism
The roots of Islamic reformism in the subcon-
tinent can be traced to the eighteenth century
and the decline of the Mughal empire and to
the emergence of British colonialism. Central to
these are the ideas of Shah Wali Allah (1703-63)
and his son Shah Abdul Aziz (1746-1824). Their
influence was felt through a variety of move-
ments ranging from the Tariqa-i-Muham-
madiyya of Syed Ahmed Barelwi to the ulema
who founded the great seminary of dar-ul-
Uloom at Deoband. Though the school was ini-
tially politically inactive, many of its teachers
and students became influenced by the call of
pan-Islamism from Istanbul. Foremost among
these was Maulana Mehmood-ul-Hassan (1852-
1921). The main thrust of his movement was the
declaration that India was d a r - u l - h a r b; territory
of war requiring a j i h a d. He was among the
founders of the J a m i a t - u l e m a - e - H i n d ( O r g a n i z a-
tion of the Ulemas of India), which participated
shoulder-to-shoulder with Mahatma Gandhi
and the Congress in the Khilafat movement, in
support of the Caliph and the conservative
Deobandis, who believed that India could
remain united as a federation of communities,
remained aligned with the Congress in the
ensuing decades and opposed the formation of
Pakistan. Many saw Pakistan as an idea put for-
ward by westernized Muslims and many were
not unaware that any scheme of partition would
leave large numbers of Muslims in India. How-
ever, some Deobandis who founded the J a m i a t -
ulema-i-Islam (JUUI) at a meeting in Calcutta in
1945, supported the formation of Pakistan.
The idea of Pakistan was not acceptable
either to Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi who, in
1941, founded the Jamaat-e-Islami who saw it
as a Muslim state rather than the Islamic one he
wanted. In all fairness, that is exactly how the
Qaid-e-Azam, Mohammed Ali Jinnah envi-
sioned Pakistan. Maudoodi advocated the idea
of the Nizam-e-Mustafa or a system, as he per-
ceived it, to be ruled the way it was in the time
of Prophet Mohammed.
After Partition
With Partition, many organizations split. The
entire JUUI went over to Pakistan while the
J a m i a t - u l - u l e m a - i - H i n d, remained headquar-
tered in India. The Jamaat-e-Islami split and the
Indian branch came under the influence of the
nationalist Deboandis and accepted and even
lauded the secular ideal as a means of preserv-
ing minority culture and focused on education
and social uplift of the community. J a m a a t - e -
I s l a m i Kashmir had an ambivalent attitude
towards politics. It participated in several state
assembly elections, the last one being in 1987.
The Pakistani branch headed by Maudoodi,
on the other hand, became active in what can
be called ‘Islamic’ politics, beginning in the
1950s with the instigation of riots against the
Ahmadiya community. In the past three
decades, the organization has become the core
of radicalism and fundamentalism in Pakistan.
It played an important role in the campaign
against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and then supported
the military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq. The
Pakistani dictator skilfully used his alliance with
the J a m a a t to strengthen his position.
Turning on India
In the years after Independence, organiza-
tions of Indian and Pakistani Muslims kept a
wary distance from each other. However, the
sharp increase in the wealth of the Arabian
Peninsula led to an enhancement of Wahhabi
influence on Indian Muslims. This effort was
spearheaded by preachers who collected funds
from the Arabs to run m a d r a s a s (schools) and
other organizations in service of the communi-
ty. The US-supported jihad against the Soviet
Union in Afghanistan led to the radicalization of
Indian Islam as well through the enhanced
interest of Saudi Arabia in the region and the
activity of fundamentalist preachers in India
and Bangladesh, many receiving funds from the
Arabian peninsula. Quietistic movements like
the J a m i a t - e - A h l e - H a d i t h (Organization of those
upholding Hadith to the exclusion of all juristic
schools of Islam) and the Tablighi Jamaat
became militant, spawning off organizations
like the Markaz Dawa-ul-Irshad (Centre for Spiri-
tual Guidance) and the H a r k a t - u l - A n s a r ( M o v e-
ment of Helpers).
But the major impetus for external involve-
ment in India came from Pakistan’s external
intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelli-
gence (ISI). Under General Akhtar Abdul
Rehman, the agency had perfected the tech-
nique of using religious fundamentalists to fight
the Russians in Afghanistan. With the outbreak
of the revolt in Kashmir 1989-1990 they decided
to use them for the cause of Pakistan. General
Akhtar was dead. He perished in the same plane
crash as General Zia-ul-Haq, but his successors,
Lieutenant Generals Hamid Gul and Javid Nasir,
proved equal to the task.
Their task was not too difficult. The J a m a a t - e -
I s l a m i, Pakistan, and its counter-part group in
the Valley were both for the accession of Jammu
and Kashmir to Pakistan. However, the uprising
was led by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation
Front, a secular formation, seeking indepen-
dence. In 1990-1991, the ISI systematically
starved the JKLF of funds and built up the H i z b u l
M u j a h i d e e n, a militant group created by the
J a m a a t - e - I s l a m i.
To enhance the combat efficiency of the
group, its members were trained alongside the
Afghan mujahideen owing allegiance to the
H i z b - e - I s l a m i of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. After the
fall of Najibullah, Hekmatyar sent a number of
his fighters to fight alongside the Kashmiri and
Pakistani cadres of the Hizbul Mujahideen. In
1993-1994 the Indian Army’s tough response
resulted in great setbacks to the Hizb and the ISI
began to explore other options as well.
Principal among these were two groups who
had been involved in the Afghan j i h a d . T h e
Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami International (HUJI) had
been founded in 1980 by the J a m i a t - u l - u l e m a -
Islam and the Tablighi Jamaat of Pakistan to run
relief camps for the Afghan m u j a h i d e e n. It was
led by Maulvi Irshad Ahmed and its support
base lay in the Punjabi business community
with JUUI and Tablighi Jamaat a f f i l i a t i o n s .
As the war developed, it established links with
the ISI and was subcontracted to recruit and
train the mujahids as well. The HUJI developed
links with the Afghanistani H i z b - e - I s l a m i ( Y u n u s
Khalis) faction. After the death of Maulana
Irshad Ahmed, shahid (martyred) in the j i h a d,
there was a poser-struggle within the organiza-
tion. Fazal-ur-Rehman Khalil, the commander-
in-chief of the group split with the new A m i r,
Qazi Saifullah Akhtar and formed a new outfit
Harkat-ul Mujahideen (HKUM) which retained
the connection with the Khalis faction of t h e
Hizb-e-Islami and its military commander,
Jalaluddin Haqqani located in the Khost area
where they were permitted to retain training
camps. These camps, many set up during the
US- Saudi- Pakistani j i h a d against the Russians
in Afghanistan, were destroyed by American
cruise missiles in August 1998 as a reprisal of the
bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tan-
zania by a group owing allegiance to Saudi mil-
lionaire and now anti-American mujahid O s a m a
bin Laden.
The HKUM sent a lashkar (war party) into Kash-
mir under Sajjad Khan, a Pakistani national, also
known as Sajjad Afghani. He set up a training
camp near Srinagar, but he was not able to
establish effective links with the local groups
and returned to Pakistan. The first HUJI lashkars
began entering the state in early 1992. Later that
year, Nasarullah Mansur Langaryal, its deputy
chief commander and Afghan war veteran was
sent in to head the lashkar. 
In 1991 the Deobandi ulemas of Karachi asked
the two Harkats to reunite so as to prosecute the
Kashmir jihad more effectively. This was done
and the Harkat-ul-Ansar was born in October
1993. The General Secretary of the new organi-
zation, Mohammed Masood Azhar was sent to
India on a Portugese passport to work out the
details of the merger between the Langaryal and
Sajjad Afghani’s lashkars. Unfortunately for
them, all three were arrested in quick succesion.
The arrest of their top leaders derailed the
Harkat’s planning in the Valley. In the next year
or so, they became involved in making efforts for
their release through four separate incidents of
kidnapping. In the first case, an Army road-build-
ing engineer was kidnapped and then executed
when the government refused to trade him for
the Harkat leaders. 
The following year, Qari Zarrar, a Pakistani
who was heading the Harkat in the Valley and
Abdul Hameed Turki (from Turkey) an associate
of Langaryal, decided to take matters into their
own hands. They organized the kidnapping of
five foreigners, of whom one, John Childs, man-
aged to escape. Another, Hans Christian Ostro,
was executed and his body left in a place where
it could be found by the authorities. The four
others- American Donald Hutchings, German
Dirk Hasert, and Britons Keith Mangan and Paul
Wells – are believed to have been executed fol-
lowing Turki’s death in an encounter with the
Indian Army in late 1995. This episode, and sub-
sequent internecine quarrels affected the
Harkat-ul-Ansar’s combat capabilities.
With the H a r k a t coming apart, the ISI has now
put all its bets on yet another pan-Islamic group,
the Markaz Dawa-ul-Irshad and its military wing,
the L a s h k a r - e - T a i b a (Army of the Pure). Among
the fundamentalist sects that backed the
Afghan j i h a d, was the Jamiat Ahle Hadith, an
ultra-orthodox grouping of organizations who
accept the austere Wahabi practices of Saudi
A r a b i a .
Saudi money channeled through Sheikh Abu
Abdul Aziz helped set up the Markaz which is
headquartered at Muridke, near Lahore in 1987.
Its founders were three university teachers, Zafar
Iqbal, Hafiz Mohammed Sayeed and Abdullah
Azam. This organization has institutional links
with the Jamiat-ul-ulema Islam of Pakistan head-
ed by Maulana Fazlur Rehman, a former Senator
in the Pakistan’s parliament and a political ally of
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Its principal aims,
according to its founders, are jihad and preach-
ing. But while many are involved in preaching,
the Markaz is one of the few that still stresses
jihad. However, its main battle-ground is Kash-
mir. The first fighters were sent into Kashmir in
early 1993 through the Islami Inquilabi Mahaz.
Later it associated with the Al Barq, a Valley Kash-
miri group. But since the beginning of 1994, it
has been sending its fighters under the banner
of the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Currently, of an estimat-
ed 300 fighters in the Valley, some 90 per cent
are Pakistanis.
The A h l e - H a d i t h movement, stressing ‘pure’
Wahhabi Islam, has found support among some
of the ulema in India. Nevertheless, the conserv-
ative mainstream Deobandis do not see India as
a D a r - u l - h a r b since Muslim life is still run by their
own Personal Law. The Indian Muslims suffer
from many of the infirmities afflicting their Pak-
istani counterparts, primarily poverty and illiter-
acy. Some of them are falling prey to fundamen-
talist preachers and sects, many of whom had
links with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Not sur-
prisingly, the Pakistani intelligence agency has
been using some of them as a cover for its activ-
i t i e s .
The key watershed for the attitude of many
Indian Muslims, especially in northern India, has
been the the destruction of the Babri Masjid by
a mob of Hindu fanatics in December 1992.
They cited as their reason a belief that the
mosque had been erected by the first Moghul
Emperor Babur in the sixteenth century after
razing a temple commemorating the birth-
place of Rama, one of the most popular gods of
the Hindu pantheon. The emotive campaign
roiled the politics of northern India and set the
stage for the collapse of the Indian National
Congress. It also led to horrific riots in which the
minority Muslim community paid a dispropor-
tionate cost in terms of loss of life and property.
The worst occurrences were in Mumbai follow-
ing the destruction of the Mosque in December
1992, followed by another round in January
1993. In retaliation, as it were, elements of the
Mumbai’s Muslim underworld, with the help of
the ISI, carried out a series of bomb blasts across
the city in March 1993, arguably the worst act of
urban terrorism in recent history.
Pan-Islamic groups see all this as an opportu-
nity. Both the Markaz dawa-ul-Irshad a n d
H a r k a t - u l - A n s a r (it has reverted to H a r k a t - u l -
M u j a h i d e e n after the American proscription in
1997), make it clear that Kashmir is merely a
gateway for a larger j i h a d in India. To this they
have expanded their network across the coun-
try. Mosques and m a u l v i s (teachers) owing alle-
giance to the A h l e - H a d i t h sect are a major link
for an underground terrorist network run by the
HUA and MDI in collaboration with the ISI. These
stretch from Bangladesh, across West Bengal,
northern Bihar and Uttar Pradesh to Delhi. Both
Nepal and Bangladesh have been used as a base
by these groups and, across India, Debandi
madrasahs are a target of subversion and a
source of recruitment. Information on this
development has come through those arrested
for the bombing campaign that saw nearly a
hundred bomb blasts across northern India in
1996-97, taking the lives of scores of people.
Islamic fundamentalism and militancy are
now a fact of life in South Asia. Whether or not
forces of modernization will moderate their
impact is difficult to tell. The steady decline of
the State’s ability to influence the every-day life
of the citizens of the region is playing an impor-
tant role in the growth of fundamentalism.
Political parties, especially in Pakistan, take
quick recourse to hoisting the flag of Islamiza-
tion to handle problems. To compound things,
there is a new factor that must now be taken
into account – the success of the Taliban in
establishing control over Afghanistan. ♦
Manoj Joshi is a senior editor for India Today.
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M A TT H E W  I S A A C  C O H E N
Indonesia, with a population of more than 200 million,
of which perhaps 80 percent is Muslim, is frequently
portrayed in popular presses as ‘the world’s largest
Islamic nation.’ Typically, this statement is then immedi-
ately qualified. But, portrayals often continue, ‘the’
Islam practised by Indonesians is different than that
practised in the countries of the Middle and Near East. It
is more tempered or syncretic, less dogmatic, doctrinal,
or fundamentalist. If proof of this more ‘relaxed’ atti-
tude to the strict observance of Islam is offered, more
often than not it is not through what Indonesian schol-
ars of Islamic law have written (which tends to be rather
conservative) nor by attendance figures at Friday
mosque services or the number of women who are wear-
ing j i l b a b head covers (both of which are escalating at
remarkable rates). Rather, commentators characteristi-
cally turn to the continuing popularity of pre-Islamic
cultural forms in contemporary Indonesia – Java’s cele-
brated shadow puppet theatre or w a y a n g, with its sto-
ries based on the characters and situations of the Indic
epics of the Mahabharata and Ramayana, above all.
Semar Makes
t h e H a j j
Shadow Puppet
Theatre and Islam
i n I n d o n e s i a
The fact that many of the people who live in
Java (which contains nearly half of Indonesia’s
population) enjoy watching the adventures of
Arjuna and Gathotkaca enacted as theatre is
taken as incontrovertible evidence that Indone-
sians, as a people, are somehow ‘less Islamic’
than other member-peoples of the Islamic world
community. This view is not limited to reporters,
but pervades the discourse of anthropology.
Ward Keeler, a renowned scholar of Javanese
culture and language, has written that ‘the mes-
sage of Islam stands counter to the Hindu-based
image of the cosmos inherent to the world of the
wayang’, while James Boon has argued that
‘Islam diminishes the wayangish properties of
culture.’
Such views are stereotypes, of course. There is
no monolithic ‘message of Islam’ nor are wayang
and Islam really in a state of competition for the
souls of ‘the Javanese.’ Going beyond these rei-
fied absolutes requires more nuanced under-
standings of the relation of wayang and Islam,
and particularly how Islam is represented in
wayang performances. For if wayang really is the
encyclopedic crystallization of Javanese culture
that anthropologists and philologists have long
claimed, Islam merits at least an entry.
Historical research on Javanese literature
demonstrates that before the late nineteenth
century, wayang and Islam interacted in com-
plex ways. S u l u k, or Javanese mystical poems,
appropriated images and symbols from the
shadow puppet theatre to meditate upon
notions of unity of God and Man, the workings
of fate and free will, and knowing and doing.
Encyclopedists and chroniclers redacted
genealogies and tales co-articulating the for-
merly distinct histories of Javanese gods and
culture heroes and Islamic prophets and holy
men. Stories circulated concerning the exem-
plary uses of wayang by Sunan Kalijaga, one of
the semi-legendary w a l i u l l a h or ‘Friends of
God’ credited with introducing Islam to Java in
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. One par-
ticularly well-known tale describes how Sunan
Kalijaga gave wayang performances for spon-
sors who paid by reciting the Islamic declara-
tion of belief: ‘There is no God but Allah, and
Muhammad is His Messenger.’
So much does the Javanese manuscript tra-
dition, as compiled in public collections in Lei-
den, Jakarta, and Yogyakarta, tell us. The ques-
tion arises as to what continuity such practices
have with contemporary Java, after the rise of
Islamic mass organizations, the development
of Middle Eastern-style Islamic modernism,
and the massive growth of Islamic institutions
of learning through the university level.
A partial answer to this query is found in a
particular ‘school’ or ‘regional sub-style’ (k a o l)
of wayang, the so-called k i d u l a n or ‘southern’
style epicentred in the town of Palimanan,
some 15 kilometres west of the city of Cirebon,
in north-coastal West Java. The greater Cire-
bon area is renowned throughout the Indone-
sian archipelago as a centre for Islamic learn-
ing, and particularly its mystical traditions. It is
also famed for its characteristic art forms, par-
ticularly its distinctive batik cloth, reverse
paintings on glass, and mask dance. Southern
puppeteers, over four generations of an
extended family, have inflected wayang in par-
ticularly Islamic ways, taking seriously their
charge as descendants (biological as well as
spiritual) of Sunan Kalijaga. Wayang is viewed
as a warisan sing para wali, an ‘inheritance from
the Friends of God,’ and the puppeteer as a
juru dakwah or ‘Islamic proselytizer.’ In south-
ern wayang, the familiar characters of wayang,
including the Hindu gods and culture heroes,
remain at centre stage. But they are animated
by Islamic ideas and ideals.
A characteristic southern wayang play is
Semar Munggah Haji, ‘Semar Makes the Hajj,’
which I saw performed by the young southern
puppeteer Purjadi in 1994. Purjadi is a gradu-
ate of Cirebon’s branch of the National Insti-
tute for Islamic Studies, and frequently draws
upon his Islamic learning in performance. The
play’s title character is Semar, the elder brother
of Divine Guru (Shiva to South Asians), the
faithful clown-servant of Arjuna and the other
Pandhawa brothers. A toll road, not unlike the
Jakarta-Surabaya superhighway that passes
through the Cirebon region, has been con-
structed through Semar’s hamlet of Karangtu-
maritis and Semar has received 25 million rupi-
ah as retribution for the appropriation of his
property. Subsequently, Semar receives a
divine vision: he must use this windfall profit to
make the pilgrimage to the Arabian peninsula.
He sends his youngest son, Cungkring, to see if
Semar’s brother, Divine Guru, will come to see
him off. Guru refuses, for going on the hajj is
for Muslims and he and his ancestors have
always been Hindu-Buddhists. Semar’s de
facto conversion to Islam would be a black
mark on Guru’s genealogy. Battles erupt. After
many complications, including the destruction
of Semar’s corporeal body, Semar is instructed
in the various laws concerning the hajj by a
Muslim j i n n (genie) named Nalikaparman (with
reference to Algensindo et al.’s Fiqh Islam, an
oft-reprinted textbook on Islamic law that the
puppeteer read in his student days at the
Islamic Institute), goes on the hajj, and
changes his name to Haji Asmaruddin.
Semar Munggah Haji, and the southern
wayang school in general, cannot speak for the
entire ‘Javanese wayang tradition,’ if such an
entity exists. Nor is it clear whether such plays
and institutions are prognostic of a new inte-
gration of wayang and Islam, a remnant of an
old tradition, or both. They do serve to unsettle
old assumptions and boundaries, however,
and sensitize us to the remarkable range of
local dynamics of Islam world-wide. ♦
Dr Mathew Cohen is research fellow at the
International Institute for Asian Studies, Leiden.
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In recent years, the number of Islamic butchers has been
growing at an increasing rate. This brings a few prob-
lems with it. Not only are there Dutch regulations for
butchers, Muslims also have their own requirements for
the meat that they buy.
In Search of the
Muslim Consumer
Islamic Butchers in
t h e N e t h e r l a n d s
The overall number of butchers in the Nether-
lands has steadily declined in the last years.
Whereas in 1990 there were still 5,300 registered
with the professional association of butchers in
Rijswijk, by the end of last year this number had
dwindled to 4,500.Yet remarkably in recent years
the proportion of Muslim butchers has risen
sharply. At the end of last year, the butchers’
association had 490 Islamic butchers registered
with it – twice as many as four years ago. By the
end of June this year, this number had already
risen to 523. ‘I’m sure that there are still a few
hundred missing from our books,’ says A.L.
Moerman, the association’s spokesman.
The vigour which Islamic butchers show in
establishing themselves is matched by the wor-
ries that the association has about this ‘subsec-
tor’. In Islamic circles, attempts are also being
made to keep a sharp eye on the way Islamic
butchers practise their trade. The association is
concerned about whether the butchers work
competently, observing hygiene and safety
rules, as well as acting in an economically
responsible manner.
Of paramount importance to the Muslim com-
munity is that it is ensured of the religious side of
the business. The meat must be approved as
‘halal’. But, random samples and surveys of
everyday practice indicate that there is no effec-
tive check. This means that many Muslims, confi-
dent that they are eating halal food, are, in fact,
eating food which is ‘haram’, forbidden by Allah.
‘Quite often we receive signals that the rules are
being taken with a grain of salt,’ says Abdul
Qayyoem, chairman of the Halal Food and Food-
stuffs association (HVV), based in The Hague,
which runs its own inspection service.
Even in the 1960s, the specific position of the
Islamic butcher was already a bone of con-
tention, which had raised its head after Dutch
companies began the large-scale recruitment of
guest-workers from countries such as Turkey
and Morocco.
As early as 1967, a Moroccan butcher had
already started a business in Utrecht. In the same
year, another settled in Amsterdam. These first
Islamic butchers had no official papers and
worked in rooms which bore little resemblance
to a butcher’s shop. Until 1969, when he was
able to rent a shop, the butcher in Utrecht
worked in a garage. Ritual slaughtering took
place without a permit. It was not until between
1975 and 1977 that a small number of butchers
obtained a special permit. Chamber of Com-
merce figures show that these pioneers were
mostly Moroccan, and that Utrecht was the most
important retail centre. From their bases here,
these fairly wealthy butchers established
branches throughout the country. Most of these
butchers had enough money to invest and
almost all of them came from the cities of
Tétouan and Nador in the north of Morocco.
These butchers did extraordinarily well.
Among them were entrepreneurs with a
turnover of ten to twenty thousand guilders per
week. Their customers stood in long queues in
front of the door. This is also not surprising since
Muslims in the Netherlands are relatively big
meat-eaters. Last year for example, according to
estimates, the ethnic minorities accounted for
ten percent of the total purchases of meat in the
Netherlands. 
In the first half of the 1970s, despite a con-
stantly rising demand for ritually slaughtered
meat, the number of butchers with a permit
remained at 33. Those who wanted to begin
faced a number of problems. In order to com-
plete formalities such as legal requirements, it
was necessary to obtain the advice of ‘a pioneer’
– in other words, a competitor. Besides this it
was difficult to raise starting capital and contacts
also had to be established with abattoirs and
exporters of Moroccan foodstuffs in France and
Belgium.
Turkish butchers lagged behind their Moroc-
can counterparts for a long time. In 1974 there
were eight Turkish butchers in the four big cities
compared with 22 Moroccan ones. Surinamese
butchers appeared even later. For instance,
although the first Moroccan butcher started in
Utrecht in 1967, his first Turkish colleague did
not follow suit until 1974 and the first Suri-
namese only came on the scene in 1980.
That the number of Islamic butchers has now
risen to 523 or perhaps even higher, is inelucta-
baly linked the fact that the number of Dutch
Muslims now totals an estimated 800,000 to
1,000,000.
Nowadays, the Islamic butcher is required to
have a professional diploma and be registered
with the butchers’ association, to which he must
pay an annual contribution of more than a hun-
dred guilders. ‘Actually, it’s quite simple,’ says
Moerman. ‘Even though there is wide diversifica-
tion – they often sell vegetables, dates, olives,
herbs, tableware, bread, and household goods
as well – if his business involves jointing meat, he
must be a butcher and must satisfy the technical
and hygienic requirements.’
‘It can happen that someone sometimes regis-
ters himself and says that he completed his train-
ing in, say, Ankara. In a case like that, we ask him
to ‘hone a knife’, as we call it – in other words, to
sharpen it. This is a simple check because it is
done in the same way all over the world. If he
cannot do this, you can be pretty sure he is not
telling the truth.’
‘It is also extremely important that he works
according to the HACCP code. This is a hygiene
directive drawn up in Brussels for various sorts of
businesses-like hotels and restaurants and the
fish trade. HACCP stands for Hazard Analysis Crit-
ical Control Points. Since 1 January 1997, every
butcher is required by law to work in accordance
with this food-safety system.’
Moerman says that, in the case of a number of
Islamic butchers, it is not only the hygiene
aspect that is worrying, it is also the way they
manage their business. ‘They often do not do
their sums properly and then operate with far
too low a profit margin. Usually, a business like
that doesn’t last long. To some extent, the roots
of this problem lie in the clientele; their cus-
tomers are quick to find their way to the cheap-
est shop.’
‘This is the reason why supermarkets have not
yet seized upon that market segment en masse.
Of course, a million Muslims represent a lucra-
tive market but supermarkets are not interested
in going to so much trouble for such a minimal
profit margin.’
‘These profit margins are often crippling for
the Islamic butchers as well, and they soon lead
to bankruptcy. The situation also creates friction
between the butchers. While one of them has his
professional diploma and works according to
the HACCP code, he has to compete with neigh-
bouring ‘colleagues’ whose businesses are
absolutely not above board. That is not good at
all.’
Abdul Qayyoem has concerns of a different
nature. He is Surinamese by birth, originally a
chemist, and is now chairman of the HVV Associ-
ation as well as chairman of the Dutch Muslim
Information Centre.
‘In 1972, we started talking about a federation
of Muslims that could represent a point of refer-
ence to which the government could turn. At the
time, there were about fifty organizations active
on behalf of the group then known as guest-
workers. This federation – the Dutch Federation
of Muslim Organizations – was founded in 1975.
At the time, we had regular discussions with the
Permanent Parliamentary Commission for Cul-
ture, Recreation, and Social Welfare about the
problem of Islamic butchers, and other related
matters.’
‘In 1980, ethnicity began to raise its head once
more and the whole thing fell apart. We then
carried on with the Dutch Muslim Information
Centre in order to maintain the dialogue regard-
ing education, training, integration, Islamic festi-
vals, and activities. By 1987, there seemed to be
a tangible demand for a sort of ‘halal certifica-
tion’, by which we mean that food and food-
stuffs are certified pure, in accordance with the
requirements of the Koran.’
‘Of course there was nothing we could do – we
are not a police organization. But finally, in 1994,
the HVV association was set up and this has an
autonomous inspection department. The associ-
ation also has a ‘fatwa council’ consisting of five
muftis.’ ‘The muftis also instruct the inspection
department, which consists of ten men, about all
sorts of questions regarding slaughtering and
foodstuff problems for Muslims. Actually, ten
inspectors is far too few. We should have a hun-
dred, but let me hasten to add that I would also
be very satisfied with thirty.’
The inspectors supervise ritual slaughtering,
and inspect the way the meat is processed but
also, for example, supervise the composition of
baby-food sold in shops. ‘For instance, recently it
turned out that low-fat vegetable margarines
contain gelatines derived from offal that serve as
a binding agent. They also occur in desserts, ice
cream, sweets, and medicines for example. This
is absolutely forbidden to Muslims. So the
inspectors do not restrict themselves to inspect-
ing meat. We would also like to have our own
laboratory where we could investigate the ingre-
dients present in all sorts of foodstuffs.’
The association’s inspectors have no formal
authority. ‘It is a sort of gentlemen’s agreement
that they can visit a butcher’s shop with a view to
certifying it. Their findings are announced in the
mosque. That can be a source of annoyance for
certain butchers. All the same, we do not go into
the matter with them,’ says Qayyoem.
Moerman points out that meat is also sold in
mosques – a trade which takes place completely
hidden from sight of the Inspection Department
– but, according to Qayyoem, this trade is
extremely limited.
If Islamic butchers knowingly sell meat that is
not ‘halal’, they are committing a grave sin, says
Qayyoem. ‘Every Muslim knows this. But we do
not have the authority to force someone to close
his shop.’ ‘The eating of pork is absolutely for-
bidden,’ says Qayyoem. ‘But then nor is beef
allowed just like that. That would be putting it
too simply. There are also requirements set for
the slaughtering of beef cattle. The slaughtering
must be accompanied by the prayers of a ‘true
Muslim’ who doesn’t necessarily have to be an
imam. The slaughter should also be supervised
by people who have been approved by the HVV
Association.’
A butcher who sells meat according to the
requirements does not necessarily have a ‘halal’
shop, says Qayyoem. ‘You sometimes see –
mostly with Turkish butchers – that they also sell
alcoholic drinks such as beer. According to
Islamic law this is a grave sin. In fact, you could
also say that a butcher like that is not a true Mus-
lim.’ ♦
Bram Pols is a journalist for the daily
N R CH a n d e l s b l a d.
© NRC Handelsblad 1998.
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G I L L E S  K E P E L
By the year 2000, Islamism will be approximately a quar-
ter of a century old. This movement, though it claimed
deep roots, surfaced and flourished with the major social
breakdown which took place in the mid 1970s in the
Muslim world. Twenty-five years later, social sciences –
provided they take stock – have the opportunity to make
a significant breakthrough in the analyses of what was
one of the most puzzling – if unexpected – social phe-
nomena of the contemporary period.
The Political
S o c i o l o g y
of Islamism
A quarter of a century covers the span of a
generation. Activists who were in their twen-
ties in the mid 1970s, on Egyptian, Pakistani or
Indonesian campuses, are now middle-aged.
Their black beards are turning barley and corn.
They chanted slogans and forwarded the
utopia of the daoula islamiyya, the Islamist
state. As for now, for better or worse, they have
a record. They are established, part of the polit-
ical game. Some are in power – where they dis-
tribute patronage –, others are in jail, some
dead, others in exile in the impious lands of the
West – to which they have an intimate expo-
sure –, and many are in business. In some
cases, their world-view has changed. And they
have children. The new generation which is
coming of adult age in the 1990s has no mem-
ories of the fights of the late seventies and
early eighties – the Iranian revolution, Sadat’s
assassination, etc. – just like the activists of the
seventies were foreign to their own parents’
stories: the struggle against colonialism, the
battles for independence, and everything that
had taken place from the middle forties to the
early sixties. The young Islamists of yesterday
had built their vision and mobilized their fol-
lowers to a large extent as a reaction to the sta-
tus quo of their time – which they described in
categories of thought and speech which were
grounded in Islamic parlance but adapted to
the social, political, cultural and economic con-
ditions of those days. To what extent are they
still relevant for the young adults of the year
2000? The 1997 presidential election in Iran
gave advance notice that a majority of the chil-
dren of the Islamic republic were willing to
oust the incumbents. In Turkey, Refah Partisi’s
short-lived venture in government showed
that Mr Erbakan and his friends could not engi-
neer enough social pressure to remain in
power. Egyptian and Algerian Islamist move-
ments, in spite of their wide following, were
unable to topple the State, and could not help
their splitting up into competing splinter
groups: the violence and terrorism of the
extremist factions blurred the accomodationist
message of the mainstream organizations.
These and a few other examples should help
us understand that Islamism is not the tidal
wave that its supporters longed for and its
opponents dreaded. It is by no means the End
of History of the Muslim world today. It is but a
social movement like any other – communism,
nationalism, liberalism, fascism, socialism, … –
which is subject to ebbing and flowing, to inter-
nal contradictions, and it has to compete fierce-
ly with other social movements in order to
attract and mobilize followers. Twenty-five
years ago it was a new issue: today, it is no
longer so, and we have to consider post-
I s l a m i s m .
A quarter of a century of existence provides a
lot of data, and allows for comparative analysis
– something which was hardly feasible for
those of us who engaged in early studies of the
phenomenon by 1980. Then, the task of the
social scientist who tackled such a topic was to
be an eye-opener, to uncover the significance
of Islamist movements – in contradistinction to
the p r é n o t i o n s or the common wisdom of the
social sciences discourse of the times, that dis-
carded them as insignificant, epiphenomenal,
reactionary, fascist, and the like. During this
pioneering stage, each of us was discovering
his own field, and we had very little access to
comparison, because social science literature
was scant. As a new phenomenon, it did not
bring with it much historical depth: it could be
put into perspective with earlier movements –
such as the Egyptian Muslim Brothers for
instance – but the social environments of
British-controlled and independent Egypt
were worlds apart. It could be related to intel-
lectual history – such as the œuvre of Sayyid
Qotb – but ideology was by no means a surro-
gate for political sociology. For the few who
took the movement seriously at its onset, it
was fascinating – all the more so because it
provided for an ‘indigenous’ conceptual lan-
guage that seemed to reveal the malfunctions
of society, that had a tribune tone. But we were
not equipped at the time to analyse the move-
ment in terms of political sociology, to evalu-
ate its relation, as an object, to the field to
which it belonged. Hence, we focused on what
was at hand and expedient – on discourse and
m i l i t a n c y .
Since then, the environment of the research
on Islamism has undergone a sea change.
Scarcity was replaced by hypertrophy. Many
valuable studies (and many less valuable) were
published, and their first and foremost asset
was to provide grounds for comparison. It is
outside the scope of one individual, even of a
team of scholars, to cover an array of move-
ments that function in so many different soci-
eties and use so many different idioms. Field-
work research is now available on Islamism in
China; Southeast, South and Central Asia; Iran;
Turkey; Africa; the Arab world; Europe; and
America. To take but one example, students of
the Arab world, who rarely know Urdu, had to
rely on hearsay when it came to Mawdudi and
the jamaat-e Islami: now that we have S.V.
Nasr’s superb scholarship, not only can our
knowledge per se of that ideologue and his
organization make a leap forward, but it also
brings invaluable food for thought when one
embarks on a study of FIS or R e f a h. Hence, the
challenge of the social sciences has changed:
though there always will be a lot more to dis-
cover, much has been done in terms of
description and inventory of Islamist move-
ments as an object of research. What remains
in front of us is the study of the interaction
between such an object and the social field in
which it functions. In other words, the political
sociology of Islamism is now the continent to
be explored.
One of the difficulties of this task is due to
the extremely politicized aspect of the majori-
ty of the literature which is produced on
Islamism, and the strong normative pressure
which is exerted on scholars to take sides –
something that blurs the very process of
research. To some extent, the present situation
is comparable to studies of communism in the
post World War II period, when specialized
scholars were caught between the hammer of
the fellow traveller and the anvil of the social
traitor. Nowadays, one is torn between apolo-
gists and enemies. Both groups are backed by
powerful, well-funded interest groups and
foundations, control research centres, univer-
sity chairs, journals, and the like, particularly in
the United States. When one does not want to
enrol in either camp, financial resources
become scarce. Both apologists and enemies
share one basic assumption: Islamist move-
ments as they view them are representative of
Muslim societies today. Either they are alto-
gether ‘bad guys’, hostile to the West, and
should be contained; Or they are mainly ‘good
guys’ – except for a few ‘extremists’ – with no
hostility to market forces, and they should be
co-opted into power. An increasing amount of
the social sciences literature on Islamism is
now being produced in order to reinforce
either of these two normative views.
The risk here is to jump to conclusions and to
miss the object of research – to confuse the
representation of Islamist movements with
their reality. All the more so as the movements
themselves contribute to this process of repre-
sentation as they produce a lot of discourse,
which is self-promoting. Some is aimed at the
West, some at local bases of support. Some is
replete with s a l a m, some with j i h a d. Twenty
years ago, when nothing was available but dis-
course and militancy, we had to take discourse
very seriously. Nowadays, with a quarter of a
century of social history of Islamism, we should
start with facts, and consider discourse as part
and parcel of the political process, not as a key
to its understanding.
One very simple starting point, for those con-
vinced that it is now time to take stock, would
be to look back at the divergent fates of Islamist
movements in the many countries where they
have emerged – and for which there is serious
monographic research available. How is it that
they have been successful in some cases, man-
aged to seize power, have failed in others, were
unable to resist state repression and/or to
mobilize wide enough a constituency? Com-
parative data now allow researchers to find
new evidence on the social cluster that com-
poses Islamist movements: everywhere, they
brought together different social groups with
diverging agendas, which could remain united
under certain circumstances, but whose
alliance could break under other circum-
stances. If one compares the movements of
Iran and Algeria, for instance, one of the keys to
understanding why they succeeded in seizing
power in one case and failed in the other lies in
the interaction between the pious middle-
classes, the young urban poor and the Islamist
intelligentsia in each society. In Iran, Khomeini
managed to control the whole mobilization
process and keep all groups united until the
outcome of the revolution. In Algeria, the FIS
was able to mobilize side by side the h i t t i s t e s
and the goldsmiths during the early phases,
from 1989 to 1991, but it was incapable (lately)
to prevent the splitting of the ranks between
the pious middle-classes and the young disen-
franchised – something which hampered its
capacity to seize power, and then to resist
repression. Such phenomena should lead us to
be more aware of the social composition of the
Islamist parties, and of the relevance of social
factors to their capacity for mobilization –
whether it be in the case of Refah Partisi, of
Jama’at-e Islami and the other Pakistani reli-
gious parties, of the Arab Muslim Brothers
organizations and their rivals within the politi-
cal Islamic field, of ICMI and the Muham-
madiyya in Indonesia, etc. To what segments in
contemporary Muslim societies do those move-
ments eventually deliver, and what do they
actually deliver – particularly when they have
partial or hegemonic access to power? And,
conversely, which are the social groups that
feel deprived, or ill-treated by them?
A quarter of a century should have been long
enough for social scientists to dispel their fas-
cination for the mystique of contemporary
Islamism: it is now high time for scholars to
treat it like any other social object – something
which may well, in turn, shed more light on our
understanding of the social use of religion on
the eve of the twenty-first century. ♦
Prof. Dr Gilles Kepel is the director of research at
t h e Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique and
professor at the Institut d’Études Politiques in Paris.
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Up until the early 1970s the academic study of Islamic
family law was largely the privileged terrain of those
involved in Oriental studies. In their work, they mainly
focused on the texts of the leaders of the major schools
of Islamic law, on the one hand; and the newly codified
and reformed twentieth-century laws, on the other.
Considering family relations as the outcome of the pro-
visions of Islamic law, they tended to define the classical
Islamic family as monolithic, static and rigidly patriar-
chal, and saw the promulgation of the twentieth-centu-
ry legal reforms as signaling the eclipse of this type of




D i f f e r e n t
P e r s p e c t i v e s 1
During the last twenty years, such an
approach to women and Islamic law has
become subject to serious criticism, and the
grounds of debate have fundamentally
changed. With an increasing number of histori-
ans and anthropologists involved in research
on Islamic family law, new perspectives have
been brought to the fore, and firmly held
assumptions have come in for scrutiny. Rather
than assuming that law texts determine social
relations, these scholars question the ways in
which such texts relate to other genres of legal
discourse and to various forms of social prac-
tice. In order to do so they make use of a
greater variety of sources and methodologies,
including a wide range of court documents
and oral narratives.
This disciplinary shift intersects with the
entry of a rapidly growing number of women
into the field of Islamic family law, many of
them either from the region itself or having
close ties of family or residence, also coincid-
ing with the increasing importance of
women’s and gender studies. This has led to
more theoretically informed work on gender
relations. Rather than taking the meaning of
gender for granted, the focus is on the ways in
which gender is constructed in particular local
contexts. More nuanced and finely-tuned
notions are employed to deal with gender rela-
tions rather than patriarchy or male oppres-
sion and female subordination. Women’s
agency is taken into account and women are
recognized as knowledgeable actors who
make strategic use of the means and resources
available, however limited at times these may
be. With differences amongst women fore-
grounded, they are no longer seen as a homo-
geneous category, and the complex relations
between gender and other axes of distinction,
such as class, are elaborated on. Recent work,
then, has focused on such topics as the con-
struction of gender in various genres of Muslim
legal discourse, the ways in which women’s
voices are represented in court cases and other
court documents, and how oral narratives
draw attention to the ways in which women
from different backgrounds deal with the
courts, devise strategies and express their
points of view about marriage, divorce, and
i n h e r i t a n c e .3 What insights have such shifts in
perspective brought about?
Women’s Agency and
C l a s s i c a l Islamic Law 
To start with, whereas many Orientalists and
Muslim scholars underline the similarities
between the various classical schools of law, a
comparison of legal provisions ‘from a
woman’s point of view’ brings out substantial
differences. For instance, according to Hanafi
law women of legal marriageable age were
able to arrange for their own marriages;
according to Maliki law they had the possibility
to ask for a divorce under specific circum-
stances, and according to Hanbali law women
were able to include certain conditions in the
marriage contract. If this already indicates
some of women’s options in classical law, all
schools of law grant women the rights to deal
with their property in whatever way they
wished. 
Recent studies, employing fatwas and court
cases in order to discuss how gender is con-
structed in specific legal discourses and prac-
tices, have further undermined the notion of a
monolithic, static and patriarchal Islamic fami-
ly. Authors have pointed to the ways in which
m u f t i s and qadis enforced women’s rights and,
at times, attempted to modify provisions
which would affect them negatively. Those
working with court documents used for prop-
erty registrations, such as w a q f i y y a t, sales reg-
istrations and so on, have provided ample evi-
dence that women were, indeed, property
owners. Summaries of court cases have been
used to prove that women did not hesitate to
make use of the court system in order to claim
their rights. Those working with contractual
provisions, such as the dower, have elaborated
on its flexibility and the great variety of
arrangements made.
Still, the use of such written sources poses
problems. The relation between the informa-
tion that written sources provide, and actual
social practice always needs to be questioned.
Authors working with women’s narratives (oral
history, life stories, interviews, informal talks)
have drawn attention to the, at times, substan-
tial contrasts between the amounts registered
as dower and what women receive in practice.
With respect to court action, they have pointed
out that women may turn to the court to ask
one thing (for instance maintenance or the bal-
ance of the dower) in order to get something
else (such as a divorce on their own condi-
tions). In fact, women’s turning to the court in
itself may have divergent meanings. Whereas
it indicates their ability to act as a legal person,
it may also point to the lack of any other viable
options available to them. In a similar vein,
women’s access to property does not neces-
sarily imply gendered power; women may
claim their share of inheritance because they
find themselves in a highly problematic situa-
tion (being without the support of brothers, or
being pressured to do so by their husbands, for
instance), rather than as the expression of a
position of strength. A major challenge is then
to understand how specific genres of legal
writing interact with social relations. 
The Complex Meanings of
Family Law Reform
The notion that twentieth-century legal
reforms greatly improved the options of
women needs modification. Classical family
law was considerably more flexible and varied
than often assumed, and in respect to certain
issues such as paternity claims legal reforms
did away with some of the leeway classical law
had provided to women. As such it actually
worked against women’s interests. Also, when
comparing classical Islamic law with twenti-
eth-century reforms, there is more at stake
than the issue of the substance of the law. As
family law reform also entailed its codification,
a greater emphasis on written and official doc-
uments, and a much greater control of the
State over the court, it may well be argued that
reforms have increased its rigidity. In setting
clear standards for all, it has been pointed out,
codification guarantees the equal treatment of
all citizens. There is, however, a contradiction
between such proclaimed equality of men and
women as citizens, and the gender differences
which are inscribed in Islamic family law. If the
classical Islamic system was strongly gen-
dered, the codification of Islamic family law
has further grounded such gender differences.
Analyses of legal reforms have pointed to
the need to place such reforms within the con-
text of processes of state-formation and
nation-building, which are far from gender
neutral. Twentieth-century Islamic family law
has become a powerful political symbol: in
Turkey, Pahlavi Iran and Tunisia, the codifica-
tion and reform of Islamic family law was a
strong sign of the State’s commitment to
modernity; whereas in Iran after the Islamic
revolution, the reforms instigated by the
Pahlavi regime were immediately abrogated in
order to express the State’s commitment
towards the Islamization of society. Codifica-
tion has also been employed to unify the
nation-state, and legal reforms often entailed
attempts at creating a new type of family,
undermining kinship loyalties and placing a
stronger emphasis on conjugal relations. If, at
times, legal reform may limit the control of
both kin and husbands over women, it may
simultaneously imply greater state control
over their lives.
Women have approached family law issues
from divergent perspectives. Some have
argued for replacing Islamic family law with a
secular system. Others have worked for the
implementation of Islamic family law reform
which would extend women’s options and
support their interests, whether from a mod-
ernist, or from an Islamist point of view. At the
same time, women have also made the most of
options available to them within existing sys-
tems of Islamic family law, for instance through
including stipulations in the marriage contract,
or by registering particular forms of dower, at
times refraining from claiming their legal
rights in order to gain other benefits. In order
to gain insight into the impact of legal issues
on gender relations, we need analyses which
pay attention to different genres of legal texts
and juridical practices, as well as to women’s
actions, narratives and strategies. ♦
Dr Annelies Moors is a lecturer at
t h e Anthropological Sociological Centre,
University of Amsterdam.
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There is no doubt that what is called Islamic fundamen-
talism is one among many facets of the Islamic world
which in itself represents a public phenomenon with
many divergences. Just like colonialism and folk reli-
gion, this religious fundamentalism does not represent
a monolithic system of cultural expression. Rather it is
an outcome of colonial encroachment, as well as a nega-
tion or rejection of both folk-religious tradition and
colonialism. This recent Muslim self-concept goes back
to the evolution of an Islamic ideology that was only
developed in the 1930s and arose out of the need to dis-
tance and distinguish its adherents from the politically
dominant colonial sector as well as from the handed-
down Muslim tradition. This new Muslim identity
expresses the relationship of tension between what
may be called colonial and indigenous life worlds. It is
part of the multi-layered social relationships within
modern Muslim society. I will try to explain the genesis
and dynamics of this fundamentalist identity. 
Making Sense of
I s l a m i c
F u n d a m e n t a l i s m
The incremental social complexity is, among
other things connected to the establishment
of the colonial sector that emerged parallel to
the traditional sector in the 19th century: Colo-
nial and indigenous sectors are, ideally speak-
ing, socially coherent, being informed by what
can be called an ‘internal arrangement’. How-
ever, in between these two extreme – coherent
– poles, areas of transition have emerged: Peo-
ple caught between the boundaries of the dif-
ferent milieus and social groups on the borders
between traditional and colonial societies. It is
important to note that these groups comprise
far less definite, closed, social strata than seg-
ments of different strata or classes that over-
lap. They are chiefly to be found in the lowest
to middle levels of the colonial hierarchy as
well as in the intelligentsia. They oscillate
between fixed positions and are ambivalent in
their constitution – hybrids so to speak. While
they work for the colonial or postcolonial
economy, their area of reproduction is to be
found in the traditional realm. In other words,
social forces exist here, which are based on
structural differences that manifest them-
selves, for example, in traditional and modern
economic and social sectors and thus consti-
tute completely different levels of identity that
are not socially coherent. Rapid social change
puts into question what has so far been obvi-
ous, leading to intense problems of identifica-
tion and to reorientation. Having broken away
from social ties, these identities are increasing-
ly dependent on a network of social relations:
It appears that the ordinary citizen, who is firm-
ly bound by organization, profession and rela-
tions, is as little dependent on networks as
members of simple societies. If one follows the
postcolonial discourse, the hybrid view of the
traveller-between-two-worlds, in-between
two border conditions, basically allows a per-
spective on historical and contemporary reali-
ty and a re-definition of the world, not so much
from the viewpoint of some authority outside
but as the result of an inner consciousness. A
double vision arises which lays the ground for
a creative indigenous discourse that can
enable a new construction of identity, towards
one that asserts: ‘I want to be different.’ This
desire for difference leads to a transformation
of identity, a rebirth. The conflict which arises
between a modern technological work con-
text, such as the assembly line, and a tradition-
al life-style, like the b i r a d a r i system, can be
negotiated in at least three different ways:
1. Integrationism, i.e., adapting or modernizing
one’s tradition which continues to be articu-
lated in Islamic symbols and terms;
2. Isolationism, i.e., enriching or even replacing
the world of modern production with tradi-
tion; or
3. the creation of a substitute culture – which
provides at least a temporary refuge from
the sharp contrast between modern and tra-
ditional, such as urban crime, consumption
of narcotics, or the world of cinema. The ven-
eration cult may also be considered here. 
Each of these possible negotiations depends
on the respective social position of the individ-
ual and the social prestige he relates it with. In
short, the higher a person stands in the colo-
nial and postcolonial hierarchy, the greater is
the tendency towards modernization in which
Islam serves as a frame of reference. Also, the
higher the degree of social disintegration and
the fewer the chances of upward social mobili-
ty, the greater is the inclination towards tradi-
tionalization and, in the medium term, even
willingness for radicalism, hence isolationism. 
The integrationist way is followed by leading
Islamists like Abul Ala Maududi and other func-
tionaries of Islamist organizations. They largely
originate from this field of tension between
identity and alienation, traditional and modern
sectors. They are generally representative of
middle range professionals bound up in the
postcolonial system, and relatively highly
placed in society. They live largely in a tradi-
tional world, but due to their integration into
the dominant postcolonial system, they adopt
and adapt main terms and ideas central to this
system and recognize them as part of their
own biography. Islamic terms such as d a s t u r
and s h u r a are extricated from their religious
context and given such new ideological values
such as parliament and constitution, without,
however, renouncing their Islamic identity.
Party system and nation-state, for instance, are
interpreted as having always been Islamic.
With this normative replacement, these Islamic
classicists can transcend traditional bound-
aries, legitimize modern developments within
the Islamic semiotics and stabilize their own
societal position. In this process of ideologiza-
tion of Islam and re-invention of tradition,
code or identity switching is most important.
This switching, that is the reciprocal translation
of symbols and terms, provides the ability of
action on different societal levels. To the out-
sider – for example, to the colonial public – the
Islamist argues ideologically, limiting the use
of Islamic symbols to the indispensable. To the
insider – that is the traditional society – he/she
pursues the theological argument. The Islamic
cult is reinforced. The theological discussion,
however, is of debatable theological value. It is
this network behaviour that is responsible for
the particular dynamics of political Islam.
Islamists usually promise a righteous society
here and now through catharsis: a transforma-
tion from corruption to purity, from Jahiliya
(pre-Muhammadan times, conditions of igno-
rance) to Islam. This Jahiliya was, according to
Islamists, a result of the modernization policies
of the State. The deviation from the right path
and the neglecting of religious duties have
resulted in the loss of religious and cultural
identity. Hence, the Islamist concept of history
is informed by the notion of constant decay.
They call for the reconstruction of an idealized
pure and pre-colonial cultural context – imita-
tio muhammadi. This radical re-invention of
tradition seems to be grounded in a heritage
under which the handed-down canon was
blurred and lost, as in the obliteration and
appropriation process of colonial power in the
18th and 19th centuries. Therefore, the only
way to legitimate the necessary rebirth and
revival is to go back beyond this obliterated
tradition. Consequently, a new normative and
formative past is created. These Islamists can
thus distinguish themselves from other Mus-
lims and from secular politicians. They are the
avant gardes or the hegemonic identity which
considers itself authorized to establish renewal
– t a j d i d.
Aspects of their critique are systematized in
the context of a history of salvation and formu-
lated as an integristic programme that, howev-
er, has a clear integrationist character. In con-
trast to their slogan, islamiser la modernité,
their own Islamic tradition is modernized,
since the imagined Islamic society is to com-
pete and correspond with Western achieve-
ments. This would only be possible in a central-
ized Islamic state over which they would wield
control as the agents of God’s sovereignty on
earth, as with the Hizb Ullah (Party of God) or
the Jama‘at-e Islami (Islamic Society). The
Qu'ran and Sunna would be the ideal basis for
a universal, legally ethical monism. Up to this
point of Islamist discourse, ideas such as plu-
ralism, democracy and human rights have little
value in an imagined Islamic territory, since the
main concern is to establish a unique Islamic
identity. On the other hand, these kinds of pan-
Islamic ideas are always postulated within the
boundaries of a nation state, with political
Islam providing the imagination of the realiza-
tion and reconstruction of a society within a
nation-state. As is evident, fundamentalism
preaches a traditionalism of solidarity, which is
primarily oriented to life in the world and has
certain ideas of reform. In closer view however,
its postulates reveal mere prophecies, advice,
threats and general desiderata with a little
consistent programme. It fails to solve factual
problems, offering mostly regressive attempts
at solutions precisely because its orientation is
mythical, hence restorative, and hardly utopi-
an, that is social revolutionary. However, since
the 1980s one can witness a clear change in
the Islamist discourse. This is particularly true
in postmodern times, when political Islam has
failed, because Islamist promises were not real-
ized. Analogous to this failure, new alterna-
tives have emerged, reflecting the interaction
of different social realities and cultural identi-
ties in a pluralizing society in which Islamists
have also started increasingly using ideas of
mythical re-establishments to mark out their
social and political territories and to enlarge
them, albeit within the existing nation-state. In
this phase of post-Islamism their own position
is constantly re-negotiated vis-à-vis the gov-
ernment, external patrons, other Islamist
groups, and the masses or the target audi-
ences. This involves competition and contest
over interpretation of symbols and control of
institutions, because symbols are an integral
part of Muslim politics. They express the values
and are constitutive of a political community.
Hence, there is a constant struggle concerning
people’s imagination and, following that,
about the objective chances and resources in a
free market. Therefore, Islamic – even funda-
mentalist – principles must constantly be rein-
terpreted. The result is a flexibility of ideas and
divergence over time and space. It is in the gap
between divine plan – s h a r i a – and human
understanding – politics – that the perennially
fertile space of critique can be found. This can
intensify competition and conflicts. The alter-
native to fundamentalism is that multiple cen-
tres of power and contenders for authority
come to certain accommodations. The recent
rather peaceful change of the weekly holiday
from Friday to Sunday in Pakistan can indeed
be an indication of negotiation to the relative
satisfaction of all. It is these different discours-
es that reflect the complicity of the Islamic
public. This is particularly true in the field of
the supposed latent and open tensions
between Muslim scholars, sufis and intellectu-
als. There seems to be enough societal and
economic overlappings and cross-connections
or personal unions between, for example,
Jama‘at-e Islami and Barelwis so that both
come to terms with one another, and given
boundaries and norms are shifted, displaced,
and extended. Thus, making sense of religious
fundamentalism can be possible only if these
complex and dynamic perspectives are contex-
tualized. I contend that studies on Modern
Islam therefore should be read in the light of
articulations of particular social and cultural
realities negotiating over boundaries between
spheres of social activity and institutions. For,
to approach Islamic culture normatively does
not contribute to its understanding. Islamicity
is merely the lingual and symbolic expression
of this negotiation. Fundamentalism is one of
the articulations through which Modern Islam
is to be understood. ♦
Prof. Dr Jamal Malik is head of Religious Studies,
University of Derby.
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J AN  J A A P  DE  R U I T E R Language and
R e l i g i o n
Moroccan and Turkish
Communities in Europe 
At present the Moroccan and Turkish commu-
nities in Europe count 1.2 million Moroccans and
2.5 million Turkish people. The largest Moroccan
communities are found in France (more than
500,000), the Netherlands (around 160,000), and
Belgium (around 150,000). Spain is a recent
immigration land for Moroccans (80,000 per-
sons). The Turkish community in Germany is the
largest (nearly 2 million), followed by the Nether-
lands (around 200,000) and France (also around
200,000). All figures are based on the nationality
criterion. In terms of generations one can distin-
guish the first generation, which consists of the
labourers that came in the sixties and their
wives; and the second generation, the children
of the first generation born either in the home-
lands or in Europe. At present a third generation
is being formed of which the members are near-
ly all born in Europe. Migration has not stopped
yet. Uniting of families still takes place and
through marriage new migrants from Turkey
and Morocco come to Europe. These last groups
form as it were new groups of ‘first’-generation
migrants.
The Linguistic Heritage
The Moroccans that came to Europe took with
them the linguistic heritage of their homeland.
Morocco is not, as is the general rule in nearly all
states, a monolingual society. Its official lan-
guage is Arabic in its formal form (Modern Stan-
dard Arabic or Literary Arabic, which is a modern
variant of Classical Arabic). Arabic in its dialectal
forms is spoken by nearly all Moroccans but is
the mother tongue of only about 45% to 50% of
the population. For the rest, the mother tongue
is one of the three Berber languages spoken in
Morocco. Berber and Arabic are, linguistically
speaking, quite distant from each other. Berber
in general is not understood by arabophone
Moroccans. The Moroccan Arabic dialect serves
as the general language of communication in
daily life in Morocco. Finally French, and to a
smaller extent Spanish, still plays a role in Moroc-
co. The rate of illiteracy in Morocco is quite high
with percentages of 41.7% for males and 67.5%
for females.
The majority of the Moroccans that came to
Europe in the sixties were illiterate or semi-liter-
ate. They came from the north of Morocco, the
Rif area, where the berber language Tarifit is spo-
ken. In Belgium and the Netherlands the majori -
ty of Moroccans is berberophone while in France
this percentage is around 50%. In Europe the
berberophones form, in general, the majority of
the Moroccan community as opposed to the sit-
uation in Morocco. The Turks that came to
Europe were generally better educated than the
Moroccans. A minority of them is kurdophone.
A New Language Situation
Members of the Moroccan communities took
with them their specific linguistic characteris-
tics but were confronted with societies that
were, linguistically speaking, totally different.
For the first generation, there seemed to be no
urgent need to adopt the new languages as
they were in Europe only on a ‘temporary’
basis. This is why many of these migrants hard-
ly acquired German, French or Dutch. But
when children came and new children were
born the situation changed drastically. These
children were and are much more open-mind-
ed to the new societies. They had to enter into
the educational system and thus were exposed
to the new languages. In general this intergen-
erational language shift follows the following
model (cf. Jaspaert & Kroon, 1993):
• G1 minority language dominates majority
l a n g u a g e ;
• G2 minority language and majority language
are in balance;
• G3 majority language dominates minority
l a n g u a g e ;
• G4 majority language replaces minority lan-
g u a g e .
This implies that in due time the minority lan-
guages will disappear. Of course this is a model
and as such cannot be considered as the stan-
dard path that is followed. Research on this situ-
ation in the Netherlands has already shown that
the process is more rapid for the Moroccan com-
munity than for the Turkish community (De
Ruiter, 1995, 1997). This seems to be caused by
the fact that Moroccans are linguistically more
diversified and thus the impact of the Dutch lan-
guage is far greater than for the Turkish and Kur-
dish-speaking communities.
At present one can state that the first genera-
tion Moroccans still predominantly use Moroc-
can Arabic and/or Berber as the vehicle of oral
communication. If literate, Arabic to a small
extent is used as the language of reading and
writing. The second generation is still quite
capable of oral receptivity of Moroccan Arabic
and/or Berber, but certainly more so for Dutch.
This generation hardly uses Modern Standard
Arabic as its language of reading and writing.
Instead, Dutch is used. The third generation will
be much more proficient in Dutch in all respects.
For the Turkish community these processes are
not so far advanced as for the Moroccans. Espe-
cially the first, but to a large extent the second,
generation still in majority masters Turkish
and/or Kurdish. The second generation as a
whole seems to be relatively bilingual in Turkish
or Kurdish and Dutch. But the process of Dutch
becoming increasingly predominant will contin-
ue in the third generation.
Home Language Preservation
If the processes as described above continue
to take place the end result will be that the
Moroccans and Turks in Western Europe use
German, French or Dutch exclusively. Of course
this will be a matter of long duration because
migration still takes place. For integration into
the host societies, mastering the languages of
these is a great advantage. But should this also
imply the ‘loss’ of the original linguistic back-
ground? Most European countries installed a
form of Home Language Instruction (HLI). Home
Language Instruction is a form of education in
which the language of the home countries of -
in this case- Moroccan and Turkish children at
the elementary school level is taught. Nearly all
Western European countries offer some form of
this type of education (cf. Obdeijn & De Ruiter
(1998) for the state of the art of the Moroccan
HLI in Europe). The original aim of this HLI, in
the seventies and early eighties, was to pre-
serve the home language and culture of these
children, for eventually they would return to
their lands of origin. In order for them to prop-
erly function there, they should maintain a min-
imum proficiency in these languages as well as
maintaining knowledge of the cultures. Later
on the goals changed into ‘preservation of the
original language and culture while integrating
into the new receiving society’. It was consid-
ered essential that these children would not
forget where they came from yet at the same
time would integrate in the European societies.
HLI hardly obtained a strong position in the
curricula of elementary education in the vari-
ous countries and its teachers often feel mar-
ginalized. Also in most countries it is taught
only 1 to 3 hours per week which does not yield
satisfactory results in terms of knowledge of
the original culture and proficiency in either
Modern Standard Arabic or Turkish.
Language and Religion 
Generally all Moroccans that come to Europe
are Muslims. Islam and the Arabic language are
strongly linked. Does not the Koran say: innanâ
anzalnâhu qur’ânan carabiyyan (sura Yusuf, 2)?
This distinct relation can be seen in the Moroc-
can communities in Europe. It is striking to see
that especially the parents (most of them still
from the first generation) want their children to
follow HLI because Arabic is the language of the
religion of Islam. Their children, though, show
more practical motivations. They want to learn
Arabic because it is handy when they corre-
spond with family in Morocco or go on holiday
there. A more essential problem lies in the edu-
cational systems of the divers European coun-
tries. The teaching of religion is not self-evident
especially for instance, in France, where it is not
allowed within the national educational system.
In the Netherlands and Germany, although not
forbidden, the teaching of religion is marginal-
ized. Furthermore, there is no clear definition of
what the – religious – contents are to be. Actual-
ly, HLI does not seem to contain much religious
instruction. The little research done on HLI
shows that the contents of these courses consist
in the teaching of languages for at least more
than half of the time. Of course cultural and reli-
gious themes are tackled as well but only to a
limited extent. It is important to consider that
the Muslim community is not undivided: It is
characterized by a large variation. One finds all
political and religious main- and substreams in
it. Within this context it is interesting to see that
in the Netherlands a number of Islamic elemen-
tary schools (including one secondary school)
have been recently established. The Dutch Edu-
cational Law provides the opportunity to estab-
lish schools on a denominational basis. We
observe then that -in majority- it is either Moroc-
can or Turkish religious organizations that found
these schools. Thus ethnicity seems to play a role
within the Muslim community. Not much
research has been done on these schools but it
seems that Islam is given more expression in
them.
A more recent development consists in Arabic
and Islamic lessons given in the mosques of
Western European countries. This could be due
to the fact that the number of hours of HLI is lim-
ited and its effects are not optimal. Furthermore,
HLI does not contain explicit religious education.
Research on ‘regular’ HLI nearly always includes
questions to children on the measure in which
they follow ‘extracurricular’ HLI or mosque edu-
Dr Jan Jaap de Ruiter is an associate professor,
R e s e a r c h Group of Language and Minorities
a t Tilburg University.
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cation. Most studies point to percentages vary-
ing from around 15% to around 45%. The num-
ber of hours that these children follow Arabic or
Islamic lessons outside school varies from 1 to
10. Unfortunately, hardly any research is con-
ducted on this kind of education. The world of
the mosques in Europe is not an easy one to
approach. Nevertheless, some studies do show
that the mosque education does not significant-
ly contribute to proficiency in Arabic. This seems
to be caused by the conservative methods
applied. Reciting the Koran by heart does not
imply that one is fluent in Arabic.
It is not only the mosques that offer lessons in
Arabic: secular autonomous organizations do so
as well. These courses comply much more with
modern teaching methods. In this context it is
interesting to see that for example the Spanish
authorities have recognized ATIME (Asociación
de trabajadores inmigrantes marroquíes en
España) as an official means for offering HLI to
Moroccan children residing in Spain (Obdeijn &
De Ruiter, 1998). Also in France secular organiza-
tions are active. The establishment of many
Berber associations which strive for the promo-
tion of Berber language and culture, possibly
even within the context of HLI, is noteworthy.
The Research Group of
Language and Minorities
The Research Group of Language and Minori-
ties of the Faculty of Arts at Tilburg University
has been focusing its attention on researching
home languages and the instruction thereof.
This small article is of course not sufficient to
reflect all activities of the research group.
Interested readers are therefore referred to
the following address to obtain more informa-
t i o n :
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In the 1960s labour migration from Morocco and Turkey
to Western Europe started to take place. This labour
migration was incited by the shortage of manpower in the
European market. Initially these labourers had a short-
term goal in mind, to earn money and return to their coun-
tries of origin. This option of return soon changed into a
myth. Spouses and children joined the working men and
soon their children were born in Europe. 
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Scholars from various disciplines have examined many
aspects of Muslim migrants’ lives but it has only been
since the end of the 1980s, that the articulation of Islam
has been investigated more seriously, leading to the
publication of many academic studies. My PhD thesis,
‘Around the Mosque – The Religious Lives of Moroccan
Immigrants in a Dutch Provincial Town’, written in
Dutch, constitutes part of this growing academic interest
in the religious beliefs and practices of Muslim migrants
and their families in the Netherlands.*
R e s e a r c h i n g
Moroccan Islam
in a Dutch Town
The result of an explorative and qualitative
research project, this study is based predomi-
nantly on anthropological fieldwork conduct-
ed in Tiel (the Netherlands) from 1991-1993,
and subsequent visits. At the beginning of the
1990s, Tiel had some 33,000 inhabitants, of
whom 1,000 were of Moroccan origin. In the
summers of 1992 and 1993, I made two field
trips to Morocco, specially to the Rif, the m o u n-
tainous, predominantly Berber-speaking region
in North Morocco from where the majority of
Moroccan immigrants in Tiel originated.
The main goal of my research was to
describe and analyse the ways in which, since
their arrival in Tiel, Moroccan immigrants have
practised their religion. The construction and
maintenance of social, religious, and ethnic
boundaries, between Moroccan immigrants
and others (especially Turkish migrants and
the Dutch), and among Moroccan immigrants
themselves, were examined. The problems
encountered during fieldwork induced an
extensive reflection on the anthropological
research conducted among Moroccan and
other minority groups in Dutch society. Using
the method of participant observation, I dis-
cussed both my own investigations and the
research of other anthropologists among
Moroccan immigrants, so that my dissertation
forms part of the recent tendency in anthro-
pology to reflect on the course of anthropolog-
ical fieldwork, relations with informants, and
the production of ethnographic texts.
My field research was generally tough-
going, as full participation was hard to achieve.
Relations of trust, which many researchers con-
sider crucial yielding reliable, valid results,
were difficult to maintain with Moroccan immi-
grants. Family life and the religious beliefs and
practices of women, for example, were virtally
inaccessible to me. Unfortunately having visit-
ed the local Moroccan mosque for about half a
year, a conflict about my presence meant I was
no longer permitted to attend religious ser-
vices. Therefore I had to seek other opportuni-
ties to gather data.
In short, my participant observation was
hampered by serious restrictions, which I think
also applies to other anthropologists who have
conducted research among Moroccan immi-
grants in the Netherlands. They too, have
found it difficult conduct intensive participant
observation, particularly in the private sphere.
Yet I would argue that participant observation
offers several advantages. It may uncover what
would otherwise remain hidden data. It
enables researchers to check their informants’
accounts by observing their actual behaviour.
Most importantly, the method accesses the
local context in which accounts are provided
and within which they must be understood.
The crux of this article is the foundation of
and activities in the various mosques in Tiel,
particularly the Moroccan ones. The establish-
ment and internal organization of the first
(Moroccan-Turkish) mosque, founded in 1974-
1978 and housed in a former synagogue, and
the (exclusively Moroccan) Hassani mosque,
founded in 1988 are described. Peculiar to the
first mosque is that it contained two prayer-
rooms, one for Moroccans and one for the
Turkish. Both groups organized their own
prayer sessions and appointed their own
i m a ms. This situation resembles that in other
Dutch towns, where the institutionalization of
Islam has likewise occurred along ethnic or
national lines. This process was reaffirmed and
strengthened in 1988, when the
Moroccans moved to another build-
ing and founded a new mosque,
leaving the other building to the
Turkish migrants.
The most important function of
this new Moroccan mosque (the
Hassani mosque) was religious. It
offered a place for the daily obliga-
tory prayers, and for other kinds of
assemblies. In the evening, during
Ramadan, for instance, approxi-
mately one hundred men came to
say t a r â w î h prayers. Gatherings with
a more socio-religious character
were also held in the Hassani
mosque (for the birth of a child or
the circumcision of a boy). On such occasions
prayers were recited and food served.
Each evening, except during Ramadan, the
imam gave an informal religious lesson (dars)
to the men present in the mosque. The lan-
guage spoken was Riffian-Berber or Tamazight,
the mother tongue of most Moroccan immi-
grants in Tiel. The lesson was given after the
maghrib prayer followed by a recitation of the
Koran. The men then left the prayer hall going
to an adjacent room for a chat and a cup of tea.
The conversation then assumed a more serious
note and the imam started his lesson. He
focused on the proper performance of ritual
duties and the memorization and accurate
pronunciation of Arabic Koranic texts. In this
sense, the lesson resembles the way in which
religious knowledge has traditionally been
transmitted in the Islamic world, in North
Africa in particular. The atmosphere during the
lesson can generally be characterized as infor-
mal, kindly and quite egalitarian. At times, it
was even hilarious, which the following may
i l l u s t r a t e .
One evening h a j j i Abdelkader, a man in his
fifties and a very regular visitor to the mosque,
demonstrated two versions of the greeting a s -
salam ca l a y k u m (Peace be upon you), pro-
nounced at the end of the s a l a t or obligatory
prayer. He asked the other men present
whether both versions were correct. The first
time he said a s - s a l a m facing his audience
directly. He then turned to the right, while say-
ing ca l a y k u m. The second time, he repeated
the full frontal face movement as before, while
saying a s - s a l a m; but tilted his head very far
backwards, looking to the side while saying
salam ca l a y k u m. The other men asserted that
they considered the second version incorrect,
if not absurd. Although it was my impression
that h a j j i Abdelkader actually shared their
view, he repeated both versions several times.
Then, another man demonstrated the same
greeting. He pronounced the expression a s -
salam ca l a y k u m, first looking straight ahead,
but then turned backwards and looked up into
the air, thereby suggesting that this would also
be absurd. Finally a third man stood up. Laugh-
ingly he demonstrated the example of a per-
son who rises from a kneeling position during
prayers. He did this in a very exaggerated fash-
ion, leaning very far backwards and saying
Allah al-hamidah. Seeing this, nearly all the
men, including the imam, burst out laughing.
Their hilarity was aroused by the gestures
made, and by the expression ‘Allah al-hami-
dah’, which was a shortened and therefore
incorrect form of Sami Allahu li-man Hamidah
(May God listen to him who praises Him).
In spite of the open, and informal sphere
during the religious lessons in the Hassani
mosque, only a small minority of the Moroccan
population actually fulfilled their religious
duties there regularly. Pertinantly, women
were totally absent. The most regular visitors
were a small group of fifteen to thirty, mainly
illiterate, Riffian men aged forty (or more).
Younger men appeared less frequently, and
youngsters only occasionally set foot in the
mosque. Only at Islamic festivals or during
Ramadan did the Hassani mosque attract a
larger public. Even then, the number of men
who came for the prayers was smaller than
research elsewhere in the Netherlands would
have led us to believe.
In a (tactful) attempt to examine the social
organization of Moroccan immigrants, I also
investigated the complications concerning the
purchase of the Hassani mosque building from
1988-1993. Before that it had been municipal
property. I argue that the mosque constituted
a political arena in which the men competed
for status. Positions within the Moroccan com-
munity had great significance and were worth
competing for, epecially because most of the
men belonged to the lower social strata and
did not hold positions of respect and honour
within the wider Dutch context. Apart from
contested social status issues between individ-
uals, familial and regional loyalties also influ-
enced the way the conflict over the purchase
of the building evolved.
Besides the religious, educational, and socio-
political activities in and around the Hassani
mosque, I also illustrate the way Islam was
practised in Tiel through the analysis of some
other events. Despite the existence of legal
regulations and facilities for ritual slaughter-
ing, the buying of halâl meat and the celebra-
tion of the cId al-kabîr, or Feast of the Sacrifice,
Muslims in the Netherlands are still sometimes
confronted by obstacles. In 1991, the slaugh-
terhouse in Tiel was closed on the Sunday that
the Moroccan immigrants in the town wished
to celebrate this feast. Attempting to persuade
the owner to open his slaughterhouse, they
organized a demonstration from the Hassani
mosque to the municipal hall. This was in vain;
and the slaughterhouse remained closed. The
incident illustrates of the impact of Dutch soci-
ety on the way in which Islam in the Nether-
lands is shaped.
The often-neglected issue of ethnic relations
between Moroccan and Turkish immigrants at
the local level was brought to the fore by a
description and analysis of the construction of
a prayer-room in the regional hospital in Tiel.
Although the provision of this prayer-room
suggests successful cooperation between the
groups, in reality, their representatives com-
peted for prestige. This was revealed in their
discussions about their respective financial
contributions and the furnishing of the prayer-
room. In this competition, ritual differences
between the Maliki and Hanafi schools of
Islamic jurisprudence, were used to differenti-
ate between the two groups. Largely consid-
ered of minor significance theologically, these
differences were extensively discussed by the
delegates. As such, they constituted the ‘cul-
tural stuff’ enclosed between the boundaries
of ethnicity.
The relevance of Moroccan migrants’ rela-
tions with family members and other country-
men in Morocco drew my attention when I was
in Morocco. The relationships between
migrants and non-migrants were fairly
ambivalent. Migrants longed to pass their holi-
days in their home countries, but were discour-
aged because many people, kinsmen and
strangers alike, tried to cream off their (usually
small) fortunes obtained in Europe. Non-
migrants were envious of the relative wealth of
Moroccan migrants and very eager to migrate
themselves, yet disapproved of many
migrants’ inclination to display their wealth.
Both categories competed for status, thereby
demonstrating the great impact of migration
on the position of individuals in the social hier-
archy of the community of origin. In this
respect, my anthropological fieldwork in
Morocco emphasized the importance of
including research in the migrants’ country
and it underlined the necessity of taking into
account affairs which cross national frontiers
and transcend national interests and govern-
ment policies. ♦
Dr Ruud Strijp is a lecturer of Cultural Anthropology
at the Catholic University of Nijmegen.
* Om de moskee – Het religieuze leven van
Marokkaanse migranten in een Nederlandse
p r o v i n c i e s t a d (Proefschrift Katholieke Universiteit
Nijmegen, 1998, 304 pp.), Thesis Publishers
Amsterdam, 1998 (ISBN 90-5170-456-9).
Card sold to Dutch
citizens to raise
funds for the con-
struction of the first
mosque in Tiel.
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Situated halfway between Aden and Oman, the Yemeni
province of Hadhramaut is considered by most fleeting
visitors a backwater, notable only for the highrise mud-
brick houses of the former trading centre of Shibam and
the extravagant but decaying palaces of neighbouring
Say'un and Tarim. Little is known, however, about the
people who built these remarkable constructions, and
about their far-reaching connections in the areas bor-
dering on the Indian Ocean. However, their story, if
recovered, sheds light on a number of questions perti-
nent to current interests in Middle Eastern and Islamic
history. Let us consider the biography of one such trad-
er, whose cosmopolitanism in entrepreneurial, political,
and intellectual terms is quite typical for a wider group
of Hadhramis, as well as probably for members of other
such groups in the Indian Ocean and beyond.1
The Significance
o f Studying a
Trade Diaspora
Sayyid cAli b. Ahmad b. Shihab al-Din was
born in August 1865 in Pekojan, the Arab quar-
ter of old Batavia (present day Jakarta). His
father, Ahmad b. Muhammad was a native of
Tarim in Hadhramaut and came from a family
which claimed descent from the Prophet
Muhammad. Around 1849, at the age of
twelve, he travelled to Batavia. There he made
a fortune in trade which he invested in real
estate. He also acquired and managed land for
relatives in the eastern Javanese town of Gre-
sik. At the same time, Ahmad b. Muhammad
made a name for himself by donating large
sums to charity and endowing it to the build-
ing of mosques. He married the daughter of
another immigrant family from Hadhramaut,
who later gave birth to cAli. At the age of
seven, his parents sent cAli to Hadhramaut,
where he studied for six years with some of the
most famous ulema of his time. After spending
three years in Jakarta, he returned to Hadhra-
maut in 1881 for a subsequent period of study.
In 1886/87, Sayyid cAli travelled once more to
Jakarta where he became manager of the fam-
ily’s real estate. The father returned to his
native Tarim where he died around 1890.
Part of the real estate which cAli b. Ahmad
m a n a g e d ,2 and eventually acquired in 1911,
was situated in the relatively new and fashion-
able European quarter of Menteng. It soon
became the basis of the growing wealth of the
‘landheer van Menteng’, as Snouck Hurgronje
called him.3 Having established himself, Sayyid
cAli took once more to travelling. Between
1893/94 and 1896/97 he visited Egypt and pos-
sibly Istanbul, performed the pilgrimage to
Mecca, visited Ottoman Yemen, Aden and
Hadhramaut, and finally returned via Bombay
and Singapore to Batavia.
As a wealthy Hadhrami trader and landown-
er, cAli b. Ahmad continued the family tradition
of charitable commitments by becoming, in
1905, a founding member and first chairman of
a charitable organization (Jamciyyat al-Khayr)
which founded a new type of Arab school com-
bining Islamic with Western knowledge. These
schools form the nucleus of what is considered
the Hadhrami ‘renaissance’.4 The commitment
to reform included opposition to the Dutch
colonial power by trying to rally support from
Istanbul, where one of his sons studied, and by
publishing anti-colonial articles in Egyptian
newspapers. As a result, Sayyid cAli spent a
fortnight in jail in 1908. It is less clear, however,
whether it was also Dutch intrigues or rather
his extravagant life-style which lost him much
of his land in Menteng just before World War I.
After the war, and possibly as a result of his
political and economic troubles, cAli b. Ahmad
turned to new pastures. He participated in a
fishing company, headed by his brother, which
attempted to develop the fishing industry in
the Arabian Sea, drawing in capital and know-
how from Singapore, Penang, Madras, Bom-
bay, Aden and Hadhramaut. Although this pro-
ject failed, he also contrived a large agricultur-
al project on the Hadhrami coast. His passion
for politics continued: In Hadhramaut, he
became involved in an attempt to negotiate an
agreement between the Imam of Yemen and
the coastal Qucayti sultanate. At the same
time, he strongly lobbied in Hadhramaut and
Batavia against a new reformist group which
had been formed among Indonesian Arabs to
challenge certain privileges of the Sayyid stra-
tum to which cAli b. Ahmad belonged.5 T h i s
should not be understood as a move against
reform per se; on the contrary, Sayyid cA l i
spurred not only the educational movement in
Southeast Asia but also urged the Hadhrami
sultan to open a school in the coastal capital of
al-Mukalla at a time when education in
Hadhramaut was still scarce and limited in
s c o p e .
One could write more about this remarkable
man, who also published a number of books,
and about his offspring who played an impor-
tant role in Arab and Indonesian publishing
and in the Indonesian independence move-
ment, as well as in perpetuating the contacts
between the Arab world and Muslim Southeast
Asia. However, this one life story suffices to
point to a number of fascinating themes, the
exploration of which sheds light on Islamic
developments beyond the confines of the
immediate group involved.
Most obviously, the history of Southern Ara-
bia in the 19th and 20th centuries cannot be
adequately understood without a closer
examination of the influences of the emigrant
community in Southeast Asia, India and East
Africa. In a wider perspective, this might con-
tribute to a better understanding of the role
which migrants played in bringing about
changes in conservative societies. Sayyid cA l i
b. Ahmad invested some of his money in the
Hadhramaut. Perhaps even more importantly,
he tried to initiate entrepreneurial projects on
a scale not known in Hadhramaut until his
time. Even if his initiatives, like those of a num-
ber of his contemporaries, failed, they helped
to create a climate in which, in the 1920s and
30s, hitherto having shunned economic initia-
tives, new technologies became acceptable.
Beyond the impact of the migrant entrepre-
neurs on their homeland, their study also
could – if the necessary source material could
be made accessible – contribute to a better
understanding of early capitalist Muslim busi-
ness culture, which for a long time was a major
economic factor in the Indian Ocean econo-
m y .
The political and cultural influences of the
diaspora on the homeland, exemplified by
Sayyid cAli’s political plotting and his support
for educational institutions of a new style, can
be considered in a similar way to the economic
ones, as can the effect these migrants had on
their host communities. Investigating such
contact between non-European cultures in the
imperial age can contribute, among other
things, to a better understanding of the spread
of modernity. While this is commonly attrib-
uted to the interaction of Western societies
with non-Western ones, a closer investigation
of the Hadhrami diaspora reveals a far more
complex picture. The Jamciyyat al-Khayr, which
Sayyid cAli chaired, was modelled on the
Batavia Chinese Association, a branch of the
Confucian renewal movement.6 In turn, the
Hadhrami schools influenced the educational
and thereby also the religious orientations of
the local population.
While many of these issues will to some
extent be explored in forthcoming mono-
graphs by scholars in the Netherlands, the UK,
Norway and the US, I would finally like to draw
attention to a topic which would require wide-
spread international cooperation. Sayyid cAli b.
Ahmad b. Shihab was not only an entrepreneur
and supporter of the Hadhrami ‘renaissance’,
he was also, through correspondence as well
as personal contact, in touch with a wide net-
work of like-minded scholars and politicians.
While Pan-Islam as a movement has been
explored quite thoroughly for the period start-
ing in 1876, when it came to designate the
policies pursued by the Ottoman sultan,7
scholarship has very much focused on its ideo-
logical and organizational side. Colonial
archives are primarily concerned with the ‘dan-
gers’ constituted by this type of international-
ism. Our knowledge about how and to what
extent Muslims of different cultures and speak-
ing numerous languages communicated, and
to what extent they developed cooperation
either in order to pursue common goals or
oppose colonial expansion remains, however,
quite limited, particularly for the 18th and 19th
c e n t u r i e s .
In other words, can we find out more about
the types of networks which existed? While
Sufi orders, one important form of such net-
works, have found some attention, the net-
works of the numerous trading diasporas
which played a crucial innovative role, and
their interconnections, have not been investi-
gated systematically. This, perhaps, is partly
because it involves the study of countless
biographies in many languages, which sur-
passes the capacity of individual scholars.
However, it was not just the famous Jamal al-
Din al-Afghani who spread anti-imperialist and
modernist ideas and called for common Mus-
lim action by travelling the Islamic world.
Sayyid cAli tried to obtain Ottoman support for
the Arabs in Southeast Asia. Sayyid Fadl b. Sahl,
another Hadhrami, was in 1852 expelled by the
British from the Malabar Coast for being a Mus-
lim propagator against Hindus and the British.
He later made an appearance as self-pro-
claimed Ottoman governor of Dhofar in south-
ern Arabia.8 From the East African town of
Lamu, cAbdallah Ba Kathir al-Kindi (1860/61-
1925), a scholar of Hadhrami extraction, was
called to South Africa to mediate in a conflict
among Cape Muslims. He also travelled to
Mecca, Hadhramaut and Southeast Asia in pur-
suit of knowledge and scholarly contacts.9
While it is relatively easy, although enor-
mously time-consuming, to reconstruct the
networks within one such diaspora, it is much
more challenging to investigate the interac-
tion between a number of different networks.
However, if we want to understand the trans-
mission of ideas, the creation of political
alliances and perhaps even the mechanics of
Indian Ocean trade beyond national and lin-
guistic borders, such an investigation would
be well worth a large international research
p r o j e c t .♦
Dr Ulrike Freitag is a lecturer in Modern Middle
Eastern History, Department of History, School of
Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
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Years ago, I had the occasion to sit in the audience at
two Christian-Muslim dialogues in Chicago and to
attend a pair of similar sessions at the ‘Parliament of
World Religions.’ The sponsors on each occasion were
different, as were the speakers; but what was said was
alarmingly similar.
Getting Real about
C h r i s t i a n - M u s l i m
D i a l o g u eInterfaith dialogues, until recently, typically
occurred only between Christians and Jews. And
their urgency derived from the impact of the
Holocaust on the Christian conscience, with the
horror of the realization that what had hap-
pened to the Jews of Europe was partially a con-
sequence of a long entrenched anti-Semitism
among too many Christians. Such dialogues
tended to be between those who viewed them-
selves as victims of unspeakable crimes and
those who saw themselves, in some sense, as
parties to the crimes. Surprisingly, the same
modes of thought seemed to govern the pro-
ceedings at the Christian-Muslim dialogues that
I witnessed.
The Christians usually began by denouncing
the Crusades, the eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century colonial expansions into Islamic lands,
and the more recent Cold War policies of the
United States against various nationalist move-
ments in the ‘Third World.’ They readily identi-
fied themselves with ‘the West’ and its history,
only to castigate all Western protagonists and
proponents, past and present. Their Muslim
counterparts began in the same vein. They
denounced the Crusades and argued that the
same crusading spirit worked equally behind the
colonial expansion and the unquestioning
American support of Israel against the Palestini-
ans. These were the crucial moments, they
argued, when the ‘West’ (Christianity) encoun-
tered the ‘East’ (Islam) and behaved shamefully.
The listeners nodded in agreement. One Muslim
speaker mentioned the expulsion of the Moors
from Spain as another such moment, and all
heads were further lowered in sorrow and
shame. 
Amazingly, no one asked how the Moors
arrived in Spain in the first place, or what had
brought Muslims to the land of the Testaments.
It was as if there had been no imperial expansion
of Islam, no Arab conquests of Syria, North Africa
and Spain. I’m not denying the horrors of the
Reconquista and the Crusades. I merely wish to
point out the absurdity of denying any agency
to the Muslims themselves. Islamic history
unfolded as a series of conquests. This is not to
say that Islam spread only by the sword or that
Christians and Muslims should argue over who
shed less blood. It is simply to acknowledge that
the sword was very much present in the story of
Islam’s expansion too.
When this acknowledgement is not made,
interfaith dialogue soon turns into an incoherent
comparison of Islam, a faith without history, and
Christianity, a history without faith. More, the
inordinate emphasis in such dialogues on the
scriptural and the juristic aspects of religion,
with the simultaneous neglect of the experien-
tial and salvific, turns the two faiths into two ide-
ologies, of which one seems to control all of his-
tory while the other appears to have no agency
at all -one standing for a body of aggressors, the
other for a cohort of victims. By the same token,
the dialogues manage to suppress the plurality
of Islam – its many regional forms, the differing
ways it adapted itself to local conditions and tra-
ditions. A rich and variegated religion is present-
ed in such dialogues as a homogenous, feature-
less whole.
There is such a thing as Islam, of course, and
there are many Islams as well. There is one Islam
in the sense that there is one revealed book and
one Prophet to whom it was revealed. There are
many Islams in the sense that there are many dif-
ferent traditions of interpreting that book and
understanding that Prophet. The lived Islam of a
peasant in Bangladesh is similar to, but not iden-
tical with, that of his counterpart in Algeria, as is
the Islam of a middle-class professional in
Karachi and his counterpart in Indonesia. In each
instance, the differences as well as the similari-
ties are greatly cherished. These differences,
however, found no mention in the dialogues I
witnessed. They were not present in the remarks
of the Muslims and formed no part of the under-
standing that the Christians sought.
This elision of Islamic differences has dangers
not merely for the Christians engaged in dia-
logue, but for the Muslims as well. The Christians
never scrutinized a repeated Muslim claim that
what made Islam unique was that it was a totali-
ty, a complete system that covered each and
every aspect of human life. That such a claim has
a dangerous edge went unnoticed. Both for
Muslims in self-proclaimed Islamic countries and
for Muslims in such non-Islamic nations as India,
Islam was said to be a total religion – which easi-
ly transposes into the demand that every Muslim
be a total Muslim, a Muslim entirely in terms of
the person making that demand. Any sugges-
tion of diversity, any opposition to that pro-
claimed totality then becomes ruthlessly punish-
able. It takes very little to turn a dream of totality
into a totalitarian nightmare.
The Christians who initiated these dialogues
may have gained some understanding of con-
temporary Islamic politics. But if their aim was to
get an insight into the lived religion of the Mus-
lims, they should have brought to these dia-
logues their own lived religion. At none of the
meetings that I attended did the Christians high-
light any of the issues that are currently so prob-
lematic a part of their lives as Christians – issues
related to homosexuality; women’s rights;
prayer in schools; and abortion. Or the three
great issues of the recent past: ecumenism; race;
and anti-Semitism.
The Muslims were not inclined to raise such
issues either. And when they did, it was only to
dismiss them with a scriptural quotation. For the
overwhelming part, they used these occasions
as opportunities to tell their story of grievances
and hurts, placing their remarks precisely and
entirely in recent history – in a narrative of defeat
and loss, neglect, denial, and victimhood.
I am not blind to the brutality inflicted on
Bosnian Muslims, the ferocity displayed against
the Iraqis, or the unremitting injustice done to
the Palestinians. But is that all there is to being a
Muslim at this time? Should I not also shed a few
tears for those who are victimized in the name of
Islam – the Christians in Egypt and Sudan, the
Ahmadis in Pakistan, the Bahais in Iran? The
instances may not compare in magnitude with
what was done to Bosnian Muslims, but should-
n’t I at least note the horribly similar impulse
behind them? As I denounce the abandonment
of Bosnia by the Western powers, shouldn’t I also
point to their equally shameful abandonment of
the Kurds – who are also Muslims – to the mercy
of three so-called Muslim states: Iraq, Turkey and
Iran? Not raising that issue, I remain blind to the
systemic question the two cases share: how do
modern nation-states go about forming and
preserving themselves?
Most importantly, the Muslim narrative of
hurts not only posits an immediate colonial past
of utter decline and passivity but also implies a
pre-colonial period of pristine Islamic glory. Both
descriptions are not merely false, but also harm-
ful; invoking them only distorts any effort to
think through our shared future. A selective
memory of caliphs and kings cannot help us
much in working towards a world that is not just
pluralistic but also democratic.
The goal of an interfaith dialogue between
Christians and Muslims should certainly not be
the position taken in a Qur'anic verse that was
invoked by one Muslim: ‘To you your way, to me
mine’ (109:6). That verse is explicitly addressed
to kafirs, ‘the Unbelievers.’ Christians are not
kafirs, perhaps not even in the sight of the most
absolutist Muslim. More, in its full context, the
verse is a statement of an absolute parting of
ways, which, of course, cannot be the aim of any
dialogue – any more than a dialogue can be for
the sake of a victory for one of the participants.
But neither should some compromise or syn-
cretism be its goal. The only dialogues that we
should deem fruitful must either clarify some-
thing that was obscure in our own thought, or at
least make a little bit opaque what we earlier
thought patently clear.
Judaism and Christianity are religions explicit-
ly affirmed in the Qur'an, but the Qur'an equally
explicitly commands Muslims to ‘judge between
[Christians and Jews] in the light of what has
been revealed by God, and do not follow their
whims, and beware of them lest they lead you
away from the guidance sent down to you by
God.’ (5:49)—which would seem to rule out any
kind of dialogue. The Qur'an, however, else-
where seems to invite dialogue when it enjoins
Muslims to say to Christians and Jews, ‘O people
of the Book, let us come to an agreement on that
which is common between us, that we worship
no one but God, and make none His compeer,
and that none of us take any others for lord apart
from God.’ (3:64) The Qur'an also clearly places
Muslims, Christians and Jews on an equal foot-
ing to the extent they are capable of performing
deeds that are good in the sight of God. ‘To each
of you We have given a law and a way and a pat-
tern of life. If God had pleased He could surely
have made you one people (professing one
faith). But He wished to try and test you by that
which He gave you. So try to excel in good deed.
To Him will you all return in the end, when He
will tell you of what you were at variance.’ (5:48)
How we can differently worship one God;
what makes a given deed good or bad; how
these critical issues play out in the lives of ordi-
nary Muslims, Christians and Jews, at different
times and in different places – some understand-
ing of these matters is the worthy goal of any
interfaith dialogue. ♦
Dr C.M. Naim is professor of Urdu Studies in
the Department of South Asian Languages &
Civilizations, University of Chicago.
* This essay is a revised version of a text published
earlier in Word & World, XVI:2 (Spring 1996)
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In the core countries of the European Union, Muslims,
today, are counted in the millions and Islam is engaged
in a process of institutionalization in the midst of secu-
larized societies. Whereas Christianity is receding to the
countryside, Western Islam is manifesting itself as an
urban phenomenon: Muslim populations are concen-
trated in towns and the symbolic attributes of Islamic
faith and culture are becoming more and more conspic-
uous in this urban environment. In these closing years
of the twentieth century, Europe is more than ever
before becoming a space were Islamic, Christian, Jewish
and secular traditions come together ‘to fight, support,
and fertilize each other’.1
Muslims in Belgium
Enemies from within
o r F e l l o w - C i t i z e n s ?
If we would accept Huntington’s well-known
thesis of the coming ‘clash of civilizations’,2 t h i s
state of affairs would imply that the ‘front’
between Islam and the West once again (i.e.
since 1492) is no longer ‘safely’ located between
the continents, or between the eastern and
western parts of the European continent, but
that it is actually running through our very
towns and societies. Are we heading then for a
kind of ‘civil war’ in Western society itself? And
the Muslims in our societies: i.e. the Turks, the
Moroccans and the others, naturalized or not,
immigrants and converts, are they to be imag-
ined as ‘the enemies from within’? Will they, as a
consequence, eventually have to be driven out
again – just like the Moriscos in Spain were, at
the beginning of the 17th century?3
There is no denying that there are signs that
would superficially seem to confirm such a read-
ing: for instance, the riots and confrontations
between ‘Muslim’ youngsters and the police
which on a more or less regular basis break out
in our towns.
Already, a new racism is legitimizing this
growing polarization between the so-called
indigenous population and the so-called immi-
grants, not only in Belgium but in other Euro-
pean countries as well. This new racism, which is
actually accompanying the construction of
European unity, can be identified as an ‘anti-
Muslimism’. While it is being constructed along
the selfsame lines as the anti-Semitism in the
t h i r t i e s ,4 this European racism is mainly based
on the ethnicization of cultural, i.e. religious, d i f-
ferences between ‘Europeans’ and ‘Muslims’.
Starting from the myth of an originally ‘white’
and ‘(lay-) Christian’ Europe, it operates by iden-
tifying ‘Turk/Moroccan’ and ‘Muslim’ and, gen-
erally, by identifying ‘immigrant’ and ‘Muslim’.
As Fred Halliday formulated it, this anti-Muslim-
ism ‘involves not so much hostility to Islam as a
religion (…) but hostility to Muslims, to commu-
nities of peoples whose sole or main religion is
Islam and whose Islamic character, real or
invented, forms one of the objects of preju-
d i c e ’ .5 Feeding on these anti-Muslim feelings
and fuelling them at the same time, right-wing
extremist parties are exploiting the situation, in
Belgium as well as in other countries of the E.U.,
in order to win popular votes.6
However, there is no fatality in this evolution.
All in all, the process of Muslim integration into
our secularized society has been going on
peacefully for many decades. It is urgent though
that an end be put to all discrimination and also
that Muslims, especially youngsters, get the
chance to contribute as Muslim citizens to the
social development of their country.
The number of Muslims in Belgium – i.e. of
people having an immigrant Muslim back-
ground and/or considering themselves Muslim
(converts included) – is rapidly growing. Of
course, figures are necessarily inaccurate, for (a)
the criterion of nationality is becoming less and
less relevant since a growing number of people
originating from Muslim countries acquire Bel-
gian nationality; (b) the definition of Muslim
identity has inevitably many nuances, going
from strictly-practising believers to laymen and
agnostics. In the early nineties, the total number
of people in Belgium with a Muslim cultural
background was estimated at 285,000 – more
than 2.5 per cent of the total population. At this
moment, the number is going beyond 350,000.
Concurrent with this demographic growth,
there has been a proliferation of mosques and
prayer halls: on the eve of the new century, Bel-
gium counts some 240 places of Islamic wor-
s h i p .
Whatever the precise figures may be, it is
undeniable that ‘Belgian Islam’ has become a
cultural and social fact. Quantitatively, it repre-
sents the second largest religious denomination
of the country; or to put it otherwise, Islam is the
largest minority religion in Belgium, far out-
numbering Protestantism, Judaism, Humanism,
e t c .
The settlement of a large Muslim population
in Belgium is an irreversible phenomenon. The
major question therefore that has to be faced by
a society that considers itself to be democratic
and pluralist, is the one concerning the place
and space that one is willing to concede to
these cultural and ethnic minorities. Will we
actually allow them to maintain – be it
inevitably in interaction with their secular envi-
ronment – their collective cultural and religious
identity? Or will we, out of irrational fear for the
future survival of the secular state (if not of ‘the
West’ itself), impose upon Muslims a kind of pri-
vatization or secularization of Islam – some-
thing that, for the great majority of them at
least, would be tantamount to demanding that
they abandon their religion?
There is no denying that, from the perspective
of basic human rights, the Belgian state made a
good start when as early as 1974 it passed a law
granting Islamic worship the same status as that
accorded to religions historically established in
the country: Catholicism, Protestantism and
Judaism. The immediate and most spectacular
effect of this recognition was the introduction
(since 1975-76) of the teaching of Islam in pub-
lic schools, on the same basis as the other reli-
gions. At present, there are about 700 Muslim
teachers giving Islamic instruction in both pri-
mary and secondary schools, their salaries being
paid by the State.
The law of 1974 also allowed for financial pro-
visions to be made for the costs of the infrastruc-
ture (e.g. places of worship) and the ‘personnel’
of the religious group (e.g. the salaries and pen-
sions of the Imams). The importance of this kind
of religious ‘engagement’ by the Belgian state –
which is officially a secular state, based on the
principle of separation between Church and
State – is measured when one considers that in
this way the Catholic Church is annually receiv-
ing a total provision of no less than about 10 bil-
lion Belgian Francs. This sum is paid by the Bel-
gian taxpayer – which is also by non-Catholics,
meaning Muslims as well. As for Islamic worship,
this kind of advantageous treatment has still not
been put into effect. So, for a quarter of a centu-
ry or more, Muslims financially contribute to a
system they themselves are excluded from. The
reason for this unfortunate state of affairs is offi -
cially the same one as that for the existing defi-
ciencies in the status of the Islamic teachers: viz.
that it requires the identification of a national
Muslim authority, an issue that until now has
remained unsolved.
This financial discrimination was accompa-
nied, all these years, by violations against the
basic rights of religious freedom, which in prin-
ciple are guaranteed by the Belgian Constitu-
tion (e.g. the right to be buried according to
your philosophical or religious faith). Generally,
Muslims in Belgium as yet do not have the pos-
sibility of burying their loved ones in the ceme-
tery of their own place of residence. The same
goes for religious rights at school, in prison, and
in hospital: for example, the right to eat food
that is prepared according to your religious pre-
scriptions; the right to safeguard yourself
against (threats of) violations of your physical
integrity – e.g. by wearing a head-scarf and
modest dress; and the right to celebrate your
religious feasts, etc. These infringements must
be taken together with: the usually negative
coverage of Islam in the press and the other
media; regular conflicts in schools (e.g. concern-
ing the head-scarf); the systematic stigmatizing
of Islamic values and symbols as being obsta-
cles for a smooth integration of Muslim immi-
grants; and, of course, the many forms of ‘daily
racism’ being perpetrated by officials, for exam-
ple by members of the police force, etc.
It goes without saying that this situation puts
heavy pressure on the peaceful coexistence
between the communities, and as a conse-
quence on the democratic future of Belgian
society as well. Luckily, there are political signs
pointing in a more hopeful direction, i.e. of a
society willing to really assume it’s cultural and
ethnic pluralism. The Belgian government, for
one, has recently accepted a proposal for the
election of a representative council of the Bel-
gian Muslim communities. Once put into place,
this council offers the perspective that the insti-
tutional situation of Belgian Islam one day will
be finally regularized. Still more recently, a new
law has been accepted on burial places, which
could provide for Muslim sections in local ceme-
t e r i e s .
Of course, equality of treatment at the institu-
tional level, if ever realized, does not suffice.
Islam and Muslim culture should as well be
enabled to develop their intellectual and social
potential within a secularized society. Besides
taking the necessary social measures, an effi-
cient anti-racist policy requires the introduction
of a whole set of measures in the cultural and
educational domain as well. For example, in our
secondary schools Arabic and Turkish should be
introduced as optional languages for all pupils;
the history and culture of the Mediterranean
countries of origin and the history of immigra-
tions in Belgium and Europe should receive a
place in our schools’ curricula; a comparative
history of religions should be offered, etc. At the
university level, an all-round curriculum of mod-
ern Islamic studies should be introduced: for the
sake of Muslims but also for that of society at
large, the study of Islam should be freed from
the historicist and colonial shackles of tradition-
al Orientalism.
The final goal should be the ‘interculturaliza-
tion’ of our society. Muslims themselves, it
should be said, whatever their ethnic affilia-
tions, are playing more of an active role in this
process of cultural and social interaction. Run-
ning their own social and cultural organizations
and working together with non-Muslims as
w e l l ,7 they are demonstrating the correctness of
the view that, far from being a threat, the West
once again has much to gain from the new Mus-
lim presence.♦
Prof. dr Herman De Ley is the director of the Centre
for Islam In Europe, University of Gent.
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Taslima Nasrin, the writer from Bangladesh, shot into
international fame and limelight with the publication of
her novel ‘Lajja’ (Shame) which criticized Muslims for
attacking minority Hindus in Bangladesh following the
1992 destruction of a mosque by Hindu zealots in neigh-
bouring India. Nasrin’s writing so angered Muslim senti-
ments in Bangladesh that Khaleda Zia’s government
ordered her arrest in 1994 on charges of blasphemy.
After a year in hiding, Nasrin fled Bangladesh for four
years of exile in Europe. Several Muslim religious lead-
ers demanded her immediate arrest and trial. They
warned the government of serious consequences if she
is not put on trial for suggesting that the Qur'an should
be rewritten. Nasrin has denied making the comments.
However, it was finally confirmed that the 36-year old
author should indeed stand trial. Nasrin has appealed
to the international community for help.
The Threat of
I n t o l e r a n c e
R e l i g i o u s
E x t r e m i s m
I am not a great philosopher, a great histori-
an, nor a great writer. I am a simple ordinary
writer. But I am a writer who has been threat-
ened in Bangladesh by the religious funda-
mentalists. They have decreed a f a t w a , a reli-
gious sanction, against me and have set a price
on my head. Even today you have only to men-
tion my name to provoke their angry reaction.
Not only that, I am a criminal according to my
government, which accuses me of having
exposed society’s injustices and the govern-
ment’s failure to protect the rights of the reli-
gious minority. Now, the government has
banned my book and issued an arrest warrant
against me for committing blasphemy. As a
result I have been forced to go underground.
With the help of my friends, I managed to hide
for sixty long days. Because of the pressure cre-
ated by the international human rights move-
ment, the Bangladeshi government granted
me bail and let me leave. Away from my own
country, I was surrounded by police who not
only saved me from harm but also imprisoned
me by their total protectiveness. My future is
u n c e r t a i n .
Although I have been far from my country
and my own people for several years, I still
remain true to my own ideals. I continue to
believe in humanism, not in any religion. I do
not pray to any god to end my sufferings. I still
have confidence in myself. And, I assure you, I
most definitely will continue my ideological
fight against religious fundamentalism.
I am an atheist. Let me explain, although I am
not a specialist in the study of religion, how
because of my personal experiences I have
come to the atheist position. I was born of a
Muslim family. When I grew up I was shocked
to learn that some of my neighbours were not
the real owners of their houses. The actual
owners had been Hindus forced to leave their
homeland by the partition of India in 1947, a
partition forced on the basis of religion. Just
across the border was the land of the Hindus.
The violent and fratricidal partition forced
many Hindu families out of my country to seek
refuge in the Hindu-majority country on the
other side of the border. Meanwhile, many
Muslim families came over to my country. I
heard that it was religion that had led to all
these disasters. So it followed that, when
young, I could not understand what religion
was, what type of thinking could lead to such
negative acts.
Over time, and during the course of my train-
ing in science, I developed the powers of
observation, experiment, analysis, and reason-
ing. Without reasoning, I found, nothing
should be accepted as fact. I knew about the
Hindu texts that are called Aptabakya,
‘received wisdom,’ facts which are supposed to
have been received from some superior
authority, an authority that cannot be ques-
tioned. There are similar unquestionables in all
religions. But I could not accept the concept
that some things are supposed to be unques-
tioned. When I began to study the Koran, the
holy book of Islam, I was surprised to be told
that ‘the sun revolves around the earth,’ just
one more example of unreasonableness. Also,
the Koran taught discrimination against
women, describing females as slaves and as
sexual objects. Naturally, I set aside the Koran.
Meanwhile, wherever I looked I continued to
find that religion was oppressive.
One day, I resolved to fight back. I took up
my pen and started writing against injustice,
unreason, and prejudice. I exposed the crimes
of religion, particularly the injustice and
oppression against women. And what hap-
pened as a result? My government, as I previ-
ously mentioned, has accused me of blasphe-
my and forced me to move from my friends,
my family, my home, my homeland.
I am against religion for other reasons. Reli-
gion as practised does not always teach people
to love one another. On the contrary, it often
teaches them to hate people of a different
faith. Religion also leads people to depend on
fate, to be led, and thus to lose self-confidence
in making individual decisions. It unnecessarily
glorifies poverty and sacrifice and thus serves
the vested interests of the wealthy few.
In all countries and throughout the ages,
conscientious people have exposed the uneth-
ical aspects of religion. The C h a r b a k a s, philoso-
phers of the L o k a y a t a tradition, were the mate-
rialists of Ancient India. They raised many
questions about religion, questions that
appear simple but actually are very subtle.
These materialists did not believe in reincarna-
tion, did not believe in heaven, and did not
believe in hell. They were quite vocal against
the dominance of the priests. But priests did
not allow the materialists to succeed, and their
texts have almost been obliterated, only a few
fragmentary references remaining. Despite
this, they had a big influence on the common
people. Hence, perhaps, their name: L o k a y a t a,
which really means (the option or philosophy
of) the common people.
Today we are still carrying the same fight
against unreason and prejudice. The rise of
fundamentalism all over the world shows that
the battle remains urgently necessary. What is
behind the rise of religious fundamentalism?
The rise of Islamic fundamentalism, I think, is
attributable to the failure of secular democracy
on the one hand, and of communism on the
other, to solve the problems of the world’s eco-
nomic underdevelopment and its social
inequities. Disillusioned and hopeless people
are now seeking salvation by turning to the
blind forces of faith. Beaten by science, over-
whelmed by other civilizations, Islam is now in
search of its ‘roots’. There is an element of fear
in its search. Of course the responsibility of
inciting fundamentalism should not be laid
fully on the so-called secular leaders of the ex-
colonies who have used fundamentalism to
serve their own interest. The responsibility
should be shared also by the democratic and
secular states of the developed world. It is they
who have made compromises with the funda-
mentalist forces. We have seen how the so-
called secular political parties in Bangladesh
use the religious sentiments of the people to
get votes. But similar instances of rank oppor-
tunism have been seen in India and elsewhere,
too. We have also seen how the powerful West-
ern states have declared the protection of
human rights to be one of their supreme
objectives, but then they patronized funda-
mentalism both overtly and covertly. Democ-
ratic governments recognize military dictator-
ships for short-run political interests. Secular
states make friends with autocracies as well as
theocracies. They even tolerate the completely
inhuman behaviour of their own fundamental-
ists. Such double standards practised by so-
called democratic and secular states at home
and abroad give the fundamentalists a sort of
legitimacy. Governments then have to suc-
cumb to the fundamentalists’ pressure and
proscribe books and make arrangements to
send its writers and authors to prison.
Some authors in the West are coming for-
ward in support of the fundamentalists. They
argue that not all the customs in vogue in the
third world countries are harmful for women.
They find a sort of stability and social peace in
the oriental world. They think that even h a r e m s
are not necessarily bad for women, because
they provide a degree of autonomy and inde-
pendence! May I humbly observe that all this is
plain nonsense. For me, there can be no differ-
ence in the concept of human rights between
the East and the West. If the veil is bad for
Western women, then it is bad for their oriental
sisters as well. If patriarchy is to be fought
against in the West, it should be equally fought
against in the East. The fight, in fact, is more
urgent there because most of the women have
neither any education nor any economic inde-
pendence. If modern secular education is good
for Western women, why should the Eastern
women be deprived of it. The peace that some
authors visualize in the Eastern countries is,
clearly, the peace of the graveyard. The point
is, the fundamentalists cannot be countered
without a relentless and uncompromising
fight. The struggle should be both theoretical
and tactical. 
Democracy and secularism should be
applied in practice and not remain a mere play
of words. Fundamentalism is an ideology that
diverts people from the path of natural devel-
opment of consciousness and undermines
their personal rights. I find it impossible to
accept fundamentalism as an alternative to
secular ideas. My reasons are: first, the insis-
tence of the fundamentalists on divine justifi-
cation for human laws; second, the insistence
of fundamentalists upon the superior authority
of faith, as opposed to reason; third, the insis-
tence of fundamentalists that the individual
does not count, that the individual is immater-
ial. Group loyalty over individual rights and
personal achievements is a peculiar feature of
fundamentalism. Fundamentalists believe in a
particular way of life; they want to put every-
body in their particular strait-jacket and dictate
what an individual should eat, what an individ-
ual should wear, how an individual should live
everyday life – everything is to be determined
by the fundamentalist authority. Fundamen-
talists do not believe in individualism, liberty
of personal choice, or plurality of thought.
Moreover, as they are believers in a particular
faith, they believe only in propagating their
own ideas (as autocrats generally do). They do
not encourage or entertain free debate, they
deny others the right to express their own
views freely, and they cannot tolerate anything
which they perceive as going against their
faith. They do not believe in an open society
and, although they proclaim themselves a
moral force, their language is one of hatred
and violence. As true believers, they are out to
‘save the soul’ of the people of their country by
force of arms. 
Is it possible for a rationalist and humanist to
accept this sort of terrible repression? The fight
between obscurantism and enlightenment,
between rationality and faith, is therefore
inevitable. But it is to be fought in the realm of
ideology, in the field of education, on political
platforms, and in all the spheres of daily life.
♦
This is a shortened version of a speech delivered
a t the Humanist World congress in Mexico City
(November, 1996).
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M u s l i m Discourses on
Human Rights
Ann Elizabeth Mayer’s work addresses her
subject principally during the post-World War
II period, more specifically since the 1948 ratifi-
cation of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights which only Saudi Arabia among Muslim
nations declined to approve. The book d o e s
not treat all possible aspects of the subject but
focuses on specific human rights declarations
and positions that Muslim bodies and selected
prominent Muslim thinkers have propounded.
Within that range, the discussion addresses
Muslim reactions to human rights, Islamic
restrictions on human rights, discrimination
against women and non-Muslims, restrictions
on the rights and freedoms of women, Islamic
human rights schemes and non-Muslims, and
freedom of religion in Islamic human rights
s c h e m e s .
Mayer is both a scholar of classical and mod-
ern Islamic legal thought and a lawyer.
Although her book contains much in the way
of sources and analysis that will be unpalatable
and even repugnant, for very different reasons,
to secular (or religious) humanists on one side
and traditionalist patriarchal thinkers, on the
other, it is a largely dispassionate study of
human rights records and human rights dis-
courses, mostly in the Arab Muslim world.
There are several guiding principles that
inform Mayer’s coverage of her topic through-
out the book. The first is an assumption, based
on her reading of Islamic history and literature,
that Muslims have generally been concerned
about the sorts of ideals, values, and behav-
ioral patterns that undergird modern notions
of human rights. But Mayer rightly warns
against anachronistic modern readings when
treating Islamic or Western ethical and legal
concepts in pre-modern times, because the
discourses that have produced contemporary
international human rights agreements are
decidedly modern in spirit and secular by
design so as to be as inclusive as possible of
diverse peoples and traditions.
A second assumption is that Islam and the
Muslim world have not previously and do not
now constitute a monolithic entity, but exhibit
a wide range of regional and local diversity,
not only in customs and cultures but in theo-
logical, ethical and, particularly, legal tempera-
ments and positions. Closely related to this
assumption is the recognition that what con-
temporary Muslim human rights declarations
call ‘Sharica,’ when qualifying their articles so
as to keep them tightly reefed against the
winds of Western style interpretations, is not
the traditional field of sometimes widely
diverse legal opinions but a simplistic modern
default notion that may unintentionally permit
states and rulers to act absolutely and with
impunity in all kinds of human rights abuses
and challenges, rationalizing their behaviour
as ‘Islamic’ in some sense. 
A final assumption, or rather conclusion that
has taken the form of an assumption until
proven otherwise, based on careful analysis of
human rights documents and declarations
produced in the Muslim world, is that they are
more focused on limiting than on guarding
human rights.
This last point is really the key critical contri-
bution of the book. It rests on the fundamental
distinction between individual rights and state
power. Whereas in Western democracies indi-
viduals are, in varying ways, protected from
state absolutism, Mayer sees political order-
ings in the contemporary as well as traditional
Arab world, whether Islamic or simply dictator-
ships, as entities against which individual per-
sons have no real rights, although some citi-
zens – mainly free adult males – may enjoy cer-
tain privileges. Closely related to the pre-emi-
nence of state power is a long-standing dis-
trust of human reason in defining and adjudi-
cating human rights and duties and a strong
preference for guidance based on scripture
and juristic precedent and consensus.
The appearance of a variety of Muslim
authored and ratified human rights declara-
tions in recent years indicates a genuine con-
cern for being connected with international
discourses. It is not prudent, ethical or humane
for a major population in today’s international
economic and political environment to absent
itself from a movement that is, for many peo-
ple and nations, as urgent and influential as
human rights. Mayer contends that although
many Muslims fully and enthusiastically sup-
port international human rights norms and
agreements, official Muslim authored declara-
tions seek to engage the subject from a care-
fully framed, conservative Islamic perspective,
yielding as little as possible to secular, interna-
tional, and pluralistic principles. The interna-
tional order (including most Muslim countries)
have their human rights declarations and
agreements, and so now do Muslims in the
sense of a separate community, and both
deserve respect if not general acceptance. 
Mayer summarizes and analyses several such
declarations and comments on what she con-
siders to be their sometimes diverging and
even evasive shifts in meaning between the
original language – usually Arabic – and trans-
lations into English and/or French. An example
is Article III.a of the Universal Islamic Declara-
tion of Human Rights of 1981, framed by mem-
bers of the London-based Islamic Council of
Europe. In English it reads: ‘All persons are
equal before the Law and are entitled to equal
opportunities and protection of the Law.’ The
original Arabic term translated as ‘Law’ is shari-
ca and not some generic notion of civil law as
understood in the West. Mayer contends that
the uninformed reader might understand this
article in a very different manner than one
accustomed to Islamic legal meanings. ‘That is,
people are not being guaranteed the equal
protection of a neutral law, but ‘equal protec-
tion’ under a law that in its pre-modern formu-
lations is inherently discriminatory and there-
by in violation of international standards’ (90).
She refers particularly to women and non-Mus-
lims who have a very inferior status under the
S h a r ica than that enjoyed by adult male Mus-
l i m s .
An example of the shading of meaning with
reference to the rights of men and women is
Article 6.a of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference’s ‘Cairo Declaration on Human
Rights in Islam’ of 1990 (and presented at the
UN’s World Conference on Human Rights in
1993 in Geneva as OIC’s definitive statement at
that time): ‘Woman is equal to man in human
dignity (al-karama al-insaniyya), and has rights
to enjoy as well as duties to perform …’ Mayer
remarks that Article 1.a, also of the Cairo Decla-
ration, shares the evasiveness of Article 6.a: ‘All
men (sic., i.e. jami‘ al-nas, meaning ‘human
beings, people’) are equal in terms of basic
human dignity and basic obligations and
responsibilities, without any discrimination on
the grounds of race, colour, language, sex, reli-
gious belief, political affiliation, social status or
other considerations’ (86). Mayer comments
that ‘one is alerted to the fact that the failure to
stipulate equality in ‘rights’ is not accidental
and that the equality in ‘dignity’ and ‘obliga-
tions’ is not intended to signify equality in
“rights”‘ (i b i d .). Mayer argues that the ‘Islamic
S h a r icah’ is not as simple a reality as the Cairo
Declaration, or other similar documents,
appear to assume; but that, as a regulating
concept, it should not generally be expected
to conform with international human rights
s t a n d a r d s .
Mayer’s critical readings do not always lead
her to negative findings with respect to human
rights in Muslim contexts. In the ‘Constitution
of the Islamic Republic of Iran of 24 October
1979 As Amended to 28 July 1989’ is Article
3.14, setting forth the aims of the Islamic
Republic which include: ‘securing the multifar-
ious rights of all citizens, both women and
men, and providing legal protection for all, as
well as the equality of all before the law
[q a n u n]’ (196). Mayer contends that ‘the fact
that this provision was retained, even though
it expressed a philosophy of equality that was
radically at odds both with the actual policies
of the regime and with other provisions in the
constitution, is highly significant, because it
shows how much normative force internation-
al human rights concepts retain in Iran despite
the attempts by conservative clerics to dis-
credit them’(86). Mayer sees in such examples
signs of hope for the futherance of internation-
al human rights norms in Muslim majority
countries and looks for their definition and
application in distinctively Islamic ways as a
most healthy and potentially productive direc-
t i o n .
Although a cursory reading of her book
might lead one to conclude that Mayer sees
nothing positive in Islam and Muslim societies
regarding human rights, a careful reading will
show that her criticisms are directed almost
entirely towards politically motivated clerics
and others who detest Western thought and
culture and want to maintain as much distance
as possible from them or from what they are
perceived to be. Mayer acknowledges that
there are significant human rights theorists
and activists in the Muslim world, some of
whom appear to consider Islamic human rights
schemes as largely irrelevant. A key problem,
she contends, is that the Islamic human rights
schemes examined in her book all ‘insist on the
absolute perfection of the abstract Islamic
ideals while ignoring altogether the myriad
problems of institutionalizing and implement-
ing human rights protections and democratiz-
ing closed systems of the Middle East’ (190).
There is nothing in Islam that is against human
rights, she appears to be arguing. Rather, it is a
prevalent selective reading and narrow inter-
pretation of the tradition, from a strongly patri-
archal bias, that results in weak, incoherent,
and ineffective attempts towards defining and
institutionalizing authentic human rights for
Muslims in today’s world.
Mayer’s book, in its earlier editions, drew
much hostile criticism as well as grateful
praise. Her own very positive evaluation of
some contemporary Islamic discourses on
human rights centres on such figures as the
Sudanese legal specialist Abdullahi An-Na‘im.
Mayer sees in An-Nai‘im’s extensive scholarly
explorations of human rights an authentic
Muslim voice in harmony with the essentials of
international human rights norms and dis-
courses, making significant contributions to
them. One of the areas of greatest concern is
the practice of some thinkers and countries of
relying on cultural relativism as a means of set-
ting one’s own people apart from otherwise
universally held norms. This has been the prac-
tice, for example, of Saudi Arabia since its
refusal to ratify the 1948 Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.
Cultural relativism, ironically, accords in a
certain manner with much maligned ‘Oriental-
ist’ thinking by viewing, as Mayer puts it, ‘the
peoples of the Orient and the Occident as hav-
ing inherently different natures’ (12) and thus
unable to adopt each others’ ideas and institu-
tions because it would be ‘somehow incongru-
ous and unnatural’ (12). Highly sophisticated
and nuanced anthropological theories of cul-
tural relativism, when simplistically packaged
and crudely used as a policy imperative,
remind me of the oft repeated opinion that
today’s Muslims should embrace modernity
but not Westernization, as if the choice were
that simple or even an authentic choice
instead of a confused and misleading shibbo-
l e t h .
The publication of this third edition of
Mayer’s book is most welcome during a period
of increased concern about the general subject
of human rights in a stressed and fractured
world that leaves no major region or people
free from threats to and violation of their
rights. Her well grounded, keenly analytical,
and empathetic book provides a reliable and
extremely clear overview of the subject with
an appropriate amount of challenging techni-
cal legal analysis as well as an abundance of
forthright, independent interpretation. ♦
Dr Frederick Mathewson Denny is a professor of
Islamic Studies and the History of Religions,
Department of Religious Studies, University of
C o l o r a d o .
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The study of Islam and human rights is a challenging
activity requiring immersion in a complex discourse of
religion, law, culture, politics, postcolonialism, and
comparative ethics, accessed both through texts and
living contexts. The divide between traditional Islamic
and modern Western sensibilities concerning such
issues as individualist versus communal values, rights
versus obligations, and human dignity as distinguished
from human rights, provides ample opportunity for the
testing of everyone’s patience, empathy, objectivity,
and simple courtesy. Although this essay primarily
addresses a new edition of a significant book on Islam
and human rights, it views the book as a kind of lens
through which to observe many important aspects of
the general subject.
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In Arguing Sainthood, I examine Sufi reli-
gious meanings and practices in Pakistan and
their relation to the westernizing influences of
modernity in the shaping of the postcolonial
self. The Muslim p i r or sufi saint is a spiritual
guide, a healer, a worker of miracles, an object
of devotion at shrines, and a focus of social and
political controversy as Pakistanis debate the
true nature of Islam and its proper position in a
modern nation-state that also sees itself as an
Islamic state. With debates over the legitimacy
and meanings of the sufi p i r as my focus, I criti-
cally reinterpret theories of subjectivity, exam-
ining the production of identity in the context
of a complex social field of conflicting ideolo-
gies and interests. I challenge the notion of a
monolithic Islamic modernity in order to
explore the lived reality of individuals, particu-
larly those of p i rs and their followers. 
Furthermore, I examine how competing ide-
ologies that have emerged in the process of
nation-building in Pakistan are played out in
individual experience among ordinary Pakista-
nis. Secularism, Islamic modernism, Islamic
reform, fundamentalism, and ‘traditionalism’
are all platforms on which political leaders seek
to shape government policy and public opin-
ion. The p i r has been a target of much of this
ideological conflict about the place of Islam in
the Pakistani nation-state. But the p i r also plays
an important role in the lives of individuals,
who often turn to him for healing in times of
personal crisis and conflict. I, therefore, focus
on the p i r as a nodal point where these politi-
cal and personal processes come together. At
this intersection, I observe the extent to which
ordinary people are shaped or determined by a
discourse of modernity and by the ideologies
that arise out of this discourse. Just as the p i r
operates as a kind of nexus, this book stands at
the nexus of several lines of academic inquiry.
Drawing on my training in clinical and theoret-
ical psychoanalysis as well as on historical
sources, Sufi textual sources, and two years of
anthropological fieldwork, I offer a basis for re-
theorizing postcolonial studies. ♦
Dr Katherine Pratt Ewing is associate professor in
t h e Department of Cultural Anthropology at Duke
U n i v e r s i t y .
This book presents an analysis of the con-
temporary power dynamics between Islamist
thought and praxis, women’s activisms and
state policies. Although it focuses on Egypt
(during the presidencies of Nasser, Sadat and
Mubarak), the theoretical framework is rele-
vant for other contexts involving this triangle.
The book shatters three myths: that Islamism is
a uniform and ultimately violent freak; that the
state discourse in the Middle East is merely
confronted with an ideology it is incapable of
handling; and that women in the Arab/Muslim
world, lack feminist vigour. This study high-
lights how the mediocrity of Islamist opposi-
tion is but a reflection of the State’s own polit-
ical discourse. Far from arguing that Islamism
simply oppresses women, the book narrates a
relatively unheard of phenomenon – I s l a m i s t
f e m i n i s m. This is to be compared to two other
dominant streaks – Muslim and secular femi-
nism – within a rife, evolving and diverse femi-
nist discourse. The book brings out the plurali-
ty of Islamist praxis, the multiple means
through which the Egyptian government has
reacted and adapted to Islamist discourse over
the years, and the heterogeneity of feminist
voices in Egypt. Urging for a politics of differ-
ence, the book emphasizes that power is
indeed ubiquitous, and that most actors can,
and are, shaping the nature, impact, and future
of political discourse in the region. ♦
Dr Azza Karam is senior programme officer of
t h e Gender, Middle East, and Applied Research
Programmes, International IDEA, Stockholm.
B o o k p re senta ti o n
T he  C ha l le n g e  of  F un d a me n ta l is m :
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The process of globalization, mostly
addressed in terms of the spread of McWorld, is
misleading. There is no globalization when it
comes to culture/civilization. On the contrary,
the politicization of world religions in an age of
crisis, both structural and also a crisis of mean-
ing, is a source of fragmentation. Culture is a pro-
duction of meaning and not patterns of con-
sumption. The resort to religion for the articula-
tion of dissent results in translating religious
beliefs into political convictions. This politiciza-
tion of religion is addressed in this book as reli-
gious fundamentalism. The new ideology poses
a challenge to the world order of secular states.
With regard to non-Western civilizations, reli-
gious fundamentalism becomes a vehicle for the
claims of both de-secularization and de-West-
ernization. Religious fundamentalism is a global
political phenomenon that can be observed in
all major world religions. However, the very fact
that among the existing civilizations only Islam
and the West have universal claims, explains the
focus on Islam. Giving Islam a political imprint
results in a ideology called political Islam. This
ideology has little to do with the religion of Islam
or with the history of the related civilization, for
political Islam is not a religious belief but rather a
political ideology which is both anti-Western
and anti-secular. It has the claim of establishing
a new world order being an alternative to the
prevailing one designed by Western norms and
values. However, instead of this envisaged world
order we are currently encountering de-stabi-
lization effects resulting in disorder. Following
the first two chapters that provide the general
world-political framework for the rise of funda-
mentalism, the focus is set on the world of Islam
and in particular the Middle East. It is argued that
the Gulf War of 1991, in the West, is nothing
more than a fading memory, while in the Middle
East the confrontation between Saddam Hus-
sein and the West continues to be vital in the
anti-Western attitudes of the people in that
region. The Gulf War left a ‘Saddam Hussein
legacy’ now mixed with the thriving politiciza-
tion of religion resulting in political Islam.
I attempt to add to the political analysis of the
observed anti-Western attitudes of Islamic fun-
damentalists. In this further background analysis
I touch upon the crisis of meaning growing from
the exposure of the world of Islam to the socio-
cultural set-up of cultural modernity. In concrete
political terms, the rise of political Islam leads to
an increasing cultural fragmentation in terms of
a decline in consensus and also to the diffusion
of power in world politics. In the Middle East
itself, religious fundamentalism is the greatest
destabilizing challenge to the existing order of
nation-states in the region. The ideology of the
‘Islamic State’ is the framework for the de-legit-
imization of the existing secular states in the
Middle East. In my view, a proper interpretation
of Islam is compatible with democracy and
human rights and thus draws clear lines
between Islam, as a religion, and the abuse of
this very religion for developing an ideology
named political Islam. In rejecting Western uni-
versalism I base my plea on cross-cultural
grounds for averting a clash of civilizations. This
clash is in fact between fundamentalist ideolo-
gies, not between the civilizations themselves.
The book clearly displays the great diversity and
deep strife within the world of Islam, where the
major political movements can be identified as
an expression of religious fundamentalism. The
conclusion is that the claim to establish an alter-
native world order results in creating only disor-
der. Thus the challenge of fundamentalism is a
challenge of disorder and disarray.♦
Dr Bassam Tibi is professor of International Relations
at the University of Göttingen, Germany, and the 1998
Robert Bosch Fellow at Harvard University.
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Islam is often portrayed, especially in West-
ern media, as an alien, violent, hostile, and
monolithic religion, whose adherents resem-
ble Osama bin Laden, the Afghan terrorist,
more than Aliya Izetbegovic, the President of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. But the realities of con-
temporary Islam are closer to the latter than
the former. Islam, as I argue, is a religion
shaped both by its own postulates and ethical
demands and by the specific circumstances of
Muslim people in the modern world. The last
two-hundred years have brought many chal-
lenges for Muslims, from colonial subjugation
through sporadic revivalism to elitist reform
movements and, most recently, pervasive
struggles with fundamentalism. During each
period, Muslims have had to address internal
tensions, as well as external threats. Today’s
Muslims are mostly Asian and non-Arab, with
Muslim women assuming increasingly greater
prominence, in Asian countries from Iran to
Indonesia. My book calls attention to the
region-specific features of Southeast Asia, and
to the new developments in Malaysia which
put Islam and corporate culture as a higher pri-
ority than Islam and cultural combat. Only by
looking at the entire spectrum of contempo-
rary Muslim societies can we avoid the pitfalls
of stereotyping and falsification, such as beset
V.S. Naipaul in his tragic travelogue, ‘Beyond
Belief’. The realities of Muslim life and the
hopes of modern-day Muslims far exceed the
slanderous muckraking of headline journalists
and falsetto novelists alike. ♦
Dr Bruce B. Lawrence is professor of Islamic Studies
and Chair of the Department of Religion at Duke
U n i v e r s i t y .
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Sub-S aha r an Af r i ca
MSH,  F r anc e Islam Tropical Project 
and research experience, the co-ordinators
liaised with the publications division of the
CNRS and the MSH, to bring out a bi-lingual
(French and English) specialized annual issue on
‘Islam et sociétés au sud du Sahara’, of which
volume 12 is currently under preparation. The
journal publishes material on both the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries on Islamic
trends and phenomena as well as the transmis-
sion of Islamic knowledge in the countries south
of the Sahara.
It has recently been decided that the journal,
which by 1992 had gained a respectable circula-
tion and prestige, henceforth be published
under the collaborative aegis of the MSH, Paris;
the Institut d’Histoire Comparée des Civilisa-
tions (IHCC), Aix-en-Provence and the Institut
de Recherche sur le Monde Arabe et Musulman
(IREMAM), Aix-en-Provence.
In addition, Ousman Kane and Jean-Louis Tri-
aud have taken the initiative to publish some of
the articles dating from the origin of the journal
in a new form: with a fresh introductory chapter
and incorporating new data. Their aim is to
make this publication, with its documentation
and analyses on contemporary African Muslims,
accessible to a larger audience. The book, joint-
ly published by IREMAM, Aix-en-Provence, and
Karthala and MSH, Paris, entitled ‘Islam et
islamisme au sud du Sahara’ is currently in press.
C o l l a b o r a t i o n
In the beginning, the project was largely
characterized by the predominance of histori-
ans. With the inclusion of sociologists and
R e s e a r c h
From 1982-’92, this programme functioned in
synergy with the weekly seminar on ‘Islam and
societies south of the Sahara’ of the M.Phil pro-
gramme on the History of Africa of the Universi-
ties of Paris I and II. These were largely conduct-
ed by Henri Moniot of the University of Paris VII,
Jean-Louis Triaud who at the time was also
attached to the University of Paris VII, Constant
Hamès of the CNRS and Ousmane Kane of the
Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques
( F N S P ) .
After the nominations, in 1992, of Jean-Louis
Triaud to the University of Provence, Aix I, and
Ousmane Kane to the University of Saint-Louis
in Senegal, fresh guidelines for conducting
workshops and conferences and publications
were formulated. Most of the members within
the international framework of the project were
to participate in a quadrennial programme on
Islam under colonial domination in French
Africa. This programme was co-convened by
David Robinson and Jean-Louis Triaud, and
received financial aid from the National Endow-
ment for the Humanities in Washington. A
workshop on this was convened in July 1993 at
the Maison Suger under the auspices of the
MSH. The first of its two international confer-
ences was held in Aix-en-Provence in Septem-
ber 1994, and the second in 1995. The outcome
was the publication of ‘Le temps des
marabouts: Itinéraires et stratégies islamiques
en Afrique occidentale (1880-1960)’ (Paris,
Karthala, 583 pages) in 1997.
As far as publications are concerened, pooling
together their international collaborative efforts
The principal co-ordinators of the Islam Trop-
ical project are Louis Brenner of the School of
Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) London;
Constant Hamès of the Centre national des
Recherches Scientifiques (CNRS); Ousmane
Kane of the University of Saint-Louis, Senegal;
David Robinson of the Department of History,
Michigan State University; and Jean-Louis Tri-
aud of the University of Provence, Aix I.
Under the rubrique of this programme,
scholars from abroad have been invited, and
specialized seminars have been organized
around their visits to facilitate research and
exchange of ideas.
political scientists within the framwork, con-
temporary issues in the study of Islam have
also provided new impetus for research. 
Many members of the project collaborate
with the Programme de Recherches Interdis-
ciplinaires (PRI) of the CNRS-EHESS entitled
‘La transmission du savoir dans le monde
musulman périphérique’; as well as with a
research group, financed by the CNRS, MSH,
EHESS and the Institut Français de Recherche
Scientifique pour le Développement en
Coopération (formerly known as ORSTOM),
tracing the life and work of the Senegalese
historian Musa Kamara. ♦
Director: Professor Jean-Louis Triaud
Départment d’Histoire
Université de Provence
29 Avenue Robert Schuman
13621 Aix-en-Provence Cédex
F r a n c e
Telephone: (33-4) 42 95 32 76 
Telefax: (33-4) 42 20 89 39
E-mail: jlt@newsup.univ-mrs.fr
Islamic Area
Studies P r o j e c t
Research Aims
This project aims to create a new field which
we call ‘Islamic Area Studies’. Its specific objec-
tives are threefold.
(a) Development of new methods
i nI s l a m i c Area Studies
The term ‘Islamic World’ is often used to refer
only to the regions of the Middle East; however,
we know well that Islam as a religion and a civi-
lization has spread beyond the Middle East to
Central and Southeast Asia in the East and the
Balkans and Africa in the West. Furthermore,
Muslims now form important social groups with-
in contemporary Western societies, as well as in
China and Japan. This means that regions with
close ties to Islam now encompass the world.
When examining communities where Mus-
lims reside, we find both symbiotic relation-
ships with other peoples and serious prob-
lems, such as ethnic strife, interregional con-
flict, population explosion, and destruction of
the environment. For example, Muslims are
today deeply involved in the Bosnian conflict,
the civil war in Afghanistan, ‘the new ethnic
question’ in the European Union, and the
struggle for human rights in the United States.
Therefore, we may say that social, political and
economic trends in the Islamic world will defi-
nitely determine the development of world
civilization in the twenty-first century, making
it necessary for non-Muslim peoples to take
positive steps towards the better understand-
ing of Islamic history, ideas and contemporary
s i t u a t i o n .
(b) Development of a computerized informa-
tion system suitable for Islamic Area Studies
Up until now, Islamic Studies have not
always made sufficient use of computers,
chiefly because of the many character systems
involved and because there was little connec-
tion between this kind of research and the
applicable technical fields. This Project plans
to continue the development of databases in
languages which use non-Roman characters
such as Arabic, Persian, Urdu and Malay and
develop methods to apply computer technolo-
gy to Area Studies.
(c) Assisting Young Researchers
In recent times the rapid development of
Islamic Studies in Japan has been quite
remarkable, however on a global scale the
shortage of researchers and accumulated
research is undeniable. Considering the impor-
tance of the Islamic world will have in the
twenty-first century, I feel it is necessary to do
all we can to assist the next generation of
young researchers and support their participa-
tion in an international network.
Basic Plan of Implementation
As mentioned before, the areas covered by
Islamic Area Studies are not limited to the
Middle East and should be flexibly deter-
mined based on the character of the themes
studied. Although we must remember that
there are many ways to view Area Studies, it is
generally agreed that it is the synthesis of the
results of basic research in various disciplines
such as Political Science, Economics, Social
Studies, Anthropology, History, Geography,
Religious Studies, Literature, Linguistics,
International Relations, and Urban Engineer-
i n g .
While realizing that one of the objectives of
Area Studies is the understanding of the con-
temporary world, I believe that it is better to
initially conduct research within the various
disciplines and then synthesize them. The
notion that the deciphering of one scroll of
ancient writing is closely connected to the
understanding of the civilization of the area is
important. What is demanded of the six
research units, of the thirteen smaller groups
under them, and of the Project as a whole is
the active effort to synthesize research from
various disciplines.
Research conducted in this project is open
to researchers and specialists both in Japan
and all over the world. Each group is made up
of five or six members (rotating every few
years), but the research will not be carried out
by these members alone. The group members
are responsible for bringing in researchers
other than group members, especially
younger researchers to participate in the
planning and conducting of research. We are
hoping that those with an interest in this pro-
ject will actively plan, conduct and present
the results of their research.
We have the Islamic Area Studies newsletter
which is published in both Japanese and Eng-
lish. In the sphere of international conferences
and workshops, we recently organized a con-
ference on the ‘Slave Elites in the Middle East
and Africa: A Comparative Study’ at the Insti-
tute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo, in
October 1998. Details of forthcoming work-
shops and conferences can be found else-
where in this newsletter.
The success of this project will be closely tied
to having a wide range of researchers and spe-
cialists freely participate in the project. We
hope that those interested will frequently con-
tact the Project Management Unit, the main
research units and the research groups by e-
mail, fax, letters and so on. The purpose of the
Islamic Area Studies Project is, with the coop-
eration of many researchers from both within
the Project and outside of it, to create a sub-
stantive body of knowledge for the under-
standing of the Islamic world. ♦
Sato Tsugitaka is Project Leader of the project
Address: Islamic Area Studies Project
International Exchange
Project Management Office




Telephone: ((81-3) 5684 3285
Telefax: (81-3) 5684 3279
E-mail: i-inr@l.u-tokyo.ac.jp
The Japanese Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and
Culture commissioned this area study entitled Islamic
Area Studies to collect information and create a com-
puterized information system in order to better our
understanding of the Islamic world. Beginning in April
1997, it will continue for five years, until the spring of
2002. Herein, I would like to explain the aims, content
and basic plan of action of the project and express my
hope that many people will participate actively in it.
The programme ‘Islam Tropical’ of the Maison des
Sciences de l’Homme (MSH) was set up to facilitate
international co-operation and exchange between Eng-
lish and French-speaking African, European and Ameri-
can scholars for the development of research on Islam in
the countries south of the Sahara. Conceived of, at an
international round table discussion held in Paris in
December 1983, by leading specialists on sub-Saharian
Islam drawn from the three continents, it was only by
the end of the 1980’s that the programme was included
in the general research programme of the Ministry of
Research on what is termed in French as ‘Islam périphé-
rique’. Discussed in the journal ‘Islam Tropical’ pub-
lished by the MSH, the project received its final go-
ahead when its chief French representative, Jean-Louis
Triaud was nominated to his post at the University of
Provence, Aix I in 1992. This laid the foundation for the
collaboration between the MSH and the researchers on
this project.
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Widening the sphere of involvement in these
discussions, in the summer of 1996 the Insti-
tute contacted faculty at other universities in
the nation about a possible research initiative
at HRI. The number of responses received and
the comments they contained confirmed that
there is a real need for such an undertaking.
HRI’s next step was to hold an interdisciplinary
forum on the topic, in November 1996. The
attendees recognized that sometimes even on
the same campus scholars are isolated from
colleagues working on similar issues, so that
Middle Eastern scholars may well be ignorant
of Africanists or Asian specialists working on
Muslim-based research problems. They all
agreed that the tendency toward separation
and fragmentation which exists on the depart-
mental and disciplinary levels among Islamic
specialists should be overcome, particularly for
a research initiative. They emphasized the pos-
itive effect that interdisciplinary research on
the topic would ultimately have on curricula
and the classroom. They also stated the need
to have disciplinary configurations reflect
shifts in student populations that have
occurred as a result of Muslim immigrations in
recent decades. By the end of the day-long
meeting the broad structure and general
research themes of the multi-year research ini-
tiative were established.
In the spring of 1997, the Institute applied to
and received a grant from the Office of the
President of the UC system for seed funding in
order to launch the multi-year initiative. We
are in discussion with several private founda-
tions about possible funding for the projects
that will take place next year. Planning discus-
sions for the second project of the initiative
took place at HRI last spring, attended by Pro-
fessors Leonard and O’Brien, several members
of the initiative’s special Advisory Council, and
several other professors (Georges Sabagh,
UCLA; Mehdi Borzorgmehr, CUNY) interested
in the initiative as a whole.
Mission of the University of
California Humanities Research
Institute (HRI)
The principal purpose of the UC Humanities
Research Institute is to provide a centre for col-
laborative, interdisciplinary research in the
humanities among the scholars of the nine
campuses of the University of California sys-
tem and their national and international col-
leagues. Research conducted at the Institute
usually requires the participation of scholars in
humanities and social sciences disciplines, and
may often require the participation of special-
ists in the sciences. 
The Challenge of the Topic and
the Goals of the Research
Initiative on Islam and Muslims
The intellectual goal of this project is to
improve our understanding of Islam and Mus-
lims in the United States and throughout the
world by examining the religion and its diverse
expressions and practices; the global politics
of Islamic movements; the ethnic and national
identities of Muslims; the importance of gen-
der and citizenship issues, feminism, and fami-
ly structures in various settings; the relation-
ship between regional expressions and a glob-
al market economy, and a particular scrutiny of
the development of Muslim communities in
North America. The study’s pragmatic goals
are to produce and disseminate knowledge
concerning these questions and issues. This
will be accomplished through the publication
of research findings, as well as through schol-
arly conferences, symposia, and colloquia.
Organizational Structure of the
Research Initiative
Three core groups of scholars are construct-
ing the studies and, in order to ensure mean-
ingful and objective guidance for the overall
project and crucial periodic reviews of
progress, an Advisory Council of preeminent
Islamicists has been formed. Research will
comprise three broad clusters of themes. Each
cluster will be addressed by a separate
research group in residence at different times
at the Institute. A series of workshops for mem-
bers of all three groups will take place at the
Institute during the initiative so that the initia-
tive may be truly comprehensive in its
approach and conclusions.
Project Participants
Each of these residencies will include schol-
ars working across a variety of disciplines in
the Middle East, Europe, South Asia, the Pacific,
and the Americas. Working together in resi-
dency is crucial because, although historians,
anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists,
political scientists, literary theorists, religious
scholars, historians, art historians, and others
have investigated these questions, many have
not had the opportunity to draw their findings
together in the intensely collaborative and
highly focused forum that a residential
research group provides. Every indication from
our planning an development is that the value
added by collaboration will allow for new find-
ings and new contributions to research devel-
opment and policy formation. Members of
Muslim communities will be visiting partici-
pants over the course of this initiative.
Residential Research Group I:
Academic Year 1998-99. Gender
and Citizenship in Muslim
C o m m u n i t i e s
The role of Muslim women in the family and
the community will figure prominently in the
study. One of the projects will take as its point
of departure the question of how women con-
stitute themselves — as subjects and as citi-
zens— in their social and political communi-
ties. Citizenship and related legal and property
issues will constitute the core concern of this
gendered approach. Issues that stem from cer-
tain religious concepts and which relate to the
traditional roles and civil rights of women will
be examined in light of current Islamic feminist
activism. Scholars will look into the impact of
the globalization of women’s movements as
well as of human rights and cultural move-
ments. This residency will also examine related
NGO movements, and the competitiveness
between NGO’s and nation states. The roles of
women’s advisory groups, and how they often
work through children’s advocacy groups, will
figure in this residency. The convener (project
director) of this research group is Suad Joseph,
Anthropology, UC Davis, and other scholars
are drawn from the University of California sys-
tem. Outside participants will be drawn from
the local Muslim community.
Residential Research Group II:
Academic Year 1999-2000.
Muslim Identities in North
A m e r i c a .
This residential group will focus on Muslims
in North America, especially the United States
and Canada. Islam is a fast-growing religion in
the U.S., poised to displace Judaism and
become second only to Christianity in the
number of its adherents. This study will exam-
ine directions that Muslims are taking in North
America. Scholars will look at how leaders of
Islam conceptualize the new communities in
North America, and how do they work towards
integration in a democratic system. This pro-
posal recognizes the diversity within this major
world religion, particularly the diversity among
Muslims in North America as immigrant and
indigenous Muslims from many national,
racial, class, and cultural backgrounds come
together. There are African Americans and
other indigenous converts, and immigrants
from countries as diverse as Lebanon, Egypt,
Iran, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan,
and Bangladesh. Major topics will be the trans-
mission and reformulation of religious beliefs
and behaviours, including gendered practices
and the teaching of Islam in families and insti-
tutions. The convener (project director) is
Karen Leonard, Anthropology, School of Social
Sciences, UC Irvine. A call for applications for
fellowships has been issued to all humanities
and social sciences faculties at the nine univer-
sities of the University of California system.
Scholars from outside the UC system may also
be invited to participate. The group will also
benefit from consultations with leaders and
members of local Muslim communities. 
Residential Research Group III:
Academic Year 1999-2000.
Islamic Modernities in an Era of
Globalization: Discourses,
Movements, and Diasporas
This study will be devoted to global econom-
ic and political perspectives of Islam. Themes
include the Islamic revival, Islam in light of
globalization, and the reactions of Islam to
modernity. At the same time, the increasing
numbers of Muslims in many areas of the
globe, including the United States, call for an
examination of their communities, their ties to
each other and to Islam, and how their pres-
ence fits into or is a part of the larger societies
in which they are minorities, as well as atten-
tion to those areas in the Middle East and
South Asia where they are majority popula-
tions. The impact of Islam on the global econo-
my is a subject of utmost importance, and
scholars have debated for many years whether
Islam is consistent with the logic of market
economy. In addition, this study will look into
Muslim immigrations and the movement of
migrant workers back and forth across nation-
al boundaries. The electronic connections link-
ing local communities – and, in fact, creating
virtual ‘cyber communities’ which are much
larger than the local communities will be stud-
ied. This project will also explore challenges to
and opportunities for these communities to
coexist and to integrate themselves in to the
societies in which they find themselves. The
convener of this research group is Paul M.
Lubeck, Sociology, UC Santa Cruz. The other
scholars who will participate in this study will
be selected by April, 1999. A call for applica-
tions for fellowships has been issued to all
humanities and social sciences faculties at the
nine universities of the University of California
system. Scholars from outside the UC system
may also be invited to participate. ♦
Director: Professor Patricia O’Brien
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This initiative stems from a series of individual meetings
held in 1995-96 between the Director of the Humanities
Research Institute (HRI), Dr Patricia O’Brien, and members
of the humanities and social sciences faculties of the nine
universities of the University of California system. Profes-
sors in different departments often expressed the need
for time in which to examine issues that have risen out of
movements associated with Islam and with Muslim com-
munities which have taken place during the twentieth
century, especially in recent decades. Faculty acknowl-
edged the large body of work that has been done on these
topics, but stressed the need for specialists in the different
fields intersecting them to examine the given issues
together, in a research setting, for an extended period.
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Sub-S aha r an Af r i ca
C A R O L I N E  A N G E N E N T
&  A N N E K E  B R E E D VE L D
On Friday 7 August 1998, the world was horrified by two
bomb attacks on the American embassies in Nairobi and
Dar Es Salaam. Although 250 Kenyan citizens and about
ten Tanzanians were killed in these attacks, the atten-
tion of the world focused mainly on the distress caused
by the deaths of twelve Americans. The perpetrators
were immediately sought among Muslims in the Middle
East. The past of Osama Bin Laden – the suspected mas-
termind behind the attacks – was dredged up and a pos-
sible Dutch connection with international terrorism was
explored in depth. Africa seems to have been no more
than an accidental setting for these attacks, possibly
selected because airport security leaves so much to be
desired. 
Power and
t h e Study of Islam
South of the Sahara
None of the journalists seemed to be even
slightly aware that the coastal regions of these
countries in particular have been part of the
Islamic world for centuries, with trade contacts
dating from pre-Islamic times and a multitude of
slave expeditions that made Zanzibar notorious
as a transit port. This is why it is remarkable that
no one in the media asked whether ‘the army for
the liberation of Islamic holy places’ might not
possibly be a local organization – all the more so
since at the beginning of this year there were
demonstrations in Dar Es Salaam ‘against Chris-
tianity’ organized by groups of radical Muslims.
The Tanzanian government reproached the rad-
ical groups for their lack of religious tolerance
and gave the police permission to use violence
to put an end to the demonstrations (Marc de
Meij, personal communication). Yet there are
two reasons why even radical East African Mus-
lim organizations are an improbable source from
which to expect anti-American terrorism. These
Muslim organizations are financially supported
by countries such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait,
which are pro-American in inclination. Generally
speaking, religious tolerance does indeed
appear to be an important aspect of religious life
in Africa to the south of the Sahara.
In this article, we shall restrict ourselves to
Dutch studies of Islam south of the Sahara since
for years scientists have treated this desert as a
dividing line. However, this geographical
boundary is of doubtful value – after all, no one
knows where ‘North Africa’ stops and ‘south of
the Sahara’ begins. Certainly, as far as Islam is
concerned, the Sahara cannot be called an
absolute boundary. However, because of this
self-imposed division, differences in the choice
of subject matter in science can be observed
between the two areas. Generally, in North
Africa, Islam is the primary study theme and
‘unorthodox’ local forms of expressing Islam
(trance dancing, worship of saints, festivals, sufi
brotherhoods) are often described. On the other
hand, studies of Islam south of the Sahara are
often linked to describing an ethnic group. A
researcher will only focus attention on Islam if
this religion is important to the group studied. In
the Netherlands, the religion itself is seldom the
primary study theme and here the religious tol-
erance mentioned above is probably to blame.
South of the Sahara it is not uncommon to find
followers of a traditional religion, Islam and
Christianity within one family. Religious sectari-
anism seems to be absent, or still in its infancy,
and religious organizations also succeed in
recruiting large numbers of followers by peace-
ful means.
With reference to this religious tolerance,
Mazrui (1998) has stated that in this part of the
world, religious observance only leads to conflict
if it coincides with ethnic dividing lines. Within
some ‘mono-religious’ Islamic communities,
conflicts also take place along ethnic lines. The
violence in Algeria, for example, has partly to do
with an enforced process of Arabization aimed
against the language and culture of the Berbers.
The same process of Arabization in Mauritania
has led to the resistance (and an exodus) of non-
Arabic-speaking population groups from the
south of the country. As early as 1990, Buijten-
huis observed that this Arabic imperialism was a
major cause of the hotbeds in the Sahel area and
in the Horn of Africa. Arab imperialism from
Libya led to problems in Chad; in the Sudan, the
Muslim/Arabic cultural domination comes from
the north of the country.
Yet it would still be unjust to associate the
spread of Islam in Africa only with violence. It is
true that a number of jihads took place in the
19th century – particularly in West Africa – but in
the vast majority of cases the spread of Islam,
which had already crossed the Sahara in the 9th
century, took place in a peaceful manner via
wandering clerics and trading contacts. Even
today, large numbers of people convert to Islam
of their own free will. One of the reasons for this
conversion put forward in Dutch studies is that,
in some areas, trade is entirely in the hands of
Muslims. Conversion to Islam makes access to
this commercial network easier or is possibly
even a precondition (Schilder 1994).
But economic power often goes hand in hand
with political power. For example, the Touareg,
who have played an important part in the dis-
semination of Islam in the Sahel, succeeded in
monopolizing particular trans-Saharan trading
routes at one time. The colonial powers were
only too willing to make use of such local Islamic
power-brokers. In Senegal, where the
marabouts (spiritual leaders) had a great deal of
influence on the local population, they were
appointed by the French as intermediaries south
of the Sahara in their consultations with the tra-
ditional leaders. The marabouts then urged the
population to go over to cultivating groundnuts,
an important export product for the French. The
relationship of mutual interdependence
between the political leaders and the marabouts
to which this gave rise also established the rela-
tionship between State and politics in present-
day Senegal (Angenent & de Bruijn 1990:8).
These religious-political balances of power have
been dealt with exhaustively in Dutch studies of
Islam south of the Sahara (see also Van der Drift
1986, Hesseling 1985).
The balance of power between man and
woman is also dealt with regularly in Dutch stud-
ies of Islam. Nowadays, the active role of the
woman outside the house in Africa seems to be
at odds with her protective, domestic position,
as propagated by certain movements within
Islam. In many agricultural communities in
Africa, the woman is the primary worker of the
land and the income derived from the sale of her
crops plays an important role in keeping the
household going economically. Within nomadic
Muslim groups that live from animal husbandry,
the grandmothers of today still recall how they
used to trek with their animals and go to the vil-
lages to trade their milk surplus.
However, particularly in sedentary urban Mus-
lim communities, the Muslim woman’s place has
become increasingly domestic. Women and
men have thus been allocated a different role in
the household, in which the position of the
woman seems to have changed most and has
thus received the more attention in literature.
Bartels (1993) associates the introduction of
female circumcision among the Balante in Sene-
gal and infibulation in Sudan with a change in
the balance of power between the sexes. How-
ever, that the precepts of Islam always work out
to the disadvantage of the woman is too one-
sided. Van Santen (1998) shows that Mafa
women certainly become better off when they
convert to Islam because this religion assigns a
better position to women with regard to rights
of inheritance than does the Mafa religion. In the
north of Cameroon, town-dwelling Fulbe
women, who saw themselves being confined to
their home, applied themselves to singing the
praises of the Prophet and composing religious
poetry (Haafkens 1983). They not only com-
posed, but also learned old texts by heart – by
such writers as Usman Dan Fodio, the founder of
the Sokoto kingdom – and thus ensured the tra-
dition of their (Islamic) history.
So the literary world of Islam in Africa is not
restricted to the reciting of verses from the Ara-
bic Koran. In many Muslim communities, there is
a great wealth of spoken and written texts in
African languages. These texts often have a reli-
gious content but not always. A poem may deal
with the building of a dhow – the sailing boat
that plays such an important part in the trade-
links between East Africa and the south coast of
Asia (Miehe & Schadeberg 1979). These texts are
not only studied for their literary value; anthro-
pology also draws on texts of a religious nature.
Mommersteeg (1996) exhaustively analyses the
(secret) techniques of marabouts who, for exam-
ple, write texts from the Koran on wooden writ-
ing boards, after which the text is washed off
and the water used to invoke certain blessings –
a cure, for instance. This process has also found
its way into (anthropological) films (Van Rou-
veroy van Nieuwaal & Van Rouveroy van
Nieuwaal 1974). Another important literary
genre is the so-called ‘taariki’ – the history of the
conversion of one’s own community. It so hap-
pens that many Muslim communities derive sta-
tus from the fact that they became Muslims
before other surrounding groups (Breedveld &
Angenent 1997). So people in Africa are often
not just nominally Muslim – this religion clearly
plays a role in their daily social lives. Various
anthropologists have studied how local customs
have, or have not, endured the confrontation
with comparable Muslim institutionalized social
habits, such as the zakat (De Bruijn 1994, Van
Hoven 1996).
Perhaps it was the result of coincidence or was
due to the extreme tenacity of some passionate
researchers that in the Netherlands so much
attention has been devoted to the Islamic archi-
tecture in Mali, particularly in the city of Djenne
(Bedaux & Van der Waals 1994, Maas & Mommer-
steeg 1992). This study, carried out at various sci-
entific institutes in the Netherlands and abroad,
by archaeological, anthropological and architec-
tural researchers, has led to the renowned exhi-
bition about Djenne at the Rijksmuseum voor
Volkenkunde (National Museum of Ethnology) in
Leiden, which was later exhibited in Bamako, the
capital of Mali. Actually, this is a classic example
of how science can be spectacular in a small
country, namely by not stopping at disciplinary
boundaries or at North-South boundaries. Coop-
eration with researchers from Mali itself has also
made a great contribution to the success of this
study. Future Dutch research into Islam in Africa
will be helped considerably if it endeavours to
have the same unbounded, multidisciplinary
and global character.♦
Drs Caroline Angenent is a PhD researcher at
the Leiden Institute for the Study of Religion,
Leiden University.
Dr Anneke Breedveld is a researcher at the African
Studies Centre and at African Linguistics,
Leiden University.
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The aim of this Guide, compiled by Ruud Strijp, is to
offer a comprehensive survey of research on Islam and
Muslim societies as it has been conducted over the last
decade or so by scholars in the Netherlands as well as by
Dutch scholars abroad. The initiative was taken by the
International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Mod-
ern World (ISIM) in Leiden. 
A Guide to Recent
Dutch Research
on Islam and
M u s l i m S o c i e t i e s
ly influenced by or related to the study of Islam.
The Guide begins by presenting an alphabeti-
cal list of the persons included. It informs the
reader of their disciplinary backgrounds, their
positions, and their main topics and regional
interests. Besides this some major and/or
recent publications are listed if appropriate to
the context, their PhD thesis or the subject of
their PhD research is mentioned. In addition to
the alphabetical list, the Guide contains a Geo-
graphical Index and a Subject Index.
The Guide contains the names of more than
250 persons, both Dutchmen and foreigners in
the Netherlands and Dutchmen abroad. The
majority has conducted scientific research on
and published about Islam – actually, the main
criterion for the inclusion of individuals in the
Guide was the existence of publications based
on academic research. In addition, a number of
persons have been included whose research
and writings about Muslim societies and Mus-
lim communities can be considered to be close-
The picture emerging from this Guide is that
of an expanding and increasingly productive
Dutch academic community. Islam and Muslim
societies and communities are studied by rep-
resentatives of various disciplines, such as lin-
guistics, theology, law, history and, increasing-
ly, cultural anthropology. As might be expect-
ed, their topical and geographical interests vary
widely and cover various historical periods. ♦
For a copy of this Guide, please contact the ISIM office.
A D V E R T I S E M E N T
I s l a mic  Wo r l d /  Ge ner a l
E K K E H A R D  R U DO L P H
In 1996 the Institute for Advanced Study
(Wissenschaftskolleg) in Berlin launched the
initiative to survey contemporary German
research on Islam and Muslim societies, past
and present.
The project emerged from the discussions
of the Working Group Modernity and Islam,
uniting scholars mostly from the two Berlin
universities (Freie and Humboldt University),
the German Orient Institute (Deutsches Orient-
Institut) in Hamburg, and fellow researchers
from Islamic countries.
The survey is generally intended to analyse
the state of the art in all studies on the Mid-
dle East and the whole Islamic world at Ger-
man universities and outside research insti-
tutions. Supported by the Federal Ministry of
Education and Science (BMBF) the survey
had to identify the crucial problems and
lacunae in the content and structure of rele-
vant research. Finally it was to put forward
precise recommendations to the responsible
bodies of the German Länder (states) and the
Federal Government as a means to strength-
en its future promotion.
The ambitious study was executed during
1997 as a project of the German Orient Insti-
tute in Hamburg. Questionnaires of more
than 300 scholars and researchers at about
60 institutions were analysed, forming the
nucleus of the survey. In addition, the pro-
ject coordinator conducted personal inter-
views with a number of scholars to gain a
vivid picture of the current situation.
By summarizing all related topics of
research, including both historical and textual
studies, as well as sociological contributions
(for example on migration and European
Islam), the project surpassed former surveys
which merely pointed either to historical or
contemporary research (cf. Denkschrift Orien-
talistik, Wiesbaden 1960; Gegenwartsbezo-
gene Orientforschung in Deutschland, Göttin-
gen 1974).
This comprehensive approach pays tribute
to the growing mergence of social and cultur -
al sciences in regard to methodology. This ten-
dency can best be illustrated by several multi -
lateral research projects on the transformation
of societies in their turn towards modernity in
different parts of the Islamic world (cf. Gradu-
ate Colleges, Collaborative Research Centres).
The relevance of the interdisciplinary research
to comparative studies in international and
intercultural relations needs to be further
emphasized.
The first part of the draft study is an
overview of the main subjects of research in
the study of languages, literature, history and
religion in the Islamic world as well as in
regional geography, anthropology, political
and economic sciences. The second part in the
study is aimed at the institutional structures of
research in Germany including the situation
and development of academic staff. Subse-
quent chapters are devoted to a description of
German scientific societies, special libraries
and documentation services, and last but not
least to the funding of research and the per-
spectives of international cooperation. The
annex provides detailed information about
relevant institutions, scholars, addresses, spe-
cial publications and periodicals.
Following a series of consultations and dis-
cussions over recent months, the survey will
be published before long.
Dr Ekkehard Rudolph is coordinator of
t h eI s l a m i c Studies Project, Hamburg.
For information please contact:
Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin
Arbeitskreis Moderne und Islam
Fax: +49-30-89001-200
e-mail: meiering@wiko-berlin.de
F o r t h c o m i n g
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I s l ami c  Wo r ld  /  Gene r al
K N U T  V I K Ø R
While it may seem surprising that the far-off countries
of the North have developed research interest in the
Islamic world, a region they have had no colonial or sim-
ilar relations with, such studies have in fact a long tradi-
tion in the Nordic countries. While we need not go back
to the medieval Viking contact with the inner Mediter-
ranean and the Arab world, both Denmark and Sweden
had relations with various Middle Eastern powers from
the seventeenth century onwards. Denmark, a maritime
power, traded in Moroccan and other ports in North
Africa, while Swedish forces in Central Europe came into
direct military confrontation with the Ottoman Empire,
to which they were allied for a period. Thus, there is lit-
tle reason to wonder that the universities in the region
developed a Middle Eastern interest. 
Research on Islam in
the Nordic Countries
Arabic was studied and taught in Copen-
hagen, Uppsala and Lund already from the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries, and in 1760,
the Danish expedition led by Carsten Niebuhr
made a notable contribution to Western
knowledge of the Arab peninsula. When the
first university in Finland, then under Swedish
rule, was established in Turku in 1640, even
this distant institution was given a chair in Ara-
bic. Norway, the fourth of the Nordic countries,
developed this interest only later but can take
pride in the fact that Carl Caspari’s A r a b i s c h e
G r a m m a t i k, still one of the major authorities on
Arabic grammar, was completed in Oslo (then
Christiania) in 1848. 
There is thus no novelty in the study of Mid-
dle Eastern societies and cultures in the four
countries. (The fifth Nordic country, Iceland,
still has to develop this area of research.) In
particular over the last two decades, the field
has expanded tremendously, through the
extension of traditional subjects as philology
and religious studies, as well as through the
development of Middle Eastern research in his-
tory and the social sciences. Thus, most univer-
sities in the Nordic countries have some inter-
est in the Middle East. About ten of them offer
regular courses on the subject. They include
the traditional centres of Uppsala, Lund,
Helsinki and Copenhagen, as well as Oslo,
Gothenburg, Stockholm and younger centres
as Århus, Bergen and Odense. Research inter-
ests are varied in all institutions, but there is
clearly a tendency for the more established
centres to have a continuing tradition in philo-
logical and classical studies, while the younger
universities have greater emphasis on social
sciences and the modern period. 
Arabic is currently being taught in nine of
these institutions; Oslo and Bergen in Norway,
Copenhagen and Odense in Denmark, Helsinki
in Finland and four universities, Uppsala,
Stockholm, Gothenburg and Lund in Sweden.
However, only Uppsala, Copenhagen and Oslo
have courses in Iranian languages, and the
same three in Turkish. The teaching of Hebrew
and other Semitic studies have long traditions,
in particular in those universities with a tradi-
tion of theology. All institutions teach Islamic
or religious studies in some form, while the his-
tory of the Middle East is taught as a specific
subject only in Bergen; Copenhagen and Lund,
among others, also have research in Middle
Eastern history. 
In terms of research, the same dual pattern
can be found. All universities have research in
the main areas of Middle Eastern and Islamic
studies, but certain fields are stronger in par-
ticular milieus. Looking at the four countries
one by one, we will find that in Finland, the
largest centre is at the University of Helsinki,
which has a very strong focus on Ancient Near
Eastern studies. In the Islamic and modern
area, Helsinki has a long tradition of philologi-
cal and linguistic research, now being contin-
ued by Heikki Palva and his studies of Bedouin
dialectology, in particular in Jordan. Among
the younger scholars, an interest in both classi-
cal and modern Islam is developing, thus
Helsinki is planning to hold a conference on
Sufi studies in the near future. Helsinki is also
developing relations with colleagues in nearby
St. Petersburg.
The second large and very dynamic centre in
Finland is that of Tampere, which is specializ-
ing on the modern political history of the
Maghreb. This is constituted by a group of
young scholars around Tuomo Melasuo, who is
working on Algeria in the late colonial and
post-colonial period. This milieu has grown in
close collaboration with research centres in
Europe and the Maghreb. The same is the case
for the smaller group at the University of Joen-
suu, where M’hammed Sabour is developing
very active research in the field of sociology. 
Sweden is the largest of the Nordic coun-
tries, and also has the largest number of schol-
ars in this field. Uppsala has a long and distin-
guished history in Semitic and Islamic studies.
This approach continues to dominate the Upp-
sala research environment, which has the most
extensive philological studies both in Arabic
and other Middle Eastern languages. Another
very clear distinction between Sweden and
other Nordic countries is the close relation
between Islamic studies and the field of theol-
ogy, which has traditionally been open to the
non-partisan study of all religions. This has
recently manifested itself in the now-vacated
Swedish Church of Alexandria, which has been
transformed into a Swedish centre for Middle
Eastern studies in Egypt (details are yet to be
settled). The dominant figures in Uppsala may
be too many to mention, but Tryggve Kron-
holm holds the chair in Arabic studies and has
among other topics been working on Arabic
literary history; while Bo Utas is a key figure in
studies of Iranian languages and literature, not
least in his studies in Persian Sufism.
The University of Lund has a tradition of Mid-
dle Eastern scholarship of equal depth to that
of Uppsala, and is second to it in size. While it
shares Uppsala’s interest in philology, an
active group of young scholars, organized by
Jan Hjärpe, have started to focus on the ideas
and social context of modern Islamic move-
ments, both in Sweden and Europe, as well as
in various countries of the Middle East. 
Gothenburg University seems to have
focused more on the contemporary Islamic
world, being the Nordic country with the
largest number of scholars on Middle Eastern
political science as well as contemporary polit-
ical history. Sune Persson is the dominant fig-
ure there. He has written several standard
works on the modern history of the Palestine
conflict and the Middle East.
Stockholm University has a research interest
in Arabic language and literature, the chair in
Arabic there was until recently held by Kerstin
Eksell. She has, however, recently taken over a
post in Copenhagen. Stockholm also has some
research in various social sciences of the Mid-
dle East. Individual scholars on the Middle East
are also employed at other smaller universities
in Sweden, such as Linköping and Umeå.
In Denmark, the classical tradition is pre-
served by the University of Copenhagen,
which also has a continuing tradition in philol-
ogy as well as in ancient Near Eastern studies.
Recently, the internal organization of this latter
has been modified, in that several units of Near
and Middle Eastern studies come under the
umbrella of the Carsten Niebuhr institute of
the University. This covers the traditional
areas, but is also opening up to research more
focused on modern Islamic topics, often in
cooperation with Lund just across the straits in
Sweden. This reorganization is spearheaded by
the historian Jørgen Bæk Simonsen, who has
worked both on medieval and contemporary
Islamic topics. 
The University of Århus, the second largest
Middle East research milieu in Denmark, has
built up a tradition of anthropology at the
Moesgaard institute/museum. A number of
expeditions to Afghanistan have brought this
centre to attention, not least those led by Klaus
Ferdinand. Århus also has other research inter-
ests in the modern Islamic world, both in
anthropology and political science.
The only Danish university with a specific
Centre for Middle Eastern Areas Studies is how-
ever the third one, Odense. This new centre
has focused on contemporary studies, and has
also given emphasis to reach beyond the acad-
emic world. Research on water issues, contem-
porary linguistics and political Islam can be
noted at this centre, which was selected to be
the national coordinating centre for Arabic
teaching in Denmark.
It must also be noted that the Danish State
has taken an important interest in developing
contemporary Middle Eastern studies in Den-
mark. This has led to the establishment of a
Danish Centre in Damascus, as well as the
development of a Middle East network project.
The latter is to last over five years, with a num-
ber of national and international conferences
each year on a variety of subjects, including
conflict resolution, water politics, and others.
The aim of the network, which is run from
Copenhagen, is to develop research especially
among young scholars from all Danish areas.
In Norway, the ‘dividend’ from Norway’s role
in the ‘Oslo process’ has been some national
funding for research on Palestinian/Israeli
issues, but not so as to set a determining mark
on the research milieu. The University of Oslo
carries the national traditions of philological
and linguistic research in all three language
groups. The Arabic milieu has grown up
around Gunvor Mejdell, now supported by the
recent arrival of Michael Carter. Recently, a
research group on current social and political
issues in the Gulf has also developed in Oslo.
The Bergen research environment is, on the
other hand, dominated by history and anthro-
pology. Bergen is unique, not just in Scandi-
navia, but in Europe and beyond, for its very
special focus on and relations with one coun-
try, the Sudan. This spans not only all arts and
social sciences, but even cooperation in medi-
cine, natural sciences and other disciplines as
well, which all have tended to focus coopera-
tion on the Sudan. Beyond the history of the
Sudan – pioneered by Seán O’Fahey – Bergen
has focused on the history of Islamic Africa in
general, and in particular on the documenta-
tion of its sources. In anthropology, the Sudan
interest (started by Fredrik Barth, now in Oslo)
has been matched with a recent interest in the
Turco-Iranian world, initiated by Reidar Grøn-
haug, and most recently research on the Indian
Ocean is growing. Bergen also has a specific
coordinating Centre for Middle Eastern and
Islamic Studies, which i.a. publishes the journal
Sudanic Africa (on the history of Islamic Africa)
and various book series.
It is the custom in non-European studies of
this region to organize on a pan-Nordic basis,
rather than on a purely national one. This is
evidently because the individual national
research environments are comparatively
small, and only on the Nordic level can one
expect the inter-university exchange that larg-
er countries find nationally. Thus, there were,
in the 1970s, common Nordic research centres
established both for Asian studies (in Copen-
hagen) and for African studies (in Uppsala). No
such pan-Nordic institution was set up for the
Middle East, which was thus split between the
two. As the two centres developed, both have
a formal attachment to the Islamic world. But
the Asia centre has decided to focus its atten-
tion on East and Southeast Asia, thus de-
emphasizing their interest in Asia west of the
Indus. The Africa institute is strongly focused
on contemporary issues, and while not formal-
ly restricted to sub-Saharan Africa, evidently
feels a pull in that direction.
To counteract this falling-between-the-cen-
tres, Middle Eastern and Islamic scholars have
organized themselves in a society of scholars,
which has no fixed centre, but is organized
from the Bergen Middle East centre. Its main
objective is information interchange between
scholars in all fields of humanist and social
sciences of the Islamic world and the Middle
East, and holding regular conferences and aca-
demic encounters between scholars in these
fields throughout the four countries. Thus, the
fourth triennial conference of the Society, on
‘Globalization and the Middle East’, was held in
August 1998 in Oslo (after the earlier ones in
Uppsala, Copenhagen and Joensuu). ♦
Dr Knut Vikør is director of the Centre for Middle
Eastern and Islamic Studies, University of Bergen,
and elected secretary of the Nordic Society for
M i d d l e Eastern Studies.
The statistics in this article are based on the
Directory of Middle Eastern Studies in the Nordic
C o u n t r i e s, Bergen 1998, which brings more detail of
the various research topics and geographic areas
covered in the Nordic region. More information on
Nordic countries can be found on the Web, at the
address http://www.hf.uib.no/smi/nsm/
Gent ,  Be lg ium
H E R M A N  D E  L E Y
D i r e c t o r
The presence of Muslims in Europe has always been a his-
torical reality. From the 1960’s, with postwar decoloniza-
tion and the massive immigration of labourers from Mus-
lim countries to Europe, Islam is today, a Western Euro-
pean reality more than ever before. Yet, the persistent
refusal by a significant number of political parties to
grant the right to vote to so-called ‘non-EU citizens’
proves that European perceptions, even in the closing
years of the twentieth century, are still largely dominated
by the nationalist ideologies of the nineteenth century.
The Centre for Islam in E u r o p e
C I E
It is taking into account such sentiments, and
the necessity for Islam to regain its historical
place as a valuable E u r o p e a n tradition and
worldview, which provided the impetus for our
Institute to be set up.
The Centre for Islam in Europe (CIE) in Gent
has been established recently as a largely ‘vol-
untarist’ initiative: ‘voluntarist’ being the term I
would use for an academic engagement which
wishes to respond to pressing social challenges;
in this case, the challenges posed by social
developments concerned with the embedding
of Muslim communities in Western European
societies. To that end, the CIE is an academic
centre for research, education and interaction. It
aims at giving ‘European Islam’ an academic sta-
tus while developing tools for combating
racism. Pursuing the goals of emancipation,
equal rights and pluralism, the CIE is staffed by
Muslims and non-Muslims, representing a wide
variety and broad spectrum of views, traditions
and backgrounds. As an academic centre, the
CIE stands for an interdisciplinary and scientific
approach. It acts independently of all partisan
i n t e r e s t s .
Membership is open to individual researchers,
experts and members of staff. Institutes and
democratic associations are welcome as associ-
ated members.
With the collaboration of academics from all
over Europe, and in close interaction with Mus-
lim organizations and institutions, the aims of
the CIE are:
a. To co-ordinate and disseminate already avail-
able knowledge, skills and information (books,
journals, data bases, etc.) among university
staff and researchers;
b .To mobilize financial resources to conduct
policy-oriented research in support of a more
harmonious institutionalization of Islam in
Western European societies;
c . To build an academic forum for Muslims and
non-Muslims, with the help of publications,
seminars, conferences, courses, training ses-
sions, etc.;
d .To stimulate the Muslim public to enter acad-
emic studies, while demanding public respect
for their Islamic identity;
e . To develop and support proposals for creat-
ing recognized academic degrees in Islamic
sciences and theology.
It is the cherished hope of the CIE that on the
basis of equality with other creeds and different
world views, once Muslim academic graduates
are provided with specific skills and expertise,
they will look after not just their fellow believ-
ers, but other fellow citizens as well. With col-
laboration and positive determination, we hope
that they will contribute positively and decisive-
ly to the realization of a better-integrated and
more harmonious European society. ♦
Dr Han den Heijer is director of the NIAASC, Cairo.
Director: Professor dr H. De Ley
Address: Blandijnberg 2
B-9000 Gent, Belgium
Tel.: +32 9 264 40 251
Fax.: +32 9 264 64 41
E-mail: herman.deley@rug.ac.be
Institutes4 2 I S I M  N E W S L E T T E R  1 / 9 8
Ca i r o,  Eg yp t
H A N  DE N  H E I J E R
D i r e c t o r
The Nederlands Instituut voor Archeologie en Arabische
Studiën in Cairo (NIAASC: Netherlands Institute for
Archaeology and Arabic Studies in Cairo) was founded in
1971 and has since developed into an academic unit rep-
resenting the interests of a number of Dutch and Flemish
institutions with regard to their scholarly activities in the
Middle East, particularly in the Arab Republic of Egypt.
The Netherlands Institute for Archaeology
and Arabic Studies in Cairo
N I A A S C / N V I C
Administration and Staff
The following institutions participate in the
funding and governing of the NIAASC: The Min-
istry of Education, Culture and Science of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands; Leiden University;
Groningen University; The University of Ams-
terdam; The Catholic University of Nijmegen;
Utrecht University; The Catholic University of
Leuven; Gent University.
The participation of the latter two Flemish
universities is funded by the Regional Govern-
ment of Flanders. Locally, the NIAASC is an
institution that has legal recognition under
Egyptian law. All its financial matters are han-
dled in The Netherlands at Leiden University,
whose Office for International Cooperation
administers the institute on behalf of the par-
ticipating institutions.
The NIAASC is governed by a board, which is
chaired by the President of Leiden University.
The other universities are represented by the
Presidents or other members of the respective
University Boards. The board of the NIAASC is
supported by an Advisory Council consisting of
university professors specialized in the various
scholarly disciplines related to the institute’s
a c t i v i t i e s .
Apart from an office supporting staff, the staff
of the NIAASC includes the following perma-
nent positions: director (arabist, Senior Lectur-
er); assistant director, representing the Flemish
participating universities (arabist/islamologist,
Lecturer); staff member (egyptologist, Lecturer);
librarian (arabist, Lecturer).
Moreover, the NIAASC occasionally employs
staff members on a temporary or free-lance
basis, mainly for teaching purposes in the fields
of archaeology and Arabic language training.
Finally, associate research fellows (with exter-
nal funding) and trainees are increasingly
added to the staff.
Because of the significantly increased contri-
bution of the Flemish institutions to the insti-
tute’s activities, its name will be changed
shortly into ‘Nederlands-Vlaams Instituut in
Cairo’ (NVIC: Netherlands-Flemish Institute in
C a i r o ) .
Main Activities
The NIAASC’s main task is to provide practi-
cal assistance to researchers attached to the
participating universities, particularly in
preparing and carrying out fieldwork in Egypt
or elsewhere in the Middle East. This assis-
tance generally includes applications for
research permits, site concessions or entrance
to libraries and archives. Additionally, books
and periodicals are purchased and sent to
Dutch, Flemish and other research units and
individuals upon request. The NIAASC con-
tains a reference library with sections on
Egyptology (focusing on studies related to
archaeological fieldwork) and Arabic studies
(particularly linguistics, literature, Islamic
studies and social and political sciences). In
weekly seminars, open to the public, topics
related to the fields covered by the institute
are presented by resident and visiting schol-
ars of many nationalities. At several occa-
sions, the NIAASC has organized or hosted
conferences or symposia related to its profile.
Recently, the NIAASC has evolved into an
important instrument in undergraduate
teaching of both Arabic language and Egypt-
ian archaeology. Programmes have been
developed which allow students from partic-
ipating universities to pursue their studies in
an Arabic-speaking environment or in close
proximity of relevant archaeological sites,
while fully remaining within their own acade-
mic framework of credit points, timetables,
etc. The NIAASC staff also supervises more
advanced students in their fieldwork for MA
p a p e r s .
The research programme of the NIAASC has
so far been limited to the individual projects
carried out by the academic staff, which gen-
erally also belong to the research clusters of
the participating universities. Recently, how-
ever, a development towards a more exten-
sive research programme has been initiated
by attracting associated research fellows
(mostly doctoral students) whose research
funds derive from outside the institute’s bud-
g e t .
P u b l i c a t i o n s
In the past, the NIAASC has issued two series
of scholarly publications. The NIAASC has pub-
lished five works from 1973 to 1988 by E.J. Brill
(Leiden). In collaboration with Dar Shuhdy
(Cairo), five works were published in Arabic,
mostly translations of studies by Dutch schol-
ars. Presently, a new series is being created: the
Contributions from the Nederlands-Vlaams
Instituut in Cairo will appear within the CNWS
Publications, produced by the Research School
CNWS of Leiden University.
International Contacts
Besides regular exchange with Egyptian and
Arab institutions of research, higher education
and culture, the NIAASC has frequent and mani-
fold contacts with similar institutions represent-
ing European states, the USA, Canada and other
countries, such as the Istituto Italiano di Cultura
(I.I.C.) per la R.A.E. (Arabic and archaeological
section), the Deutsches Archeologisches Institut
Abteilung Kairo, the Institut français d’Archéolo-
gie orientale (IFAO), the Institut Français d’É-
tudes Arabes à Damas (Damascus, Syria), the
Centre Français d’Études Yéménites (Sana’a,
Yemen), the Egypt Exploration Society (Cairo
Office, at the British Council), the Polish Centre
for Mediterranean Archaeology (Cairo), the
American Research Center in Egypt, the Ameri-
can University in Cairo, and the Canadian Insti-
tute in Egypt. Such contacts consist in mutual
practical assistance and attendance of lecture
series and seminars, whereas in some cases col-
laboration is more institutionalized and inten-
s i v e .
With regard to the study of the contemporary
Middle East (and indeed the Muslim world), the
NIAASC’s most important links are those with
several departments of Cairo University (e.g. the
International Relations Department), Al Azhar
University (which regularly sends junior research
fellows to Leiden through the institute’s inter-
mediary), as well as with the universities of Dam-
ascus and Sana'a. Of the utmost importance are
the working contacts with the Centre d’Études et
de Documentation Économique, Juridique et
Sociale (CEDEJ) in Cairo, which has resulted in a
common research project and workshop in the
field of sociology and anthropology of Middle
Eastern law. 
Also worth mentioning on a practical level is
the institute’s active involvement in a newly cre-
ated network of international libraries in Cairo.
NIAASC and ISIM
Since the ISIM was established by four of the
institutions that also participate in the NIAASC
(the Netherlands Ministry of Education, Culture
and Science and the Universities of Amster-
dam, Leiden and Utrecht), it is only logical that
the NIAASC acts as its liaison office in Egypt
and, whenever relevant, in other Middle East-
ern countries. In the past, the institute has
always played a significant part in the partici-
pating institutions’ professional links with
counterparts in the region, including working
contacts for activities involving large parts of
the Muslim world, such as the Indonesian-
Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies
(INIS) project, and the 1996 Leiden Conference
on Islam and the Twenty-first Century. Now
that ISIM is operational, the NIAASC will assist
it locally through various activities such as con-
tacting scholars from Egypt and other Arab
countries, in view of ISIM-related scholarly
activities (e.g., conferences, workshops). Fur-
thermore, NIAASC will advise on the identifica-
tion and selection of students and scholars
from the region for study or research at ISIM in
Leiden or elsewhere. NIAASC will also assist in
the implemention of library and documenta-
tion exchange agreements between ISIM and
universities in the region. ♦
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I s l ama ba d , P ak i sta n
M U H A M M AD  K H A L I D  M AS U D
The Government of Pakistan formally established the
Islamic Research Institute in 1960 in accordance with
the provisions of the 1956 Constitution. The Institute
symbolizes the desire of the Muslims in South Asia to
respond to the challenge of modernity from within the
Islamic tradition. Since the nineteenth century there
have been two approaches to this challenge. The con-
servatives opposed modernity and stood for reviving
and preserving tradition. The modernists were in favour
of accepting the challenge of modernity and aspired to
the reconstruction of a modern society on the basis of
Islamic principles. In 1930 Allama Iqbal proposed a sep-
arate homeland for the Muslims in India and also found-
ed an institute in Lahore for research on Islam.
I s l a m i c
R e s e a r c h
I n s t i t u t e
The need for and relevance of research on
Islam was felt more intensely after the creation
of Pakistan in 1947. The institutions of the new
Muslim State had to be creatively developed
primarily out of the Muslims’ own intellectual
resources rather than copied from others. The
need to know and explain Islam in depth and
work out its implications for human thought
and action in the present-day world was there-
fore self-evident.
For a proper reconstruction of Muslim soci-
ety it was considered imperative that Islamic
scholarship should engage itself in serious
study and research in the fields of Qur'anic
s c i e n c e s , Hadith, Islamic law and jurisprudence,
history, culture, philosophy, Tasawwuf and var-
ious other Islamic subjects. It was important not
only to review their development in the past
but also to draw the blueprint for the future
development of Muslim thought to meet the
requirements of a dynamic Muslim society.
The 1949 Objective Resolution by the Pak-
istan Constituent Assembly reflected these
needs, saying, ‘wherein the Muslims will be
enabled to lead life in the individual and col-
lective spheres in accord with the teaching and
requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy
Qur'an and the Sunna'. To achieve this objec-
tive, therefore, the Constituent Assembly pro-
posed the establishment of the Islamic
Research Institute in 1952.
The first Constitution of the Islamic Republic
of Pakistan in 1956 provided under Article 197-
(1) that the President ‘shall set up an organiza-
tion for Islamic Research and instruction in
advanced studies to assist in the reconstruc-
tion of Muslim Society on a truly Islamic basis’.
The Federal Law Minister, accordingly,
announced the establishment of the Institute
on March 10, 1960. 
The objectives of the Institute were defined
as follows:
1 . To define Islam in terms of its fundamentals in
a rational and liberal manner and to empha-
size, among others, the basic Islamic ideals of
universal brotherhood, tolerance and social
j u s t i c e ;
2 . To interpret the teachings of Islam in such a
way as to bring out its dynamic character in
the context of the intellectual and scientific
progress of the modern world;
3 . To carry out research on the contribution of
Islam to thought, science and culture with a
view to enabling the Muslims to recapture
an eminent position in these fields; and
4 . To take appropriate measures for organizing
and encouraging research in Islamic history,
philosophy, law and jurisprudence, etc.
Quite clearly, the Institute was envisioned as
a liberal and rational research organization.
The 1962 Constitution (Art. 207) confirmed
almost the same position, defining the Func-
tion of the Institute ‘to undertake Islamic
research and instruction in Islam for the pur-
pose of assisting in the construction of Muslim
society on a truly Islamic basis’.
This was the period when Dr Fazlur Rahman
(1919-1988), a graduate of Oxford University,
was invited to join the Institute as Director. He
was teaching at McGill University, Montreal,
Canada, at the time. The main objective of the
Institute was to develop a methodology for sci-
entific research in various fields. To accomplish
these goals, Dr Fazlur Rahman gathered
together a group of scholars who represented
not only various disciplines but also different
Islamic orientations. This group represented
different Islamic schools of thought and ethnic
and provincial diversity in Pakistan. In addition
to their training in traditional Islamic learning,
all had to have a degree in a modern discipline:
for e.g. economy, sociology, political science,
etc. These scholars had also advanced degrees
from renowned universities in the West. Sever-
al were sent to USA and Canada. The general
milieu at the Institute, especially at the semi-
nars, deliberately encouraged academic dis-
cussion and free exchange of views.
The results of the research work were pub-
lished in books, monographs and research
reports. The Institute also began publishing its
own research journals: Fikr-o Nazar (Urdu), A l -
Dirasat al-Islamiyyah (Arabic), Islamic Studies
(English) and S a n d h a n (Bengali). In addition,
two popular periodicals, U m m a h (English) and
Nida-I Millat (Urdu) were also published. The
first three periodicals have been publishing
continuously as quarterly journals.
For research, a Master Plan was prepared in
1965. The Institute also assisted in legislation
work. It examined and provided research
materials for the drafting of various laws. It
assisted the Islamic Advisory Council, which
would advise the National Assembly. Pakistan
Family Laws, legislated in 1962, represented a
liberal interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunna.
The conservatives opposed these laws as they
restricted polygamy and gave rights to women
that traditional Islamic law did not allow. The
Institute found itself the target of hostile pro-
paganda. Fazlur Rahman was called Abu’l Fazl,
the notorious Vizier of the Mughal emperor
Akbar who supposedly instituted a new reli-
g i o n .
Fazlur Rahman’s book Islam, a general intro-
d u c t i o n, essentially written as a defence of
Islam against Western critics, triggered contro-
versy. A population with 25 % literacy took to
the streets protesting against a book that most
of them could not and had not read. Political
opposition to Ayyub took advantage of the sit-
uation. The Ulama declared Rahman a heretic.
Agitation began first in Dacca, the constituen-
cy of Mawlana Ihtishamul Haq Thanawi who
was leading this protest against Rahman and
Ayyub Kahn. Countrywide disturbances in
1969 led Ayyub Khan to resign. Rahman was
forced to leave the country, and taught at the
University of Chicago until his death in 1988.
This was a tragic experience for the Institute.
The role of the Institute and its collaboration
with the government in the modernization of
Pakistani society was criticized widely. The
Ulama suspected research on Islam. Conse-
quently, the Institute was relegated to a low
profile. The 1973 Constitution excluded the
article about the Institute. More research staff
with Madrasa training was recruited. The
research emphasis also shifted. All these
changes could still not earn the approval of the
orthodoxy. The Institute was attached to the
newly formed Ministry of Religious Affairs. The
objectives of the Institute were redefined
reflecting a subtle change in its research orien-
tation. Among the new objectives that were
notified in 1979 by the Ministry of Religious
Affairs are:
1 . To undertake and promote research on a
continuing basis on the socio-economic,
administrative, legal and political aspects of
a Muslim society and polity, with particular
reference to Pakistan, with a view to their
reconstruction on a truly Islamic basis, and to
conduct surveys, seminars and symposia for
this purpose.
2 . To study the contemporary problems of the
World of Islam including the causes leading
to the decline of Muslim power and influ-
ence, to suggest solutions for those prob-
lems in the light of injunctions and teachings
of Islam and their application to different
aspects of a progressive Muslim society and
p o l i t y .
3 . To provide information, advice and consulta-
tion to the Council of Islamic Ideology, Min-
istries and other agencies on matters
referred to, and falling within the purview of
the Institute.
4 . To advise and assist the Shariat Faculty of the
Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad, in the
planning and formulation of the curriculum
of that Faculty and also to provide on
request the services of the Institute’s schol-
ars and academic staff for part-time teaching
and instruction at the Quaid-I- Azam Univer-
s i t y .
This was the period when the process of
Islamization in Pakistan began. The Institute
became fully engaged in the process. It trans-
lated required materials from Arabic into Urdu,
prepared and taught courses for the training of
judges and assisted various government
departments in this regard. It also served as a
part of the Faculty of Sharicah, recently estab-
lished in the Quaid-I-Azam University, Islam-
abad in 1979 to train judges in the new system.
In addition to a publication programme, the
Institute has also followed an intensive pro-
gramme of workshops, seminars, conferences
and symposia on various aspects of Islamiza-
t i o n .
In 1980, the Government of Pakistan estab-
lished an Islamic University as a part of the
Islamization programme. This establishment
coincided with the resolve of the Organization
of the Islamic Countries to Islamize knowledge.
In 1979, the OIC committees recommended
the establishment of Islamic Universities in var-
ious parts of the world. An International Islam-
ic University was founded in Malaysia.
In Pakistan, the Faculty of Sharicah at the
Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad was
upgraded to Islamic University. The Islamic
Research Institute, which was already support-
ing the Faculty, was merged with the Universi-
ty. The University was redesigned as an Inter-
national Islamic University in 1985. The posi-
tion of the Institute was further reduced in
1987 when its affairs were centralized in the
University administration.
In recent years, workshops have been held
on such topics as technical editing, the preser-
vation of manuscripts, and medical ethics.
International seminars on ‘Mutual Perceptions
of Islam and the West’, ‘Islamic Thought in the
Eighteenth Century’ and the forthcoming con-
ference on Imam Abu Hanifah in October 1998,
illustrate the vitality and variety of interests in
the Institute. In order to supervise and control
the administrative and research policies of the
Institute, a Board of Governors was constituted
from time to time. The members were selected
from the judiciary, administration, universities
and scholars. Since 1980 the Board has been
re-designated as a Council and since 1985 the
President of IIUI chairs the Council. The Direc-
tor General of the Institute provides leadership
in research projects. Research staff in the Insti-
tute is divided into five units of research. The
research positions are divided into the follow-
ing grades: lecturer, assistant professor, associ-
ate professor, and professor. Most of them
hold PhD degrees. Presently the Institute has
nineteen scholars on its research staff.
The Institute collaborates with other similar
national and international academic institu-
tions in its research projects. The administra-
tion of the Institute is divided into the follow-
ing units: finance, general administration,
accounts, audit, press and publication. The
Institute has its own printing press with the fol-
lowing facilities: typesetting, filming, plate
making, offset printing and binding. The Insti-
tute has a library with more than 95,000 vol-
umes of books, 750 periodicals, more than 262
manuscripts, 1,150 reproductions and 564
microfilms. Nearly 25,000 users per year visit
the Library. ♦
Dr Muhammad Khalid Masud is professor at
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E-mail: mkmasud@irseminar.sdnpk.org
Postal: Islamic Research Institute,




Montr ea l ,  C ana da
A.  U N E R  T U R G A Y
D i r e c t o r Institute of
I s l a m i c S t u d i e s
The Institute is a teaching unit of the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research concerned with
the disciplined study of Islamic civilization
throughout the scope of its history and geo-
graphical spread. It pays attention to the origins
of Islam, to the rise of the civilization in which
Islam was the vivifying factor, to the forces
which shaped the civilization, and the changes it
had undergone. It is also concerned with the
contemporary dynamics of the Islamic world as
Muslims seek to relate their heritage from the
past to the present. Courses, seminars and
research facilities are offered in Islamic lan-
guages (Arabic, Turkish, Persian and Urdu);
Islamic history; the social and economic institu-
tions of Islam; Islamic thought; and modern
developments in various regions in various
regions of the Islamic world.
The work of the Institute is carried out as a
joint effort, bringing together Muslims and non-
Muslims in an attempt to understand Islamic civ-
ilization. The teaching staff and students of the
Institute include Muslims and non-Muslims from
a number of countries. This strongly internation-
al atmosphere at the Institute provides an
opportunity for face-to-face exchange among
scholars at various levels. During the course of
the academic year, the Institute frequently
invites prominent scholars in the field of Islamic
studies to give lectures which are also open to
the public.
Throughout its history, the Institute has
provided a special outreach service that has
brought students to its portals from a number
of African, Asian and Middle Eastern coun-
tries. An important feature of such efforts has
been the exchange of visiting professors,
which has helped in establishing firm links
with many important Muslim universities.
These efforts have been supported, among
others, by the Canadian International Devel-
opment Agency (CIDA), the Ford Foundation,
the Rockefeller Foundation and the Aga Khan
F o u n d a t i o n .
The Islamic Studies Library (ISL) has grown
from a modest departmental collection to one
of the most important in the field, containing
over 100,000 volumes. The ISL is a research
library, with a reference section as well; and is
intended to be of primary use to postgraduate
students and faculty. The ISL’s collection can
be divided into three major categories: print-
ed, manuscript and audio visual material. All
three categories consist of material in Euro-
pean and Islamic languages: English, French,
German, Dutch, Spanish, Italian and Russian; as
well as Arabic, Persian, Turkish (Ottoman and
modern), Urdu and Indonesian. The collection
is primarily a reflection of the academic inter-
ests of the Institute; as well as teaching and
research in Qu'ranic Exegesis, Tradition,
Jurisprudence, Philosophy, Theology, Sufism,
Shi'ite thought, History and Modern Develop-
ments in the Muslim world, and instruction in
the various Islamic languages. ♦
Professor A. Uner Turgay
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Be rl i n ,  Ger ma ny
U L R I C H  H AA R M A N N
D i r e c t o r
The Centre for Modern Oriental Studies is an interdisci-
plinary institute dedicated to historical, social and cul-
tural research on the Middle East, South Asia and Africa.
Beyond its own research projects it establishes and sup-
ports networks between related research programmes
and institutions both within and outside the universities,
both on a regional and interregional level. Evolving from
a section of the Academy of Sciences of the GDR, it was
re-established in 1992, initially under the auspices of the
Max Planck Society. Since January 1996, the Centre has
been part of the newly formed ‘Verein Geisteswis-
senschaftliche Zentren Berlin e.V.’ (Reg. Society for
Research Centres in the Humanities), whose members
are, among others, the three major Berlin universities
and several academies of science. Its budget is partially
provided by the State of Berlin, while current research
projects are mostly funded by the German Research
Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft).
McGill University’s Institute of Islamic Studies was
founded along with the Institute of Islamic Studies
Library in 1952. Both have been housed on the main




The current overall research theme of the
Centre is Dissociation and Appropriation in
Response to Globalization: Asia, Africa and
Europe since the 18th Century. This programme
addresses local or regional perceptions, adap-
tations and consequences of global processes
and discourses in historical and comparative
perspective. Its geographical focus is on those
regions which have been strongly shaped by
the colonial encounter and by the postcolonial
experience. The overall programme comprises
three group projects, each consisting of sever-
al sub-projects. Group Project One, Islam and
G l o b a l i z a t i o n, examines the Muslims’ percep-
tions of the ‘West’ and their reactions to het-
erogeneous rhythms of change in modern his-
tory. Group Project Two, on Agents of Change,
investigates individuals and groups acting at
cultural interfaces. The focus is on their own
perspectives, their identities as brokers, and
their influence on societal change. Group Pro-
ject Three, Locality and the State, analyses the
construction of localized social order in the
context of the world-wide expansion and cur-
rent transformation of the territorial state.
Group Project 1:
Islam and Globalization.
Perceptions and Reactions in
the 19th and 20th Century
This multidisciplinary group project analy-
ses the cognitive processing of the experi-
ence of globalization in the Islamic world in a
comparative perspective. It is focused on the
perception of globalizing processes by Mus-
lims and on their responses to the heteroge-
neous rhythms of change in global history. Of
special interest are groups which experi-
enced, in particularly intensive ways, the
fragility of boundaries between ‘we’ and
‘them’, ‘indigenous’ and ‘alien’, ‘old’ and
‘new’, ‘faith’ and ‘hypocrisy’, ‘Islamic World’
and ‘the West’ at turning points of global his-
tory (notably travellers, migrants, politicians,
the military, and intellectuals). 
Group Project 2:
Agents of Change: Biographical
Studies and Group Portraits of
Conflict and Synthesis between
Oriental and Occidental
C u l t u r e s
Combining case studies from Asia and
Africa, the project looks at individual and
social agents acting at the interfaces of com-
peting cultures and facilitating changes in a
variety of ways. They operated under the influ-
ence of indigenous tradition, Western mod-
ernization, capitalist development and colo-
nial rule. In the different sub-projects, bio-
graphical studies and group portraits are
undertaken ranging from the eighteenth to
the mid-twentieth century. They focus on peo-
ple who lived and acted between oriental
society and occidental influences, where
domains of difference overlapped and com-
posite identities were constantly re-negotiat-
ed. In the current (second) stage of the pro-
ject, the contribution of these agents to social
and cultural change, the perception and
understanding of their own role in this
process are highlighted. In a comparative
approach, the project intends to study the
similarities and variations among the cases
examined. The process of cultural mediation
resulted in both integration and confronta-
tion, creating new forms of cultural articula-
tion, not traditional in the narrow sense and
not necessarily Western. Conceptually, the
project seeks to point out how cultural and
civilizational influences that were initiated or
absorbed by these agents, coexisted and were
synthesized rather than confronted and
excluded. 
Group Project 3:
Locality and the State.
T h e Construction of Spatial and
Social Order in Modern African
and Asian History
The project seeks to advance and substanti-
ate empirically the debate on relations between
globalization and localization among social and
cultural scientists. Locality is understood here as
a changing frame of reference of social actors
who define, through practice and cognition,
their position and limits in space, and constitute
local communities in the process. The project
explores the cultural construction and socio-
political negotiation of small-scale (sub-nation-
al) identities and boundaries in selected areas of
Africa and Asia. It addresses these processes in a
long-term historical perspective, situating them
in the context of the global emergence and
recent transformation of the territorial state and
of alternative forms of global integration,
notably religion. Six case studies are carried out
on the basis of empirical fieldwork, archival
research and analysis of locally produced texts.
The cases refer to areas in Afghanistan,
Cameroon, Lebanon, Malawi, Nigeria, North
India, Tanzania and Zambia and aim at interre-
gional comparison.
Further research might include projects about
the production of historical knowledge and net-
works within the Islamic World, both in a histor-
ical and contemporary perspective. A special
emphasis will be laid upon areas of cultural and
intercultural encounter.
Beyond the group projects listed above, the
Centre hosts numerous research activities and is
engaged in academic networks, partly in coop-
eration with local and international academic
institutions. 
The Centre also takes part in the activities of
the research association Modernity and Islam
(head office: c/o Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin)
which for example provides post-doctoral
grants especially for scholars from the Islamic
World and which organizes summer schools.
Within the context of the Zaytouna Pro-
gramme the Centre will host students from
Tunisia planning to graduate in religious studies
at one of Berlin’s universities.
The Centre’s activities are complemented by a
regular series of public lectures, conferences
and workshops related to the current research
topics and the presence of visiting scholars
notably from Africa, Southern Asia and the Mid-
dle East.
A list of the Centre’s publications which are
currently available may be requested at the
address mentioned above. ♦
Director: Prof. dr Ulrich Haarmann
D-14129 Berlin
Kirchweg 33
( M i t t e l h o f )
Tel: +49 (0) 30 80307 – 0
Fax: +49 (0) 30 80307 – 210
E-mail: zmo@rz.hu-berlin.de
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M a s t e r c l a s s
Re sea rc h Sc ho o l C N WS
L e i d e n
The Research School CNWS of Leiden University, was
established in 1988 through the collaborative efforts of
the Faculty of Arts and the Faculty of Social Sciences of
Leiden University. Since its inception, other research
institutes and universities have also amalgamated with






Several research projects are carried out
under the umbrella of the Research School
CNWS. These are grouped into seventeen sep-
arate research clusters. All the research clusters
are based on one or more academic disci-
plines. Apart from two mono-disciplinary clus-
ters in the field of lingusitics, the others are
inter-disciplinary, and organized either region-
ally or thematically. The main reason for this is
to provide fresh stimuli for research.
In the context of its new advanced master’s
programme, the research school CNWS, which
is host to almost all Ph.D. research on Islamic
studies in the universities of Leiden, Utrecht
and Nijmegen, organizes a masterclass on the
subject of
Good Government and Just
Order – Traditional Elements in
Contemporary Islamic Political
D i s c o u r s e
The goal of the class is to analyse the way
traditional values survive in, or are used (and
transformed) by contemporary political move-
ments which purport to be ‘Islamic’ and to
place this in the wider context of the political
use of religious concepts as ideological capital.
The theme of the class can be described as fol-
l o w s :
The twin processes of modernization (after
European and American models) and global-
ization have generated reactions all over the
Islamic world. These reactions in many cases
are not simply ‘reactionary’ – they form a part
of the modernization process itself and try to
formulate answers to thoroughly modern
questions. But nevertheless, in many of these
reactive movements a claim is staked that they
represent a just, or good, and at the same time
traditional and Islamic, order which is different
from such ‘alien’ systems as capitalism or com-
munism. The claim to represent traditional val-
ues is reflected in the terminology they use.
The Welfare Party in Turkey, which at one time
was called ‘National Order Party’ (Millî Nizam
P a r t i s i) and then ‘National Salvation Party’ (M i l l î
Selamet Partisi), calls for a ‘just order’ (A d i l
d ü z e n); the leader of Afghanistan’s Taliban
claims the title of ‘Prince of the Believers’ (A m i r
a l - M u ’ m i n i n); Ayatollah Khomeinî allowed his
followers to call him I m a m, which allowed
identification of his person with the hidden
Imam who would return as the ‘Messiah’
(M a h d i). Sometimes these movements formu-
late their demands in opposition to secularist
and westernist political regimes (as in Algeria,
Egypt or Turkey); sometimes they actually suc-
ceed in establishing their own ‘just order’ (as in
Iran or Afghanistan). 
The masterclass will try to establish to what
extent the discourse and terminology used by
Islamic movements of this type really reflects
traditional thinking (in the sense of views on
government and social order demonstrably
current before the introduction of Western
ideologies in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries) and to what extent we are faced by
traditional ‘packaging’ of modern concepts
derived from socialism, the ‘human rights’ dis-
course or, for instance, ‘tièrs mondisme’.
The class will be held on six consecutive
mornings from 22 to 27 February 1999. The
course convener is Prof. Dr Erik-Jan Zürcher,
who holds the chair of Turkish studies at Lei-
den University. The class will be taught by two
eminent specialists, Prof. Serif Mardin of the
American University in Washington, DC, who is
the leading authority on Islamic movements in
modern Turkey and the author of Religion and
social change in modern Turkey. The case of
Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (Albany, 1989) and
Prof. Shahrough Akhavi of the University of
South Carolina, the eminent specialist on polit-
ical-religious relations in Iran and the author of
Religion and politics in contemporary Iran: cler-
gy-state relations in the Pahlavi period ( A l b a n y ,
1980). Dr Alexander de Groot, who teaches
Turkish Islam at Leiden University and Prof. Dr
Johan ter Haar, the chair of Iranian studies
there, will act as discussants.
The course load is 3 credits (of forty hours).
Students will report verbally on the literature
they studied for each seminar. In addition they
will write a comparative essay of 3000 words
on either the use of one concept or term in sev-
eral movements, or the changing meaning of a
particular concept over time in one area. ♦
Information can be obtained either from the CNWS
(Luning@rullet.leidenuniv.nl) or from the course
convener (zurcher@rullet.leidenuniv.nl).
Le id en,  The  Nether l a nds
G I L L I A N  VO G E L S A N G
D i r e c t o r
The Stichting Textile Research Centre, Leiden, with the
help of the National Museum of Ethnology, Leiden, and
the University of Leiden has the stated aim of support-
ing academic research into textiles and costume. As part
of this work the Centre is building up a collection of
Near Eastern and Iranian Costume which will shortly be
made available for study purposes.
Texti le Research Centre
Near Eastern and
Iranian Costume
At present the Centre houses over 500 items
of clothing, and includes both traditional and
modern Islamic garments for men, women
and children.
One of the aims of the Centre is to publish a
series of illustrated books about regional cos-
tumes from various Islamic countries. The geo-
graphical range will be from Morocco to
A f g h a n i s t a n .
The ‘fashion parade’ from a recent exhibi-
tion about Islamic clothing for women (Sluiers
Ontsluierd), organized by the National Muse-
um of Ethnology, Leiden and the Stichting
Textile Research Centre.
The main project at the moment includes
the organization of an exhibition and the pro-
duction of a book about urban and regional
costume in Iran. This work is being supported
by Shell. In addition the Centre intends to pro-
duce at least two other books with an Iranian
theme, one on 19t h century photographs of
Iranians, and one on Qajar costume. It is the
intention that these books will be published in
Iran and will be available both in Farsi and
E n g l i s h .
Other projects being carried out by the Cen-
tre include a study of Moroccan bridal tradi-
tions in Morocco and the Netherlands; cloth-
ing worn by Muslim women in the Nether-
lands, and the role of clothing in the political
life of Pakistan. ♦
For further information about the Centre
a n di t s work, please contact 
Dr Gillian Vogelsang-Eastwood,
Director, Stichting Textile Research Centre,
P.O. Box 212, 2300 AE Leiden
The Netherlands
Tel/fax: +31 (0) 71 541 8442
E-mail: Vogelsang@Rullet.LeidenUniv.nl
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Univ er s i ty L ib r ar y,  L ei den
AR N OU D  V RO L I JK
More than four centuries ago, the University Library in
Leiden started collecting Arabic manuscripts and print-
ed books. Although there are other university libraries
in the Netherlands which have collections in the field of




International Book FairThe acquisition of Arabic books and manu-
scripts has always had its problems. Booksellers
in the Netherlands have never been able to sup-
ply Arabic titles, except when a local publisher
took the trouble to produce them (fortunately,
quite a large number of publishers did so, most
notably firms like Brill or Elzevier). Direct pur-
chasing from the Middle East has never been
anything but difficult, dependent as we were on
Dutch merchants residing in the Middle East or
consular agents. Fortunately, this situation
appeared to change for the better, when, in the
1970’s, a bookseller in Beirut started distributing
catalogues containing the best of what was
available in the Arab World, and who could also
conduct his correspondence with our Acquisi-
tions Department in English. The Lebanese civil
war put an end to all this: the books kept coming
from Beirut (after the local militias had levied
their export fees), but the bookseller himself had
moved to Cyprus. When, in addition to this,
financial transactions became impossible, we
were confronted with the awkward situation
that we received bills we could not pay, and
books we had not ordered but could not return
because the mail service to Lebanon had been
discontinued. By 1986, we had so much of our
assets tied up that it became unworkable.
In 1987, Jan Just Witkam, curator of Oriental
Collections at Leiden University Library, paid a
visit to the International Arab Book Fair in Cairo.
Booksellers and publishers from all over the Arab
World participate in this yearly fair, not only
putting their books on display but also selling
them to the public at attractive discounts.
Witkam decided it would be worthwile to send
someone over from Leiden to see if direct pur-
chasing would work. If it did, we would have the
additional benefit of cutting out all the ‘middle-
men’, an attractive proposition from the point of
cost effectiveness. The only thing was that the
amount of purchased books would have to be
fairly high, in order to reduce overhead costs
(travelling expenses etcetera) to a minimum per
title.
This was all very well, but how could we get
the books out of Egypt? In the oldest bureacracy
in the world it often seems that everything is ille-
gal unless expressly permitted, and as far as we
knew we needed an export permit. For this we
called upon the service of the Netherlands (now
Netherlands/Flemish) Institute for Archaeology
and Arabic Studies at Cairo. The Institute turned
out to be quite willing to help us to obtain the
necessary permits and to despatch the books in
the mail. The Leiden Library representative
could also enjoy the Institute’s hospitality in
return for a nominal fee (cost effectiveness!).
In 1988, less than six months after I entered
the service of the Library, I went to Cairo to visit
the Book Fair. Everyday the Institute’s chauffeur
drove me to the fair grounds in Medinet Nasr, a
Cairo suburb. I checked the stands of booksellers
and publishers from countries like Egypt, Syria,
Iraq, Tunisia and Morocco, and I bought every-
thing that looked new and interesting. When I
ran out of money I returned to Leiden, leaving
the books in the care of the Institute. Three
months later, I received the five hundred titles I
had bought via the post.
Until now this procedure has remained basi-
cally unaltered. Local purchasing appears to be
cheap enough to defray all extra expenses, and I
have found the Cairo Book Fair to be a veritable
goldmine, especially for titles from smaller pub-
lishing houses, or other titles on out-of-the-way
subjects that do not usually find their way into
the catalogues of the regular booksellers. 
Nevertheless, doing business in the Middle
East does have its surprises. I was, for instance, in
Cairo at the Book Fair when the second Gulf War
broke out. Notwithstanding the fact that Cairo is
further from Baghdad than Amsterdam from
Moscow, most airlines discontinued their ser-
vices immediately. The first to give up was KLM,
our national pride. Eventually, I flew home with
Austrian Airlines, almost the only company that
was still ‘in the air’, presumably, as rumour had it,
because Austria’s excellent relations with Iraq
safeguarded Austrian aircraft from being
attacked by Iraqi missiles.
A few years later my books took unusually
long to arrive. Enquiring at Cairo’s General Post
Office produced a formal declaration with many
brightly coloured official stamps, stating ‘that
the books in question were already in my pos-
session’. After months of waiting the Egyptian
Mail delivered a great number of parcels on my
doorstep with ‘University of Tokyo’ on the labels.
Immediately I wrote to Tokyo, informing them of
this unusual event and politely enquiring if they
had received my books. They had indeed and in
the end everybody received their own books (to
the detriment of cost effectiveness however).
This unfortunate incident has prompted us to
engage the services of a private Egyptian courier
service, which works excellently. ♦
Drs Arnoud Vrolijk is assistant curator of Oriental
Collections at the Leiden University Library.
Co nf er enc e R ep o rt
L e i d e n
10  – 1 2  June 1 9 98
N A S R  AB U  ZA Y D
Qur'anic studies, cUlum al-Qur'an, is a multi-disciplinary
field of scholarship. Its development is necessarily gov-
erned by the progress achieved in social sciences in
general and in linguistics, semantics and hermeneutics
in particular. The assumption underlying the idea of the
symposium is that the long history as well as the well-
established tradition of Qur'anic studies in Islamic cul-
ture have been under the great influence of modern
political and cultural changes in the Muslim world. The
twentieth century witnessed the emergence of almost a
new world order, which affected all fields of knowledge.
As for the Muslim world it has been a century of external
as well as internal conflict.
Qur'anic Studies
on the Eve of
the 21s t C e n t u r y
The modern confrontation with Europe, which
started at the end of the eighteenth century, cre-
ated an awareness of an independent identity,
and Islam emerged as a protective weapon
against European imperialism and cultural West-
ernization. This confrontation surely affected
Qur'anic studies both in the East and the West in
different ways. The awareness of Muslim identi-
ty, on the other hand, caused some internal
political and cultural conflict between Islamism
and Modernism, which increased after achieving
political independence. This conflict further acti-
vated the fever of new interpretation and
counter-interpretation of the Qur'an. Modern
trends of social sciences, no matter how differ-
ent they are, are implicitly or explicitly employed
in these interpretations. 
The purpose of the symposium ‘Qur'anic Stud-
ies on the Eve of the 21st Century’ was twofold:
first, to investigate the actual development that
occurred in the field of Qur'anic studies in the
East and in the West during the twentieth centu-
ry; and second, to anticipate the possibilities of
further development in the coming century.
Twenty-three scholars from all over the world
accepted the invitation and submitted outlines
of their contributions. Some sent the text of their
presentations in due time. Unfortunately, two of
the participants, namely Prof. Al-Sharqawi
(Egypt) and Dr Nettler (Oxford) were unable to
attend though they did send their papers. The
former was not present due to sudden illness
and the latter for having been appointed Chair-
man of the Examination Committee.
The five sessions were as follows:
Qur'anic disciplines
(cUlum al-Qur'an)
1. Dr H. Motzki (Nijmegen)
2. Professor Jane Dammen McAuliff (Toronto) 
3. Prof. Dr Hassan Hanafi (Cairo)
4. Prof. G.R. Puin (Saarbrücken)
5. Dr H.C. Graf von Bothmer (Saarbrüken)
Qur'anic Interpretation
in a Modern Context
6. Prof. Dr Stefan Wild (Bonn)
7. Prof. Dr Hussein Nassar (Cairo)
8. Prof. Dr Muhammad Shahrour (Damascus)
9. Dr Enes Karic (Sarajevo)
10. Dr Fred Leemhuis (Groningen)
Textual Analysis
11. Dr Abdulkader I. Tayob (South Africa)
12. Dr Amin Abdullah (Yogyakarta)
13. Prof. M. Shabstari (Iran)
Literary Interpretation
14. Dr Muhammad Mahmud (Sudan/USA)
15. Prof. Dr Andrew Rippen (Calgary)
16. Drs Mohammad Nur Kholis (Yogyakarta)
17. Dr Navid Kirmani (Cologne)
18. Prof. Dr Nasr Abu Zayd (Cairo/Leiden)
Political Interpretation
19. Dr Johannes J.G. Jansen (Leiden)
20. Dr Bari Azmi (New Delhi)
21. Dr Osman Tastan (Ankara)
At the final session a number of interesting
observations were made. It was pointed out that
in Qur'anic studies, the periphery of the Muslim
world (especially South Africa, Indonesia, and
Bosnia) does not closely follow the geographical
centre, but largely goes its own way, taking in
and digesting a broad spectrum of modern cul-
tural and scholarly influences, without neglect-
ing to consider the results and conclusions of
traditional Qur'anic scholarship. Also, the very
mixed group of scholars that came together for
this occasion had no trouble communicating:
the old clichés of orientalists versus Muslims
seem very much to be a thing of the past. In a
way this is not surprising: orientalists, like most
other nineteenth century scholars, believed that
the end of religion – Islam not excepted – was at
hand, and today we know better. Also, looking
to the Qur'anic text from a literary and aesthetic
point of view seems to be gaining importance
amongst modern researchers in this field. It is
difficult to escape the conclusion that this
approach may be the approach of the future.
The proceedings of the symposium are to be
published in the form of a book as soon as the
final texts are submitted at the end of Septem-
ber, and the negotiation with publishers is con-
cluded.♦
Dr Nasr Abu Zayd is visiting professor of Islamic Studies
at Leiden University.
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International Conference on Muslim Identity
in the 21st Century: Challenges of Modernity
Date: 31-10-98 to 1-11-98
Location: School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS),
University of London
Congress Site: h t t p : / / w w w . i c - e l . o r g / i i s
P.O. Box 8148, London, NW6 7ZS, England, UK, 92 The Avenue,
London, NW6 7NN, UK
Tel: +44 181-495 1000
Fax: +44 181-830 4013
I i s . u k @ v i r g i n . n e t
The West and the Gulf
Date: 2-11-98 to 5-11-98
Location: Wilton Park, West Sussex, United Kingdom
Congress Site:
http: //www.fco.gov.uk/reference/wilton_park/index.html
Organizer: Wilton Park Conferences
Contact Person: Mrs. Elizabeth Harris
Wiston House, Steyning, West Sussex BN44 3DZ, United Kingdom
w i l t o n @ p a v i l i o n . c o . u k
Earnings Inequality, Unemployment and Poverty
i n t h e Middle East and North Africa
Date: 5-11-98 to 7-11-98
Location: School of Business of Lebanese American University, Byblos,
L e b a n o n
Contact Person: Dr. Ghassan Dibeh
Organizing Committee Chair, 475 Riverside Drive, 
#1846, New York, NY 10115, USA
i c e u p @ b y b l o s . l a u . e d u . l b
Sufi Psychology Association West Coast C o n f e r e n c e :
T h e Science of the Soul
Date: 5-11-98 to 7-11-98
Location: Berkeley, California, USA
Congress Site: http: //www.sufi-psychology.org
Contact Person: Lynn Wilcox
P.O. Box 19922, Sacramento CA 95825
tel: 1 800 338 1467
fax: 1 916 923 1201
s u f i p s y @ p a c b e l l . n e t
Ottoman Law
Date: 6-11-98 to 7-11-98
Location: Binghamton, NY, USA
k e y d e r @ b o u n . e d u . t r
d q u a t a e r @ b i n g h a m t o n . e d u
Landscape Perspectives on Palestine,
A n International Conference
Date: 12-11-98 to 15-11-98
Faculty of Arts, Birzeit University
Congress Site: http: //www.birzeit.edu/conferences/landscape/
Faculty of Arts, Birzeit University, P.O. Box 14, 
Birzeit, Palestine (via Israel)
fax: +972 2 9957656
l a n d @ a r t s . b i r z e i t . e d u
Peacemaking and Negotiations
in the Arab-Israeli Conflict
Date: 17-11-98 to 18-11-98
Location: Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations
at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem
Contact Person: Ms. Laura Wharton
The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations.
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem, Israel
m s d a v i s @ m s c c . h u j i . a c . i l
http: //atar.mscc.huji.ac.il/~davis
The Middle East Studies Association
of Northern America 32nd Annual Meeting
Date: 3-12-98 to 6-12-98
Chicago, USA
Organizer: MESA Office
University of Arizona, 1643 East Helen St. Tucson, Arizona 85721, USA
m e s a n a @ u . a r i z o n a . e d u
http: //www.mesa.arizona.edu
First International Conference
on Islamic Development Management
Date: 8-12-98 to 12-12-98
School of Social Science, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang
I d m p @ u s m . m y
Manufacturing Heritage/Consuming Tradition:
Development, Preservation, and Tourism in the Age
o f G l o b a l i z a t i o n
6th Conference of the International Association of
T r a n s n a t i o n a lE n v i r o n m e n t s
Date: 15-12-98 to 19-12-98
Location: Cairo, Egypt
i a s t e @ e c d . b e r k l e y . e d u
The Islamic Marriage Contract
Date: 29-1-99 to 31-1-99
Harvard Law School
Congress Site: http: //www.law.harvard.edu/Programs/ILSP
Pound Hall 501, Harvard Law School, Cambridge MA 02138
tel: +1 617 496 3941
fax: +1 617 496 2707
i l s p @ l a w . h a r v a r d . e d u
International Congress of Mulla Sadra (Iran)
Date: 23-5-99 to 27-5-99
Congress Site: http: //www.iranpac.net.ir/sadra/index.htm
M u l l a s a d r a @ w w w . d c i . c o . i r
http: //www.iranpac.net.ir /sadra/index.htm
Middle East Encounters with European Enlightenment
Date: 26-7-99 to 31-7-99, Dublin, Republic of Ireland
e k h t i a r @ o s w e g o . e d u
The 11th International Congress of Turkish Art (ICTA-XI)
Date: 30-8-99 to 4-9-99
Location: Utrecht, The Netherlands
Congress Site: http: //www.let.uu.nl/oosters/icta0.ht
I C T A - X I @ l e t . u u . n l
The XIXth Intern. Congress of Historical Sciences in O s l o
Specialized Theme Session: Muslim Societies over the Centuries
Date: 1-8-2000 to 2-8-2000 / Location: Oslo, Norway
A D V E R T I S E M E N T
Academic Meetings
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1
E D I T O R I A L  P A G E
E d i t o r i a l
by Dick Douwes
2
I n t r o d u c t i o n
by Prof. Dr W.A.L. Stokhof
2
Obituary Dr J.K.M. Gevers
2
I S I M  N E W S
Research Approaches and
Thematic Profile
International Institute for the Study of Islam
in the Modern World
3
A Short Description of the ISIM
4
R E G I O N A L  I S S U E S
Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad




Moves Toward Conflict Resolution in Sudan
6
Mamadou Diouf
Paths of Islam in Senegal
7
Lamin Sanneh












Educational Debate in Egypt
1 2
Jonathan Benthall
The Qu'ran’s Call to Alms
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Women in the Workplace Today
In the United Arab Emirates
1 7
Poroma Rebello
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2 0
Gabrielle van den Berg
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Shadow Puppet Theatre and Islam
i n I n d o n e s i a
2 3
Bram Pols
In Search of the Muslim Consumer:
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2 4
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2 6
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2 7
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Ulrike Freitag
The Significance of Studying
a Trade Diaspora
3 0
F O R U M
C.M. Naim
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Enemies from within or Fellow-Citizens?
3 2
P E O P L E
Taslima Nasrin
The Threat of Intolerance:
Religious Extremism
3 3
P U B L I C A T I O N S
Frederick Mathewson Denny
Review Essay: Contemporary Muslim




Modernity, Psychoanalysis, and Islam
3 5
Azza Karam 
Women, Islamisms and the State:
Contemporary Feminisms in Egypt
3 5
Bruce B. Lawrence
Shattering the Myth: Islam beyond Violence
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Bassam Tibi
The Challenge of Fundamentalism:
Political Islam and the New World Disorder
3 6
R E S E A R C H  P R O J E C T S
Sato Tsugitaka
Islamic Area Studies Project
University of Tokyo
3 7
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Islam Tropical Project
3 7
University of California, USA
University of California Humanities Research
Institute: Multiyear Research Initiative
o n Islam and Muslims
3 8
R E S E A R C H  S U R V E Y S
Caroline Angenent and
A n n e k e B r e e d v e l d
Power and the Study
of Islam South of the Sahara
3 9
A guide to recent Dutch Research
on Islam and Muslim Societies
4 0
Ekkehard Rudolph
Survey of Islamic Studies in Germany
4 0
Knut Vikør
Research on Islam in the Nordic Countries
4 1
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Herman De Ley
The Centre for Islam in Europe (CIE)
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Centre for Modern Oriental Studies
4 4
A. Uner Turgay
Institute of Islamic Studies
(Mc Gill University)
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C o n t e n t s
The International Institute for
t h e Study of Islam in the Modern
World (ISIM) promotes and
conducts interdisciplinary
research on contemporary social
and intellectual trends and
movements in Muslim societies
and communities. It emerged from
the need to further research on
developments of great intellectual,
social, and political importance in
t h e Muslim world. The ISIM’s
research approaches are thus
expressly interdisciplinary and
comparative, covering a large
geographic range which includes
North Africa and the Middle East,
Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia,
South and Southeast Asia, and
(Muslim communities in) the West.
Broad in its scope, the ISIM brings
together all areas of expertise.
